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ABSTRACT
Many challenges exist when considering nuclear power to provide electricity for bases on
the Moon or Mars, including launch safety, landing safety, deployment, control, and protecting
the astronauts from radiation. Examples from the past provide guidance in these areas but surface
operations on another body have never been attempted and rarely studied. This thesis discusses
the risks and design considerations for launching, transporting, landing. and operating a nuclear
fission reactor on the Moon or Mars. A reference mission and reactor were chosen to facilitate
analysis in these areas.
Launching a reactor involves meeting environmental and federal regulations. This
includes an extensive safety analysis of launch to determine if launch accidents pose a serious
risk to the public due to fuel release or inadvertent criticality. The reactor must also be able to
survive the launch conditions without damage. Transport mainly involves protecting the reactor
from damage from meteoroids. The reactor will then land through propulsive means on the
Moon or Mars.
Landing a reactor will also require a safety analysis to determine the consequences of a
landing accident on the Moon or Mars. On the surface, the reactor must be at a location far
enough away from the astronauts to limit radiation exposure to the astronauts from the reactor.
Interaction from ground control and astronauts will be necessary to initiate startup, shutdown,
and to change the power level of the reactor; however, startup and operation of the reactor must
be autonomous due to the communications time lag between Earth and the Moon or Mars.
These are significant challenges but all are feasible given the technology and experience
in nuclear engineering and astronautics that exits today.
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1. Introduction
On January 14, 2004, President George W. Bush announced to the country his new vision for
space exploration in which astronauts will return to the Moon by 2020 and begin living and working there
for extended periods. Utilizing the experience gained in extended manned missions to the Moon, the
President hopes to send humans to Mars and beyond. [11]
President Bush put his words into action and created via Executive Order the Commission on
Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy. The Commission examined both the new
space policy and existing government infrastructure to recommend how to implement the new space
policy. Chief among the proposed recommendations was the need to increase the role of private and non-
profit organizations through competitive contracts to maintain a multi-decadal space program. [41]
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) adopted this recommendation and
issued Broad Agency Announcement 04-01, which awarded 11 research contracts. A combined team of
The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc. and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was
awarded one of these contracts to perform studies called Concept Exploration and Refinement (CE&R).
CE&R examines two areas: Human Lunar Exploration and the design of the Crew Exploration Vehicle
(CEV), the replacement for the Space Shuttle fleet. [18]
As part of the Human Lunar Exploration research, nuclear fission power systems were identified
as a desirable technology. Fission reactors have been designed for space propulsion systems and a few
have been launched and operated in Earth orbit mainly by the former Soviet Union. However, extra-
terrestrial surface power systems have not yet been developed. Previous uses of radioisotope power
sources have created an extensive knowledge base in the areas of launch safety, simple control in Earth
orbit, and reentry behavior but landing a reactor and remote operation on another heavenly body is
unexplored.
In order to explore fully all aspects of a mission to Mars, nuclear surface power must be
examined to determine all the implications of using nuclear power. This thesis examines the mission
risks, reactor design impacts, and mission impacts of nuclear power. The mission shall be divided into
four stages: launch, transport, landing, and surface operations. In the area of surface operations, very little
work has been conducted previously in investigating the deployment, startup, and control of a reactor on
another planet. As a result, proposed methods of performing each of these tasks shall be included. By
examining these areas in detail, the decision of whether to use nuclear power tfor surface applications can
be made with an understanding of the consequences.
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Prior to examining the requirements of launch, transport, and operation, a comparison of nuclear
power to solar power is presented below to explain why nuclear power is a viable if not a superior choice
for space power systems when compared to solar power systems. In addition, a short background on the
previous uses of nuclear power in space is presented. The previous examples of space nuclear reactors
will be referred to often throughout the thesis as a basis for examination of safety.
In Chapter 2, the details of the reference mission to Mars and the reference reactor design are
outlined for use in calculations and as the basis for proposed actions. The reference reactor will also serve
as a tool to recommend general design recommendations for future space reactor designs. Chapter 3
discusses the risks and legal requirements associated with launching nuclear materials. Chapter 4 covers
the risks and mission impacts of transporting a reactor through space. Chapter 5 discusses landing on the
surface of a distant heavenly body. Chapter 6 discusses the risks, operations, and mission impacts of
nuclear power surface operation. Lastly, Chapter 7 will contain general recommendations for space
nuclear reactors for surface power and conclusions.
1.1 The Case for Nuclear Power
Nuclear power as a source of electricity has been a controversy since its inception. To consider
launching it into space and using it on the Moon or Mars might seem preposterous to the public. As there
are many good reasons to use nuclear power, there are also just as many areas of risk and concern. Both
the positives and negatives of using nuclear power in the context of a mission to the Moon or Mars are
presented below for use in the comparison of nuclear to other power systems.
First, there are many areas of concern when considering any radioisotope-based power source.
Manufacture and operation can produce large amounts of radiation and place workers in danger. In
addition, the astronauts must be protected from the radiation created by the reactor. Proliferation is a
major concern. as is the method of control to assure complete safety. In terms of astronautics, the
consequences of a launch accident could be catastrophic and result in the release of the radioisotope into
the environment, negatively affecting the world's population. Nuclear reactors can be very large and
massive, which is a problem because the expense of launching mass into low Earth orbit is tremendous.
Lastly, the cost or development time of a nuclear system for surface power may be prohibitive. Therefore,
the benefits of a nuclear power system must far outweigh these disadvantages.
Nuclear power sources are superior to other systems in terms of lifetime, environment tolerance,
and flexibility. For example, radioisotope-based power systems, such as radioisotope thermal generators
(RTG), can be designed to provide hundreds of watts of power for a long lifetime due to the predictable
radioactive decay process, 0.8% power loss per year [6]. RTGs launch in the past have operated for more
than 30 years. Solar arrays have lifetime degradation equal to one minus the yearly degradation rate raised
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to the life of the satellite. Nuclear reactors can provide up to megawatts of power and can be designed to
operate at full power for anywvhere between 2 and 30 years, depending on the needs of the mission, and do
not need to be recharged by some other system such as batteries or fuel cells.
Radioisotope-based power systems are also muLch better suited for harsh environments than solar
power systems. Nuclear systems can withstand greater amounts of external radiation without degradation,
survive dust storms with only a minor drop in efficiency, and tolerate extreme temperatures [5]. In fact,
the only part of the system vulnerable to the external environment is the radiator. Silicon solar arrays, on
the other hand, can degrade by as much as 2.5% per year due to radiation while low earth orbit [52]. The
environmental tolerance makes nuclear power systems much more flexible than other systems because
nuclear power does not need sunlight or moderate temperatures to operate. In fact, the lower the ambient
temperature, the more efficient a nuclear reactor becomes. This is because the efficiency of the radiator is
proportional to the ambient temperature to the fourth power.
In terms of mass, which is the major factor in astronautics, nuclear power systems are less
massive than solar power systems, batteries, and fel cells for very large. long duration power demands
on Mars. As an example, the Draper /MIT study compared a nuclear fission reactor to a power system
consisting of solar arrays and regenerative fuel cells. Each system was modeled to provide power for the
Habitat, two all-terrain vehicles for exploration, and an in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) plant. The
systems were then compared using parametric expressions for weight and power. This model was
developed by Afreen Siddiq and is included in Appendix A [42]. The nuclear power model is based on
three points of historical data from previous designs. This is not a high fidelity method to model nuclear
power, thus the results will be conservative. A better method of developing a model would be to design a
space reactor and then scale the design by the power level to obtain mass and power points for a series of
power levels. This requires many Monte Carlo Neutral Particle simulations, which were beyond the scope
of this thesis.
The conclusions from this study were that nuclear power is more mass efficient to provide high
levels of power to support human exploration of Mars. In addition, the surface area required for the
nuclear power system is much smaller than for a solar power system. Robotic deployment is also easier,
though not without challenges, for a nuclear power system compared to a solar power system. The
following describes the models, assumptions, results, and conclusions of this study in further detail.
The main assumptions in the model were efficiencies and loss terms from Reference [52]. The
Habitat was assumed to require 10 kW of power, two ATVs require 13.5 kW-hr each to recharge, and an
ISRU plant requires 100 kW of power. For the solar plant, it is assumed the ISRU and ATVs only draw
power dlring the day and fuel cells provide power for the Habitat during Martian nights. The Martian day
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and night was assumed to sum to 24 hours and the length of the day depended upon the position of the
planet in its orbit around the sun. [42] The solar flux was determined by a model written by Clem Tillier
of Draper Laboratories, which is also included in Appendix A [50]. The Martian landing site was assumed
to be on the equator.
The Martian solar flux is about 2.25 times smaller than seen on Earth, but the day length is
comparable at the equator. Figure 1-I shows a comparison of Indium Phosphide and regenerative fuel cell
power system versus nuclear fission for three different power demand scenarios. The first scenario is the
Habitat only, the second is Habitat and two ATVs requiring 20 kW total, and the third scenario is a
Habitat, two ATVs, and an ISRU plant for a total power demand of 120 kW. The solar power system was
modeled tfor two dust obscuration rates, the first being a slow buildup of dust at the rate of 0.014% solar
panel coverage per day and the other is an overall dust loss of 30%.
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Figure 1-1: Comparison of Power System Mass on Martian Equator on Clear Day
For clear conditions and a total surface time of 600 days at the Martian equator during the
summer, the solar power system is slightly more mass efficient. However, Mars can suffer fierce dust
storms that severely reduce the solar flux. These occur typically just before the Martian southern summer
when the solar flux is greatest [13]. Observed data from the July 2001 Martian dust storm showed the
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solar flux decreased by a factor of 2.3 at the equator [13]. The power system must be able to survive a
Martian dust storm and still provide power to all of the systems. Figure 1-2 shows the new mass
comparison for the same systems as Figure 1-1 except for severe Martian dust storm conditions. In the
case of the dust storm, nuclear power is more mass efficient at the high power load. Otherwise, solar
power is more mass efficient. Therefore, nuclear power on Mars becomes more mass effective at high
power levels.
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Figure 1-2: Power System Mass Comparison on Martian Equator during Martian Dust Storm
Although this model predicts solar is more mass efficient under the best conditions, one must
consider the other logistics of solar cells. First, solar cells require maintenance to prevent dust obscuration
and degrade with time is faster than nuclear power systems. Secondly, Indium Phosphide solar array used
in the analysis are not currently available because it is still a developmental technology. Substantial
develop still remains before it can be used in a space mission. Unlike nuclear technology, the
development of Indium Phosphide arrays is a research problem not an engineering problem to adapt
current technology to space applications. Silicon and Gallium Arsenide solar arrays are currently
available but have lower specific power and are much more sensitive to radiation.
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In addition. the model assumes the solar array only provides power for one 600-day mission on
Mars. If the solar power system were to provide power for more than one mission, the addition lifetime
requirement would have to be included in the model. Accounting for degradation in the solar arrays for a
longer lifetime further increases the mass and size of the solar power system since the end-of-lite power
output must be equal to the power demands of the base. As an example, if a modest degradation of 2% per
year was assumed, the degradation for a solar power system for one mission is 3.3%. for two missions is
6.4%, and for three missions is 9.5%. The arrays would then be designed to provide this much more
power at the beginning of life and would consequently be that much larger. For high power demands, the
mass of the system will quickly become larger than the nuclear power system. The mass of a nuclear
reactor power system increases much more slowly with lifetime requirements than solar arrays because
extended life can be controlled through the enrichment of the fel and bumrnable poisons rather than
increasing the power output of the reactor.
Next, a large surface area to collect the sunlight is necessary due to the decrease in solar flux at
Mars. To give an idea of the area requirements for a solar cell system, Table 1-1 shows the dimensions of
the solar arrays in Figure 1-2. Again, these areas are for a solar power system designed to last one
mission.
Table -I: Dimensions of Indium Phosphide Solar Arrays Required for Cases in Figure 1-2
Dust Loss Scenario Habitat Only Habitat and 2 ATVs Habitat, 2 ATVs, and SRU
0.014% perday 27 m x 27m 32 m x 32 m 61 mx6l m
30%overall 31 mx31 m 36mx36m 70mx70m
The size and number of the arrays make robotic deployment difficult. The main difficulty is how
are the arrays deployed? Is each array rigidly attached to a robot'? Can a large mat of solar arrays be rolled
out onto the Martian or Lunar surface? Where are the solar arrays deployed? Is there a landing site with
enough smooth, flat terrain to accommodate the required surface area for the solar arrays? If so, is it a
scientifically valuable landing site? All of these questions need to be answered, but were beyond the
scope of this thesis.
For nuclear power, the surface area for deployment is only the size of the reactor, which is
typically a few meters in diameter. A radiation perimeter will have to be established, but this terrain does
not have to be perfectly flat. Deployment of the reactor can be accomplished in the method of landing the
reactor and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
Lastly, solar power systems are not load following but rather only capable of providing electricity
according to the solar flux. The solar arrays must provide the required power throughout the mission
14
regardless of the meteorological conditions. Therefore, during normal conditions extra electricity will be
produced that must be dispensed. Nuclear power can provide electricity as needed. If designed to provide
power tfor multiple missions, the power output could be designed tfor the last mission and the power
output during the missions proceeding can slowly increase in power demands. This provides for the
accretion of assets at one site without bringing a new power system for each mission.
Despite the mass efficiency during perfect conditions, which may improve given a more accurate
model, the nuclear power system is superior to a solar power system. Except for development time and
cost. the disadvantages of nuclear poxver can be compensated for in design or protective measures, such as
a shield for radiation protection. The capabilities of nuclear power such as long life and power production
capable of growing with the base make nuclear very attractive.
1.2 Past Uses of Nuclear Power in Space
Since the 1960s, radioisotope-based power systems have been used extensively in space
applications. The first Radioisotope Thermal Generators (RTGs) as well as the only U.S.A. nuclear
reactor flown in space were developed under the SNAP program, which stands tfor systems for nuclear
auxiliary power. The United States has successfully flown 43 RTGs in space and one nuclear reactor.
Four more RTGs were launched but returned to Earth safely after launch accidents, two of which were a
part of the Apollo 13 spacecraft. Figure 1-3 below. which is from Reference [6], describes the nuclear
space power systems launched by the U.S.A. as of 1996. Not included in this list are the three General
Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) RTGs launched in 1997 as part of the Cassini spacecraft, which is currently
orbiting Saturn. [6]
RTGs haxe come a long way in development. The first SNAP RTGs were used to power military
navigational satellites with power requirements less than 30 We. The very first RTG, SNAP-3B7, was
designed to provide 2.7 W. for 5 years with a specific power of 1.29 W/kg. The next RTG, the SNAP-27,
was used to provide power to the lunar module in Apollo missions 12 through 17. These RTGs produced
between 70 and 75 W of electricity. Then, SNAP-1 7 RTGs were used in the Pioneer and Viking missions
to provide power for science instruments and the communication system. Each SNAP-I 7 produced about
40 We at the beginning of the mission. The Pioneer RTGs are still operating after more than 30 years. [6]
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Figure 1-3: Successfully Launched Space Nuclear Power Systems Launched by U.S.A. as of 1996
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The most recent RTG design is the General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) RTGs. These RTGs
produce almost 300 We at the beginning of the mission with a specific power of 5 W,/kg for the Galileo,
Ulysses, and Cassini missions. The technology is developing smoothly and it is predicted the specific
power capabilities can be doubled. [6]
SNAP- I OA was the first space reactor to be launched and operated in Earth orbit. It was also the
first and only reactor to be launched by the United States. The SNAP-IOA is of particular interest here
because it is well documented. This reactor, shown in Figure 1-4 from Reference [44], was launched on
April 3, 1965 by an Atlas-Agena launch vehicle and placed into a 1300 km circular polar orbit. Heat is
created fromn the fully enriched U2 5ZrH fel and transferred to thermoelectric converters by a NaK-78
eutectic working fluid. The reactor uses a beryllium reflector to maintain criticality, a Lithium Hydride
shield for radiation protection of the electronics, and four control drums for control. Control was assisted
by a large instrumentation system including accelerometers, thermocouples, neutron detectors, and
gamma detectors. During launch, the entire SNAP-IOA system was protected by a nose fairing and
ejectable heat shield. The SNAP-1OA produced 1.5 kWe at full power, weighed 440 kg, and provided
power for its own systems, after startup, and an experimental ion engine. [16] [44] [54]
Figure 1-4: Diagram of the SNAP-10A
In terms of safety, a reentry analysis and ater-immersion analysis were conducted on the SNAP-
]OA. The SNAP-IOA was designed for reentry burnup, and both analytical and experimental analyses
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were performed to verify burnup including a reentry test using a fill-scale model. It was concluded the
reactor vessel would melt completely upon reentry however, the ablation and dispersion of the fuel
elements could not be guaranteed. Intact reentry was not considered. The water-immersion analysis
determined the reactor would become supercritical and explode with a yield of 70 MW-sec but anti-
criticality mechanisms were added to the design because the probability of the accident occurring near
humans was considered very low. [16]
Besides the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR) developed nuclear
power systems for space applications. A series of military satellites, called Radar Ocean Reconnaissance
Satellites (RORSAT). began using nuclear power sources in 1970. Not much is known about the earliest
designs of the nuclear reactors for these satellites but the United States bought the most recent design, the
Topaz reactors, in the 1990s. Thirty-three RORSATs were launched and all used nuclear reactors for
power. Three of the thirty-three failed, one of which was the infamous Cosmos 954 that landed in Canada.
[9]
Cosmos 954 was a reactor that used Uranium-Molybdenum fuel enriched to 90 weight percent
U -' 5 . Heat from the fuel was carried by a NaK working fluid to thermoelectric converters. Control was
achieved by six boron carbide control rods with beryllium followers used as radial reflectors. The reactor
operated forjust over four months before reentering Earth's atmosphere. The RORSATs were designed to
operate in very low Earth orbit for a few months before the orbit became unstable. At this point, the
spacecraft would separate from the reactor and fall back into the atmosphere while the reactor boosted
itself to higher orbit. In the case of Cosmos 954, the spacecraft did not separate from the reactor and
dragged the entire satellite into Earth's atmosphere. [16]
The result of the reentry accident was a debris field 000 km long and an average width of 48 km.
Cosmos 954 was designed to disintegrate during reentry, however much of the reactor did not. The fel
did ablate as expected, only 0.1 percent of the fuel was recovered, however the other pieces of the reactor
were that did not ablate had become radioactive during the operation of the reactor. Contact doses from
the debris ranged from 5 Gray/hr to 0.1 milliGray/hr. The size and radioactivity of the debris resulted in a
$14.7 million joint cleanup effort by Canada and the United States. [16]
The Topaz reactors, the most developed space nuclear reactors by the USSR, are of particular
interest. Topaz was a UO2 fuieled, Zirconium Hydride moderated reactor that converts heat into electricity
via thermionics. The fuel is enriched to 96 weight percent U'-- 5. Control was achieved through a radial
reflector/control drum assembly. A radiation shadow shield protects the electronics of the satellite, which
is connected to the reactor by Titanium support legs. [16]
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The safety record of nuclear power systems in space is very good. Except for the Cosmos 954,
nuclear power systems have never endangered the general population or the environment. RTGs, SNAP-
10A, and the Cosmos reactors were all designed to ablate upon reentry into the atmosphere. These
previous uses of nuclear power provide a good basis for the design of future systems and illuminate the
areas of safety that must be addressed in all space nuclear reactor designs.
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2. Reference Mission and Design
To understand the use of nuclear power for surface power applications on other heavenly bodies,
a reference reactor designed for surface operation on Mars is examined in the context of a proposed
mission to Mars. The mission is the favored transportation architecture of the CE&R study performed by
Draper and MIT. The reactor was designed in the fall of 2004 b 12 undergraduate students and on
graduate student during a 12-week design class. This chapter describes the reference mission and
reference reactor design.
2.1 Reference Mission
One of the first tasks in the CE&R study was to model all the possible ways to transport cargo
and astronauts to the Moon or Mars. These methods are called architectures, which encompass
transportation choices such as the number of launches, vehicle configurations, staging locations, and
technology choices. The Draper/MIT team used a modeling tool called Object Process Network to
generate thousands of possible transportation architectures. The architectures were generated by creating
a set of all possible initial combinations of vehicles. Then, the combinations were allowed to follow each
possible trajectory. As choices in the trajectories are made. new architectures are generated to follow each
of the choices. The resulting architectures, which are checked to be feasible throughout the generation of
the paths, represent all feasible architectures. In total, 1162 architectures were generated. [ 15]
These 1162 architectures were then screened according to six requirements to reduce the number
of architectures before evaluation to determine the best architectures. Three architectures were chosen
after the screening and evaluation process as the most versatile and mass efficient architectures. Of these
three, architecture 969 is favored above the others, where 969 refers to the index of the generated
architecture from Object Process Network tool. This architecture serves as the reference mission for this
thesis.[1 5]
Architecture 969 is a Mars Orbit Rendezvous architecture, which is similar to the Johnson Space
Center reference design mission in 1993. There are main three vehicles in this architecture, the Mars
Ascent Vehicle (MAV), Earth Return Vehicle, and the Transfer and Surface Habitat. Each of these
vehicles is launched individually and follows similar trajectories.
The MAV is made up of a Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), landing stages, surface cargo
module, a heat shield for Mars aerocapture, and a Trans-Mars/Moon Injection engine. Cargo will be
surface mobilitS vehicles, robots, the surface power system, and ISRU if utilized. The cargo is deployed
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to the surface along with the CEV. This CEV will be used by the astronauts for ascent from Mars and
reentry to Earth. [ 15]
The Earth Return Vehicle is made up of a return habitat, heat shield for Mars aerocapture. two
Trans-Earth Injection engines, and Trans-Mars/Moon Injection engines. The return habitat travels to low
Martian orbit and remains there until the manned surface mission is complete. When the mission is
complete. the CEV from the MAV will rendezvous and dock with the return habitat and return to Earth.
The MAV and Earth Return Vehicle are launched 2.3 years before the Transfer and Surface Habitat. The
two vehicles spend approximately 8 months in transit to Mars.[15]
The Transfer and Surface Habitat Vehicle is made up of a CEV, landing stages, surface habitat,
suirface cargo module, and a heat shield for Mars aerocapture. The habitat serves as the living quarters for
the astronauts during transit and during the surface stay, which is expected to be about 600 days. Transit
follows a Mars free-return trajectory so abort is possible at any point without a large propellant mass
penalty.[ 5]
Fitgure 2-1. from Reference [15], depicts the vehicles involved in this architecture and the
trajectories of the vehicles. The vehicle on the left is the MAV, the vehicle in the middle is the Earth
Return Vehicle, and the vehicle on the right is the Transfer and Surface Habitat. [ 151 Figture 2-1 shows the
MAV is launched first into low Earth orbit (LEO) and travels directly from LEO to the Martian surface.
Next, the ERV is launched to LEO and travels to Mars orbit where it remains until the end of the mission
when it rendezvous' with the CEV from the Martian surface and leaves Mars orbit to return the astronauts
to Earth. The Transfer and Surface Habitat vehicle is launched last and travels from LEO to the Martian
surface in a free-return trajectory. The dashed lines represent trajectories of an unmanned vehicle and the
solid lines represent the trajectories of a manned vehicle. [15]
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Figure 2-1: Diagram of Architecture 969, the Reference Mission
During landing, it is assumed the vehicles are first captured in low Martian orbit though
aerocapture. Next, the vehicles will enter the atmosphere in a powered descent until a short distance
above the surface. At this point, the vehicles will come to a complete stop and hover. The engines will
shut off and the landing vehicle wvill free-fall a short distance to the surface. Landing legs will compress
and decelerate the landing vehicle at a constant rate of about 50 m/s 2. [21]
2.2 MIT Mars Surface Reactor
At MIT, undergraduate students in the Nuclear Science and Engineering Department are required
to participate in a Nuclear Systems Design project and graduate students are encouraged to take part. The
12-week class traditionally challenges students to explore new applications of nuclear technology. For the
fall 2004 term, this class focused on the design of a nuclear power system to support Martian surface
exploration. The project was to design a fission reactor that could generate 00 kW of electric power for
five effective fll power years and operate on Mars with a test of the system on the Moon. The result, the
Martian Surface Reactor (MSR), was designed so that each decision in the design process would result in
a reactor that was of a small mass and size, simply controlled, safe for launch, and highly reliable. [12]
The core of the MSR produces 1.2 MW,t, and operates in the tfast spectrum, using Uranium
Nitride (UN) fuel pins in a tricusp arrangement with Lithium heat pipes for cooling. This configuration
exhibits excellent thermal conductivity and allows the heat pipes to remove thermal energy from the core
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at 1800 K. External control drums provide control for the core with a Tantalum Di-Boride (TaB2 ) shutter
material placed inside a Tri-Zirconium Di-Silicide (Zr 3Si2 ) reflector. A lafnium (Hf) vessel offers
structural support around the core, inside of the reflector and control drums, and absorbs thermal neutrons
helping to reduce reactivity tinder certain launch accident scenarios. Figure 2-2, from Reference [12],
shows a top-down view of the core. The blue is Zr3Si, reflector material, the green is the TaB, shutter
material of the control drums, the red circles are the Lithium heat pipes, the dark gray represents the Re
tricusp, and the light gray circles are the fuel pins. [12]
Figure 2-2: Top-down View of the Martian Surface Reactor
The Lithium heat pipes transfer the thermal energy from the core to a series of out-of-core
Cesium thenrmionics, which surround each of the Lithium heat pipes. The thermionic emitter is Re at 1800
K and the collector is molybdenum at 950 K. These units, operating at 10+% efficiency, produce 125 kWe
DC then converted by inverters to 100 kWe AC. Transformers step uip voltage tfor transmission to the
habitat via 25 12 AWG wires. Thenrmal power not converted by the thermionics to electricity is
transferred to the radiator Potassium heat pipes. This power conversion system was designed with much
redundancy and high safety margins; the highest percent power loss due to a single heat pipe failure is
4%. [12]
The radiator is a series of Potassium heat pipes with Carbon-Carbon composite fins attached. All
exposed surfaces are coated with Silicon Carbide (SiC) to prevent oxidation. The series of heat pipes and
fins form a conical shell around the reactor. There is a 10-degree temperature drop between the heat
2,3
exchanger and radiator surface, making the radiating temperature 940 K. In the radiator, the maximum
cooling loss due to a single heat pipe failure is less than 1%. [12]
Radiation protection tfor the astronauts and electronics is accomplished by a bi-layer shielding
design comprising a Boron Carbide (B4C) layer placed against the reactor reflector and a Tungsten (W)
layer placed against the B4C. The B4C is responsible for stopping neutrons while the Tungsten attenuates
gamma rays. These layers are in the shape of a semi-cylindrical shell. covering eighty degrees of arc
around the reactor. The energy of radiation produced by the MSR and the emphasis on low mass
prohibited the use of an enclosed shield.[ 12]
The entire system of the MSR has a mass of approximately 6.5 MT and stands 4.8 m in diameter
and 3 m tall. Figure 2-3, from Reference [12], shows a diagram of the major components of the MSR.
Part I is the core, part 2 is the heat exchanger with the radiator Potassium heat pipes, part 3 is the Carbon-
Carbon composite radiator, and part 4 is the shadow shield. On the shield, the B 4C is in light blue and the
Tungsten is in green. [12]
Figure 2-3: Cut-away View of the Martian Surface Reactor
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3. Nuclear Launch Requirements
The requirement for launching a nuclear reactor, or any radioisotope, involves two steps. First, a
preliminary safety analysis of the proposed mission and design of the radioisotope power source is
conducted for the environmental impact statement mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969. The second step involves determining if a separate safety analysis is necessary and/or presidential
approval. Section 3.1 addresses the environmental regulations and the results from the Cassini Mission
Environmental Impact Statement. Section 3.2 discusses the Nuclear Launch Safety Analysis and reviews
the Final Safety Analysis Report and Final Safety Evaluation Report for the Cassini Mission. Lastly, the
safety analyses for the Cassini RTGs are compared to a nuclear reactor system.
3.1 Environmental Regulations
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended, requires any Federal
agency to:
"include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official on --
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented.
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved
in the proposed action should it be implemented." [49]
This law serves two purposes; to protect the environment and ensure Federal decisions are made with a
ftull understanding of the environmental impacts of the proposed action and all alternatives. The
requirement is fulfilled by an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prepared by the head Federal agency
proposing the legislation or action.
The Council on Environmental Quality has developed guidelines for use of the EIS in decision-
making. These guidelines are described in title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 1500 to
1508. Part 1501.2 states compliance with NEPA should begin at the earliest possible time" so
"environmental values" are included in the decision and planning process from the beginning
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Furthermnore, part 502.1 states the EIS should be a major device in decision-making and not simply a
tool to reinforce a decision that has already been made. [48]
NASA incorporated NEPA and Council on Environmental Quality regulations into its own policy
and regulations concerning environmental quality, however NEPA does not clearly state when an EIS
should be prepared. Due to the generality of NEPA requirements, NASA has defined situations when it is
appropriate to prepare an ES. 14 CFR 1216.305 states the criteria for actions requiring environmental
assessments or EIS. Particularly, paragraph (c)(3) states:
*development and operation of nuclear systems, including reactors and thermal devices used fobr
propulsion and/or power generation. Excluded are devices with millicurie quantities or less of
radioactive materials used as instrument detectors and small radioisotope heaters used fr local
thermal control., provided they are properly contained and shielded." [37]
Therefore, any mission using radioactive materials for purposes other than local thermal control and/or
instrument calibration require an EIS.
3.1.1 Review of Cassini EIS
The Cassini mission EIS is valuable to review because it is the most recent radioisotope power
source launched by the United States and it is the largest RTG launch thus far. In addition, no nuclear
reactors have been launched by the United States since the 1965. The requirements for launching nuclear
materials have changed since that time especially because the requirements are now federally mandated.
During the SNAP- I OA launch, no government environmental regulations had been created controlling the
launch of nuclear materials. By reviewing the Cassini mission EIS, the type of analyses conducted to meet
the environmental regulations is demonstrated and the areas of concern are identified fr consideration in
launching a nuclear reactor. All of the information in this section, unless otherwise stated, is from
Reference [45].
The Cassini mission was a scientific mission to explore Saturn and its Moons. The Cassini
spacecraft is designed to collect information about the atmosphere, magnetosphere, rings, and Moons of
Saturn, and deploy the Huygens Probe to study Saturn's largest Moon, Titan. It was a joint venture by
NASA, the European Space Agency, and the Italian Space Agency. The spacecraft was launched by a
Titan IV Solid Rocket Motor Upgrade (SMRU) launch vehicle with a Centaur upper stage from Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station.
The power system is one of three main mission components examined in detail by the EIS. The
EIS discusses hovv these components were chosen, how each fulfills the needs of the mission in
comparison to alternatives, and analyzes the environmental impacts of each component during normal and
accident conditions.
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Three evaluation criteria were used in choosing the main Cassini mission components. First, the
component must be available and technologically feasible to implement the proposed mission at the
earliest opportunity. A component is considered technologically tfeasible if it has been tested for
spaceflight applications or in a development state consistent with the Cassini mission timeline. Second,
the component must facilitate, not inhibit, the spacecraft to achieve the science objectives. Third, the
comnponent should have the potential to reduce or eliminate the environmental impacts of the mission.
Regarding the power system, several potential power systems were examined. The final selection
had to fulfill the evaluation criteria, provide the spacecraft 675 W of electricity at the end of its 10.7-year
mission. and conserve mass due to the limited lift capacity of available launch vehicles. Solar power
systems, fuiel cells and/or batteries, radioisotope power systems fission, and fuel combustion were all
compared. Due to the mass requirements and length of the mission, fel cells, batteries, and fuel
combustion were eliminated. Solar energy was also eliminated because solar flux near Saturn is 1% of
that on Earth. thus the system would have to be very massive sing current technology. Nuclear fission
reactor was not technologically feasible due to the very small size requirement and low power level. Thus,
radioisotope power systems best fulfilled all of the requirements.
The current Plutonium-based General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) Radioisotope Thermal
Generators (RTGs) ere also compared to non-PlutoniuLm RTGs and RTGs that use less PuO, to
determine if an alternative design could fulfill the requirements with less environmental impacts. It was
concluded that other isotopes do not have a significant environmental advantage over PuO. Higher
efficiency conversion systems were not technologically feasible for the mission to lower the amount of
Plutonium. The comparison of all the possible power systems must be conducted in the FIS to
demonstrate the system chosen is the best option, both in design requirements and environmentally, to
fillfill the mission. lit should be noted that Plutonium 238 is an isotope that is not fissionable and is used
because during radioactive decay it produces useful heat. This heat is then converted to electricity by
thermoelectric converters, which are semiconductors that use a temperature gradient to produce an
electric current.
The power system for the Cassini spacecraft consists of three GPHS-RTGs for electricity and 157
Radioisotope Heater Units (RHUs) for thermal control. Figure 3-1 shows a diagram of the GPHS-RTG
assembly. All of these devices use the heat from Plutonium Dioxide (PuO2 ) fuel enriched to 71 weight
percent Plutoniumrn-238. Each RTG contains 10.8 kg of fuel producing 132,920 Curies (Ci) of activity and
each RHU contains 2.7g of fuiel for a total of about 32.8 kg of PO. The large amount f Plutonium fel
needed for the Cassini spacecraft required the preparation of an EIS.
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Figure 3-1: Diagram of the GPHS-RTG Assembly
The GPHS modules are the fuel assemblies that produce thermal energy. The RTG assembly,
shown above, consists of a radiator, appropriate electronics and structural materials, thermoelectric
converters, and 18 GPHS modules. Each GPHS module has four fueled clads surrounded by two graphite
impact shells (GIS) surrounded by two carbon-bonded carbon fiber insulator sleeves surrounded by a
graphite aeroshell. A fueled clad is one fuel pellet of ceramic Plutonium dioxide encased in an iridium
shell, which includes a small vent for helium venting. Figure 3-2 shows the exploded view of a GPHS
module including the dimensions of the aeroshell and the connection mechanism.
28
( W. _x
__ Ns~ - _ ._I N '~ % -f
@C:~~~~~~~~~~~~ t m 10 -VW .Il
I 7 , 7' ,\\
I
RTG
Mounting
Range Multi-Foil
Insulation
'
ZU 
__
_
w w
Is
___ . . I
I/A,,,,,W-'
I 1 I I 1 IF7
I P . 0 0 ,\ TX ran . . .
Floating Fueled GIS Cap Aeroshell
-_ _
Individual
GPHS Module Source: DOE 1990a
Figure 3-2: Diagram of General Purpose Heat Source Module
The design o the RTG has some inherent safety features. Starting with the fiel itself, PuO:, is
formed into ceramic pellets that are designed to be heat resistant and difficult to break upon impact. If the
fitel is released upon impact, it is designed to break into large pieces rather than small particles to reduce
the risk of inhalation, the primary health risk. The fuiel pellets are surrounded by a strong, metal sheet of
iridium to prevent fuel release. These are in turn surrounded by several layers of heat and impact resistant
graphite shields. Thus, the RTG is designed to limit fuiel release. [321
The Department of Energy, which owns the nuclear material and is very involved in the
development of radioisotope power systems, has performed extensive testing of the RTGs used in the
Cassini mission. The following are the major results of this testing as of the time of the Cassini EIS:
1. Explosions - RTG assemblies and GPHS modules can survive overpressures of
15.25 MPa without any release of fuel. In an intact RTG, the graphite aeroshell can
withstand overpressures up to 3.45 MPa.
2. Fires - Fueled clads (with and without GIS protection) can survive solid
propellant fires with temperatures estimated to be around 2,360 C. The major
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components of GPHS have higher melting points than the flame temperatures of solid
and liquid propellant fires.
3. Impacts from Fragments - RTGs can survive face-on fragment impacts at
velocities uip to 212 m/s without release of fuel. Edge-on fragment impacts at 95 m/s
will result in a fuel release. Aluminum and Titanium bullets were fired at fueled clad
elements and these components breached at bullet velocities of 555 mn/s and 423 mn/s
respectively.
4. Earth Impacts - Impacts on hard surfaces (steel, concrete, etc.) at velocities 10%
higher than terminal velocity (50.3 m/s) resulted in releases ranging from 0g to 0.22g.
Impacts on water, sand, and/or soil are not expected to have any release of fuel.
5. Reentry from Orbit- GPHS modules perform with acceptable design margins
when subjected to reentry ablation and thermal stresses associated with velocities up
to the Earth escape velocity of I 1.1 I km/s.
FuLrther safety analyses were conducted for the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) by the Department
of Energy, which are presented in the review of the FSAR in the next Section.
The environmental impacts are determined for all parts of the mission, from prelaunch to
irLterplanetary travel via a gravity-assist trajectory, and during normal and accident conditions. During
normal conditions, i.e. incident free mission, the only environmental impacts from the RTGs would be
exposure to workers in pre-launch activities. Manufacture of the RTGs was discussed in a previous EIS
just for that activity. Once on-site at the Cape Canaveral Air Station, RTGs are only attached to the
spacecraft at two points. First, upon arrival at Cape Canaveral RTGs are connected to the spacecraft for
testing. Next, the RTGs are transported to RTG storage until 4 days prior to launch when the RTGs are
installed in the spacecraft on the launch pad. Transport, testing, and installation are the only times when
workers are exposed, but the environmental impact of these activities can be mitigated using careful
monitoring and work planning to keep exposure as low as reasonable achievable.
3. 1.1.1 Accident Scenarios
To determine the environmental impacts during accident scenarios, one must determine the types
of failures that could release fel because this consequence is the primary concern. Once the failure
modes of the RTGs are identified, accident scenarios that create these failures are identified. These
accidents are then characterized by the conditions of the accidents, the probability of occurrence, and the
characteristics of the fuel release. The fuel release is called a source term, which accounts for the particle
sizes and distribution, location of release, estimated activity, and the probability of fuel release given the
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specific accident conditions. The total probability of release is the probability of the initiating accident
multiplied by the conditional probability of release from that accident.
To better characterize accident conditions, a timeline of the mission from pre-launch to Earth
escape was created. The timeline was then split into seven stages, which are described in Table 3-1:
Table 3-1: Description of Launch Phases
Four representative accident scenarios were chosen by collective expert judgment to represent the
range of severe accidents and the majority of possible failures where fuel could be released. These
accident scenarios are; 1) Command Shutdown and Destruct, 2) Titan IV (SMRU) Fail-to-Ignite, 3)
Centaur Tank Failure/Collapse, and 4) Inadvertent Reentry from Earth Orbit. The first three scenarios
occur during launch. These accident conditions were represented by blast overpressure, fragment size and
velocities, ground and fragment impacts, and temperature. The reentry scenario was represented by the
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Phase Time Period in Relation to Launch Description of Activities During Phase
Start End
0 - 4days - Os Time following installation of RTGs when the fueling of
the Titan IV core vehicle begins and continues to the
instant of SRMU ignition.
1l - Os + 11 s Period from SRMU ignition to when the launch vehicle is
high enough to provide launch site clearance in the event
of an accident.
2 + l Is + 23s Time of launch site clearance to the point where the
vehicle's point of impact given termination of thrust,
known as instantaneous impact point (IP), would clear the
Florida coast. During this phase, the vehicle would impact
land in an accident.
3 + 23s + 56s Time of land clearance to when vehicle reaches an altitude
of 10,000 m (32,808 ft). At this altitude, the potential
environmental impacts from an accident resulting in a
Plutonium dioxide release become global due to high
altitude winds.
4 + 56s + 246s Time when altitude of 10,000 m is achieved to time when
jettison of the payload fairing is complete. Stage 1 of
liquid-fueled core vehicle main engines is ignited at T +
135 s and SRMUs are jettisoned at T + 146s.
5 + 246s; + 688s Completion of payload fairing jettison to time when the
flight termination system is shut down. Flight termination
system shutdown occurs 2 seconds after end of first
Centaur main engine burn. lIP passes over African
continent between approximately T + 644s and T + 672 s.
6 +- 688s + 5,576s Time of flight termination system shut down to Earth
escape.
angle of reentry, orientation, velocity, and heating environment. Each of these accidents will be discussed
in more detail below.
NASA and the Department of Energy have an extensive experience base from previous accident
analyses in testing RTGs and all its components in accident environments, estimating the probability of a
launch-related accident, modeling the parts of the launch vehicle to determine if fragments will strike and
damage RTGs. and estimating the RTG response in different accident conditions. This information comes
from previous testing, as stated above, and safety analyses performed for the Ulysses and Galileo mission
environmental impact statements. Using this information and the accident scenario conditions, the
severity of fuel release was estimated for each accident scenario. For launching nuclear power sstems,
this reference experience is not available.
Command Shutdown and Destruct Accidents
The command shutdown and destruct can be issued at any point in Phases through 5 by the
Flight Officer to destroy the launch vehicle if it threatens land or populations. The command shutdown
and destruct will result in an explosion of the launch vehicle and the liquid propellants. The explosion
threatens RTG integrity in three ways, from blast overpressures due to the liquid propellants explosion,
fragments from the launch vehicle and breakup of the Cassini spacecraft, and subsequent ground impact.
A command shutdown and destruct in Phase will result in damage to the RTGs and then the
RTGs all to the ground. Damage is inflicted either by the blast overpressure of the explosion or impacts
firom fragments. Neither of these methods seriously threatens the integrity of the GPHIS modules, but the
damage would weaken the strength of the GPHS modules to withstand an impact upon hard surfaces. The
damage threshold for hard surface impacts is the terminal velocity of a tumbling RTG. Velocities of this
magnitude are not expected before T -+ 6 s so earlier command shutdown and destruct accidents will not
release fuel.
During Phases 2 through 4, and most of 5, the lip is over the ocean. Previous testing has
demonstrated that RTG impacts on water will not result in a fuel release. Thus, for these phases no release
of fuel is expected.
In Phase 5 when the IP is over Africa, reentry heating removes the RTG converter housings
leaving, the GPHS modules to reenter individually. The GPHS modules will survive reentry heating but
could release fuel if the modules land on rock or other hard surfaces.
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Titan IV (SMRU) Fail-to-Ignite Accident
The failure to ignite one of the SRMU rockets only occurs at launch, when T=0 s. In this
scenario, the entire launch vehicle would tip over and the non-ignited SRMU would separate from the
vehicle. When the launch vehicle tips over, the resulting impact would rupture the fel tanks of the
Cassini spacecraft. Centaur. and core vehicle causing an explosion that would rip off the payload fairing.
The shock wave fom the explosion would strip off the RTG converter and possibly the graphite a
component of the GPHS, leaving the fueled clads bare.
If bare clads were struck by the most energetic SRMU nose cone fragments, the clads could be
breached and release fuel. Other fragments would not be energetic enough to cause a breach. The ground
impact would not be sufficient to breach the clads even on concrete.
Centaur Tank Failure/Collapse Accidents
This accident is possible from the pre-launch installation of the RTGs on the Cassini spacecraft
until after the end of the second Centaur main engine burn. The rupture of a fuel tank or separation of the
two fuel tanks would cause an explosion of the liquid oxygen and/or hydrogen propellants. The explosion
would threaten the RTGs by blast overpressure or fragment impacts.
The overpressure from this explosion is expected not to release fuel especially because the
overpressure is less than required to strip off the RTG converter. The resulting fragments from the
explosion are not energetic enough to breach the fueled clads. The only way a release of fuel may occur is
if the RTUG lands edge-on onto a hard surface with sufficient velocity, which occurs only after T + 6 s. As
in the CDS scenario, fel release is only possible in Phase after T + 6s and during Phase 5 when the lIP
is over Africa.
Inadvertent Reentry Accidents
Inadvertent reentry was investigated in three scenarios, reentry from Earth orbit, short-term, and
long-term. Reentry from Earth orbit could occur if a failure of the launch vehicle occurs during Phase 6 of
the launch. Short-term involves an accident or failure occurring during Earth swing-by maneuver that
results in an uncontrollable spacecraft being placed on an Earth-impacting trajectory. Long-term involves
losing spacecraft control prior to the final gravity-assist for that trajectory and the resulting path would
cross Earth and reenter the atmosphere. 'The proposed trajectories were evaluated and failure modes of the
spacecraft, navigation. and operations during the interplanetary travel part of the mission.
In Phase 6, some launch vehicle failures could result in reentry of the RTGs. Reentry and
powered reentries would result in the thermal and mechanical breakup of the RTGs. From Earth orbit, the
RTG assembly would burn uip except for the GPHS modules, which would only result in fuel release if
the modules land on a hard surface. It is predicted that an average of three GPHS modules (out of 54)
would result in fuel release. Other modules will impact upon soil or water, wahich are not expected to
result in fuel release.
Short-term inadvertent reentry is possible if the control of the spacecraft is lost and the spacecraft
enters an Earth-impacting trajectory. Mitigation actions were taken to decrease the probability of this
accident to less than 1 in a million. The reentry angle primarily influences the response to reentry. If the
angle is less than 7 degrees, the Cassini spacecraft will skip out of Earth's atmosphere without an impact.
Entries at higher angles. between 7 and 90 degrees, will result in the breakup of the spacecraft. In this
case, it is possible the GPHS modules could release fuel between altitudes of 67 to 93 km depending on
the reentry angle resulting in a vaporization of the GIS and fuel.
Long-term inadvertent reentry would result from a loss of control of the spacecraft during travel
possibly resulting in an orbit around the Sun, which could lead to an Earth impact many years to decades
later. If a failure occurs near the outer planets, the spacecraft will be ejected from the solar system and
will not intersect Earth's path. The spacecraft response would be similar to the short-term inadvertent
reentry case however: more uncertainties exist due to aging of the materials. Figure 3-3 summarizes the
launch accident conditions for Phases 1 through 6.
Mission PhaseMission Elapsed Time'
1 2 T 3 4
Accident Scenario 0 to I s I I to 23 s 23 to 56 s 56 to 46 s 246 to 688 s 688 to 5.576 s
Command Shutdown 4-Freball/Thermal - T----------  -
and Destruct (CSD) Blast---------------- -..... N...- --------- --- A'\
[ - ... .. --- Fragment - ---
_ -..... Famn................................ _ _ _ 
Titan IV (SRNI) + FirebalVrThermal--4
Fail-to-lunite BI ast----- N A NA NA NA N A
4 -Fragment--.
Centaur Tank :-FireballThermal -..........  - - - - -Reentry
FailureCollapse -- a -----m --------- - - - - s Therma/ Aerodynamic
4y t- - ----------a- -- ---e----t-----……… …---- ----- Forces---
Inadvertent Reentry -Reentry--+
From [-Earth Orbit NA N A A N;A N A Thrmal/
Aerodynamic
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ _, 'Fores '
Source. adapted from Martin Marietta 1992
NA - Environment is not applicable for accident scenario or mission phase
a Nominal mission phase elapsed time. Some ditfferences could exist in the exact timing for the primary and the contingency opportunities
Shaded areas indicate the phase when fuel release at ground level could potentially occur
Figure 3-3: Accident Conditions for all Representative Scenarios During Launch
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After identifying the representative accident scenarios, the associated accident conditions, and the
RTG response, the accident probabilities and release probabilities were calculated. Launch accident
probabilities were calculated individually tfor the Titan, Centaur, and the Cassini Spacecraft and then
combined in a Monte Carlo technique to obtain the total launch stack probability of the accident. The
spacecraft-induced accident scenarios relied extensively upon expert engineering judgment for estimation
olf probabilities. The Titan and Centaur probabilities were calculated using original failure probabilities
updated with actual flight experience using Bayes' Theorem.
The probability of Earth reentry and impact was internally mandated not to exceed 10-6. thus the
mission was designed to meet this requirement. In short-term reentry accidents. Earth impact probability
was calculated from the expected probabilities of reentry angle, reentry latitude, fuel release altitude given
a reentry angle, the GPHS aerodynamic and thermodynamic reentry behavior, GPHS ablation due to
thenrmal stress, and fuel particle response in accident conditions. The GPHS modules would reenter
independentl? so each would have a different probability of ground impact, vaporization in high altitudes.
and the cases in between 32 to 34 % of the fel is expected to vaporize at high altitudes. Others survive
reentry and impact with some probability of release. The debris footprint was also determined depending
on trajectory and reentry angle. The designed mitigation strategies for exposure to clean Iup personnel
were taken into account.
For long-term reentry accidents, the probability that the new spacecraft orbit will cross Earth's
path at the exact position the Earth is in at that time was accounted for in the Earth impact probability.
Reentry angles. velocities, and latitudes are expected to be the same as for short-term reentry and the
reentry conditions should be no worse than for the Venuls-Venuls-Earth-Jtupiter Gravity Assist (VVEJGA)
swing-by reentry. However, uncertainties complicate this analysis in the radioactivity of the fuel, aging of
RTG components, and global population and distribution at time of reentry resulting in large uncertainty.
Next, the accident source terms were calculated. NASA estimated the source terms from the RTG
response to accident conditions according to the similarity of these conditions to those analyzed for the
Ulysses mission. The Cassini and Ulysses accidents are similar and the inadvertent reentry scenarios are
identical. Thus, 'many of the evaluations performed for the Ulysses mission are applicable to the Cassini
n-iission.'" [45] Source terms and probabilities for launch and inadvertent reentry accidents are shown in
Figure 3-4 and Figuire 3-5.
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Figure 3-4: Summary of Launch Phases I Through 6 Accident Scenario Source Terms and Probabilities for
the Titan IV (SRMUIJ)/Centaur
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Figure 3-5: Summary of Average (Expectation) Case Source Terms for Inadvertent Reentries During Earth
Swing-by
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Radiological Response
For each representative accident scenario, expectation and maximum case radiological
consequences, measured in terms of collective dose and health effects, maximum individual dose, and
land area contamination. These quantities were estimated using basic assumptions, models, and safety
techniques similar to those used in the Ulysses EIS and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) because the
preparation and completion of the Cassini mission EIS occurred early in the overall safety analysis
process. "The safety review and evaluation for [the Cassini] EIS is based on the best currently available
information." Mitigation measures were not taken into account when estimating the radiological
consequences.
Tile methods used for estimating radiological consequences and dose calculation are presented in
the Ulysses Final EIS and FSAR, as well as the results of the Galileo Final EIS and FSAR. Three
transport and dispersion models were used to determine the time-integrated airborne and ground
concentrations with respect to population. surface feature distributions, and characteristics of the surface
features. These models are EMERGE, used for releases in the troposphere (p to 10 km), LOPAR and
HIPAR, used for releases of small particles and vapor (< 10 microns), and large particles (> 10 microns),
respectively, in higher altitudes. Particle size was determined in the calculation of the source terms.
EMERGE uses Cape Canaveral Air Force Station/Kennedy Space Center regional demographic and
surface features for calculations. LOPAR and HIPAR use worldwide demographics.
After modeling, the radiation dose is calculated for four exposure pathways:
* "Direct inhalation
* Inhalation of resuspended material previously deposited on the ground
* Ingestion of contaminated food (vegetables and seafood)
* External exposure to ground-deposited material"
Inhalation of very small particles, three micrometers or less is the principal health concern because these
particles can stay in the body for many years. For this reason, individual and collective doses are the 50-
year committed effective dose equivalents, which is the total dose received by an individual during the
50-year period following initial exposure. In calculating the long-term dose estimates for populations
outside Cape Canaveral Air Station boundaries, dose contributions from inhalation of resuspended
material and ingestion of contaminated food were included during the 50-year period after the accident.
In addition to individual doses, the collective or population dose was also calculated. The
collective dose is the sum of all individual doses received in a population, measured in person-Sieverts.
Average population densities used to calculate the worldwide exposure in the vaporized fuel cases were
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based on a probability weighting over reentry conditions of latitude-dependent population density
distribution. Given a oground impact by fuel that survived reentry, "the location of the maximally exposed
individual relative to a ground-level release was determined by considering the average area associated
with an individual corresponding to the applicable population density."
Health effects are measured as the number of excess latent cancer fatalities above normally
observed cancer fatalities. The estimator tfor health effects in an exposed population is I tfatality in 40
people (2.5x1 0- 2 fatalities) per person-Sv or 7 fatalities in 20,000 people (3.5x10 - 4 fatalities) per person-
rem, which is the value used in the Ulysses FSAR. Results were calculated using de minimis dose and
ignoring de minimis. The de minimis dose assumes that below a given level, in this case 10- Sv/yr (10--'
reMn/year), an individual will have no adverse health effects.
Land contamination, which is measured in activity per unit area, is also considered a health
consequLence. A screening level of 7.4 x 10' Bq/m 2 (0.2 LCi/m2) tfor land area contamination is used
because the EPA suggest that areas below this contamination do not need mitigation because the
associated risk of radiation-induced cancer fatality is less than 1 in one million. Higher levels require
some type of mitigation according to EPA regulations. Figure 3-6 and Figure 3-7 show the estimates of
health effects for the launch and inadvertent reentry accidents.
Collective Dose. person-S' I Health Eftfects' Maximum [.and Area.
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Figure 3-6: Radiological Consequences for Phases I Through 6
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Figure 3-7: Radiological Consequences for an Inadvertent Reentry during an Earth Swing-by Associated
with the VVEJGA
The cost of radiation contamination mitigation, decontamination, and secondary costs, in terms of
lost wages and revenue, was used as the economic impacts of radiological accidents.
Using the radiological consequences and health effects, the radiological risk of the mission was
calculated. In developing estimates of radiological risk for the entire mission. the long-termn inadvertent
reentry scenario cannot be estimated and thus is not included. Risk, the probability of an accident and fuel
release multiplied by the consequence. was calculated in three ways: total mission risk, average individual
risk, and the maximum individual risk.
The total mission risk is the probability of an accident with PuO, fuel release, which is the
probability of the given accident times the conditional probability of that accident releasing fuel times the
consequences of that accident, summed over all possible accidents. In this case, the total mission risk is
expressed in expectation number of latent cancer fatalities.
Total Mission Risk = P(AF ) x Consequences(Aj )
.111
and
P(AF,.)= P(F / A, )xP(Ai)
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where P(AF ) is the probability of accident i with fuel release, Consequences(AF ) are the health
risks of the accident i with fuel release, P(F/ Ai) is the conditional probability of fuel release given
accident i and P(A,4) is the probability of accident i. The total mission risk over all launch phases is
8.4x 1 0 - 7 for proposed action and 1.7x10-3 for short-term inadvertent reentry from VVEJGA trajectory.
The risk from the short-term inadvertent reentry accident dictates the total mission risk for all phases
except long-term inadvertent reentry. Figure 3-8 shows the mission risk estimates for launch accidents
and inadvertent reentry.
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Figure 3-8: Preliminary Health Effects Mission Risk Estimates for the Proposed Action Using the Titan IV
(SRMU)/Centaur
The average and maximum individual risks are calculated in a similar manner at the total mission
risk. The individual risk is the probability of an accident with PuOG fuel release times the individual
health effects, either the expected or maximum. As an example, Figure 3-9 shows the maximum
individual risk for the representative accidents and inadvertent reentry accidents.
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Estimated
Maximum Latent Cancer
Mission Phase/ Individual Fatalities Per Sv Latent Cancer Fatalit
Accident Scenario Total Dose. S (rem) (rem) Exposture Risk
Probability 
Phase 1: Command 107 x 104 1.02 x 0" 3.5 x 0 6.1 x l) - '
& Destruct (1.02 x 1(- ') (3.5 x 104)
Phase 1: Titan IV 9.1 x - 4.3 x 10- 3.5 x 10-- 1.5 x 10''
SRMU Fail to (4.3 x 1) (3.5 x 10)
_^lite
Phase : Centaur 4.2 x 10- 1.03 x 10 ' 3.5 x 10-- 1.5 x 10 -
tank (1.03 x I0') (3.5 x I- ) )
IFailure/Collapse _
______ _____ ____ _ _____Subtotal: Phase 1 2.3 x 10'
Phase 5: Command 4.6 x 10- ' 1.24 x 1 3.5 x 2.0 x 10 - '
Shutldo n & (1.24 x 1(-) (3.5 x 10. ' )
Destruct
Phase 5 Centaur 3.7 x 10-' 1.24 x 10-' 3.5 x 10- 1.6 x 10' '
tank (1.24 x 10') (3.5 x 10' 4)
Failure/Collapse _ 
________________~_ Subtotal: Phase 5 2.2 x 1) '
Phase 6: 4.4 x 10 -' 5.43 x 10--' 3.5 x 10- 8.4 x l0 -9
Inadvertent (5.43 x 1) (3.5 x IO)
Reentr from Orbit
Earth Singby: 7.6 x 10- 3.06 x 10' 3.5 x 10-' 8.1 x 1 "
VVEJGA (3.06 x 10') (3.5 x 10')
Earth Singby: 1.9 x 1- 4.76 x 10' 3.5 x 10-' 3.2 x 10- '9
Backup Mission El (4.76 x 10) (3.5 x 10-')
Earth Singby: 2.8 x 0 3.55 x 1()' 3.5 x 10" 3.5 x 10 
Backup Mission E2 (3.55 x 0!) (3.5 x 10--')
Subtotal: VEEGA 6.7 x 1 "
Source: Martin Marietta Astro Space 1993. JPL 1993f. O ings 1994a.
adapted from Halliburton NUS 1994a
a. The maximum individual dose is based on the individual being ithin the footprint
b. Based on expectation release values presented in Tables 4-1)0. 4-12. and 4-13.
Figure 3-9: Estimated atent Cancer Fatality Risks to Individuals Receiving the Highest Exposures in Cassini
Mission Accidents
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The Cassini EIS determined "The health effects mission risks from the Cassini mission would be
small and less than the total health risks faced by the public from construction and/or operation of large
industrial projects." [45] It is important to compare the cancer fatalities and mission risks to current
statistics about cancer fatalities and the risks of everyday activities to convex the mission risks to the
public.
Similar analyses are expected to be required for a reactor-based system with additional
considerations due to the differences between nuclear reactors and RTGs. This will be discussed frther in
Section 3.3
3.2 Nuclear Launch Safety Approval Procedure
During the 1970's. new regulations were created to protect the environment and the world
popuilation from harrriful materials released from launching objects into space or during an accident
during launch. In 199,7 President Carter took action to protect the environment from all potentially large-
scale effects that could occur do to space-related activities. Regarding nuclear materials, Presidential
Directie (PD) #25 states:
",A separate procedure will be followed for launching space nuclear systems. An environmental
impact statement or a nuclear safety evaluation report, as appropriate, will be prepared. In
addition, the President's approval is required for launches of spacecraft utilizing radioactive
sources containing more than 20 curies of material in Radiotoxicity Groups I and 11 and for more
than 00 curies of material in Radiotoxicity Groups III and IV (as given in Table I of the NASC
report of June 16. 1970 on Nuclear Safety Review and Approval Procedures.") An a hoc
Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel consisting of member from the Department of Defense,
Department of Energy, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration will evaluate the risks
associated with the mission and prepare a Nuclear Safety Evaluation Report. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission should be requested to participate as an observer when appropriate. The
head of the sponsoring agency will request the President's approval for the flight through the
Office of Science and Technology Policy. The Director is authorized to render approval fotbr such
launchings, unless he considers it advisable to forward the matter to the President for decision."
[391
At the time of PD 25, the International Atomic Energy Agency (AEA) classified nuclear
materials into eight radiotoxicity groups to facilitate regulations for the transport of radioactive materials.
Radionuclides were divided into the groups depending on the specific activity, severity of biological
efftects, and characteristics of the biological effects de to exposure [46]. These groups were used to
determine if the nuclear materials proposed for use qualified as a significant quantity by using the same
activity limits as the IAEA. Special provisions are required for transporting materials with activities
beyond a threshold specified for each radiotoxicity group. For example, Plutonium is considered a Group
I material, the most hazardous group. Group I materials require extra provisions when transporting a
sample with an activity greater than 20 Ci. These values were used in PD 25 to quantify the amount of
nuclear materials that could be launched with or without Presidential approval. [26]
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Following PD 25 and the IAEA Regulations for Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials,
unactivated Uraniumn fuel is considered a Group 111 material [26]. Thus, quantities of inactivated Uranium
fuel greater than 200 Ci would require a full safety analysis and review by the Interagency Nuclear Safety
Review Panel.
Another method of determining if special provisions were required for transport was to calculate
the F value for materials with more than one radioisotope present. The F value is the total activity of
nuclides in a given group divided by the activity limit per package for that group. If the F value was
greater than one, then special provisions are required. [26]
The IAEA has changed the Regulations for Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials since 1965
and now assigns each isotope an activity threshold called the A, value to determine precautions necessary
for transporting material. Samples of materials whose activity exceeds the A, for the isotope requires
special provisions. Mixtures of isotopes use the F value described above to determine the appropriate
provisions for transport. [27]
NASA uses the IAEA regulations to determine the appropriate analyses necessary for launch
nuclear materials. The A, mission multiple corresponds to the risk posed by the radioactive material and
thus determines the procedures and guidelines that must be followed. The A mission multiple is
calculated according to following equation from the NASA Safety Manual, section 5.4.2:
Radioactive Source, Activi
A, mi~ssion mltiple 
-.~1, ~ ~ ~ 1 Source,, Isotopic A, [Vllle
where the isotopic A2 value comes from the IAEA transportation regulations described above, which can
also be found in Appendix G of the NASA Safety Manual. A2 mission multiple is taken as the highest A,
multiple for different times in the space flight: at launch. in earth orbit, or during near Earth flight. [36]
NASA has established a procedure for evaluating missions that use nuclear materials to fulfill the
safety requirements imposed by PD 25. Once radioactive materials have been identified for use during
mn ission planning. the A mission multiple is calculated by the Program Manager (PM) using the
procedure outlined in NPR 8715.3 Section 5.4.2, described above. Next, a Nuclear Launch Safety
Approval (NL.SA) request is sent to the Nuclear Flight Safety Assurance Manager (NFSAM) along with
required documents according to the A mission multiple. The NLSA process is outlined below
depending upon the A-, mission multiple, which will be referred to as A2, as set out in Reference [34].
43
A2 < 0001
For A, values less than 0.001, the PM completes a Radiological Materials Report (RMR) and
submits it along with the NLSA request to the NFSAM. A RMR is simply a list of the radioisotopes
expected to be used in the mission, the quantity of the radioisotope, and the activity. The materials are
reviewed by the NFSAM. The NFSAM then may grant NLSA and prepares a NLSA Granting Letter for
internal records.
0.001 <A2 < 10
For A, values between 0.001 and 10, the same process is followed as for A, values less than
0.001 except for one ditfference. In this procedure, the NFSAM notifies the Executive Office of the
President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through an OSTP Notification Letter if the
radioactive materials are launched on the Shuttle. The OSTP Notification Letter informs the office that
NLSA has been granted tfor radioactive materials to be launched on the Space Shuttle.
101 < A2 < 500
For A, values between 10 and 500, the PM completes and submits a RMR, NLSA Request, a
mission description, and additional radiological risk scoping materials to NFSAM. These materials are
evaluated by the NFSAM and are subject to resubmission if more information is necessary. The NFSAM
analyzes the radiological risk and reviews the information with the PM. The information indicating the
risk associated with launching the material is then presented by the NFSAM to the Associate
Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance (AA/SMA). The AA/SMA then grants NLSA or defers
pending more analysis. A NLSA Granting Letter is prepared by the NFSAM, signed by the AA/SMA, and
submitted to the OSTP.
500 < 2 < 1000
For A, values between 500 and 1000, the PM completes and submits a RMR a NLSA Request, a
mission description, additional radiological risk scoping materials, and a Safety Analysis Summary (SAS)
to the NFSAM. The NFSAM analyzes the radiological risk and reviews the information with the PM. The
information indicating the risk associated with launching the material is then presented by the NFSAM to
the AA/SMA. At any point during this procedure, the NFSAM or AA/SMA ma) defer NLSA and request
more information from the PM.
After approval from the AA/SMA, the NFSAM presents risk information and analyses to the
NASA Administrator. The NASA Administrator grants or defers NLSA. If deferred, a formal letter is
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written to the PM by the NFSAM and the procedures must be repeated. If the NASA Administrator grants
NLSA, the NFSAM prepares a NLSA Granting Letter for the PM and notifies the OSTP through a
notification letter.
A2 > 1000
For A, values greater than 1000, the PM prepares a request to empanel an Interagency Nuclear
Safety Review Panel (NSRP) and INSRP empanelment letters with the assistance of the NFSAM. The
NFSAM starts the process of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Planning (REPP). REPP includes all
agencies possibly involved or affected by this launch. In addition, NASA Headquarters establishes a
Radiological Emergency Operations Center at the launch site.
Once the NASA Administrator has empanelled an INSRP for the mission, the PM prepares and
submits a Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the mission and major sources to the NFSAM, INSRP, and
the NASA Administrator. For sources with lower A, values, the appropriate materials may also be
prepared separately or incorporated in the SAR. The NFSAM assists INSRP as the NASA liaison. NSRP
or the NFSAM may request more information from the PM through a formal written request for
Completion/Resolution by the PM.
INSRP evaluates the SAR and prepares a Safety Evaluation Report (SER). The NFSAM, INSRP,
and the PM present the results of the SAR, SER, and REPP to the AA/SMA. The presentation includes a
draft request by the NASA Administrator to OSTP for NLSA. The NFSAM, INSRP, and PM then present
the results of the SAR, SER, and REPP to the NASA Administrator who decides whether to continue the
process of requesting NLSA from OSTP. OSTP reviews the NASA Administrator's request and decides to
garant or defer NLSA. If granted and sources with A, < 500 are present, a NLSA granting letter is prepared
for these sources as well.
In addition to the documentation prepared for launch, nuclear materials must be licensed by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The licensing of these materials follow the regulations stated in Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 30, 40, and 70. However, if these materials are produced by the
Department of Energy for the Department of Defense or NASA, those materials are exempt from
licensing. [46] Therefore, RTGs are unlicensed and any reactor fiel produce by the Department of Energy
for a space reactor would not need to be licensed. If the fuel were produced by a vendor, then a license
would be necessary.
The procedures outlined above apply to all radioisotopes proposed for use during a space mission.
RTGs are Plutonium-based power sources with a very high A, mission multiple greater than 1000. The
next few sections discuss the safety analyses performed for NLSA for the Cassini mission, which used
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three RTGs for electricity, as an example of the necessary safety analyses required. This discussion is
vital because the United States has not launched a nuclear reactor into space since before the mandate for
presidential approval of nuclear materials. Thus, by examining the analyses necessary for RTGs. the
analyses for the nuclear reactor can be better understood.
3.2.1 Review of Cassini Final Safety Analysis Report
The Cassini FSAR consists of a reference design document, an accident model document, a
nuclear risk document, an uncertainty analysis, a reentry consequence analysis, and a comparison of the
first and second launch opportunities. The reference design document describes the GPHS-RTG system,
the launch vehicle, the Cassini spacecraft, the launch facilities, and the launch and trajectory profile. The
accident model document describes possible accidents from pre-launch activities at the launch facility
through Earth gravity assist maneuvers including the accident environment and response of the RTG. The
nuclear risk assessment describes the results of any fuel release and the radiological consequences. The
design of the GPHIS-RTGs and Cassini mission has already been discussed in the review of the EIS. This
section focuses on the selection of accident scenarios and methodology for evaluating the accidents and
determining mission risk. All information, unless otherwise stated, come from Reference [33].
Risk tfor the Cassini mission was calculated using the process depicted in Figure 3-10. The first
step in this process is identifying the accident scenarios, which were compiled in the RTG Safety
Databook and Earth Swing-by Plan. The Cassini Titan IV / Centaur RTG Safety Databook define
accidents during pre-launch, launch, and earth-orbit phases. The Cassini Earth Swing,-by Plan was
prepared as a supporting study for the Cassini ES describing accidents that occur during interplanetary
travel. The Source Term Determination step simulates each accident environment and determines the
source term, which is the amount, character, location, and probability of fuel release should one occur.
The source terms are then used in the consequence evaluation to determine the consequences of the fuel
release on the environment and human population. Transport, inhalation, and ingestion of fuiel particles
are accounted for in this step. Lastly, from the probability of release calculated in step 2 and the
consequences in step 3, the risk is calculated. Risk is defined in the FSAR as the probability-veighted
sum of consequence and associated probability distributions." Review of the FSAR below follows this
process.
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Figure 3-10: "Top Level View" of the Risk Analysis Process
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3.2.1.1 Accident Scenarios
The accident scenarios were determined using probabilistic risk assessment. First, all initiating
events were identified using fault trees. Initiating events were traced to failures using event sequence
diagrams. The sequences from initiating event to outcome are numerous so pinch points were
implemented to aggregate lower level results into higher-level categories, which in turn were used to
develop representative accident scenarios.
For the Cassini mission, the initiating events were identified b estimating the failure
probabilities of basic components and subassemblies. Next, the initiating events were grouped into
accident initiating conditions according to the effect of the initiating event on the launch vehicle behavior.
The accident initiating conditions were then grouped into accident outcome conditions according to the
first threat to RTG integrity posed by the accident. Lastly, the final scenario environments were identified
by grouping the accident outcome conditions by the last significant threat to RTG integrity from the
launch vehicle. Ground impact is not included in this process but is included later on in the risk
assessment process. The representative scenarios were then the events starting from each accident
outcome condition and ending in a final scenario environment.
After identifying all the accident scenarios, one last grouping was performed according to the
time during launch when the initiating event occurred. The launch timeline was split into nine phases,
which are described by Figure 3-11 and Table 3-2. Of these eight phases, only the first three phases
encompass launch accidents, where the main concerns for RTG integrity are a result of an explosion and
irnvolve a shock wave, fragment field, and possibly a fireball. Reentry accidents, which occur in phases 3
through 8 and beyond, involve aerodynamic heating. This, along with impact on a hard surface, is the
mlain threats to RTG integrity in reentry accidents.
Table 3-2: Time Period of Cassini Mission Phases Used in FSAR
Phase Beginning Time Ending Time
0 T - 48 hours T + 0 seconds
2 T + 0 seconds T + 143 seconds
3 T + 143 seconds T + 206 seconds
4 T + 206 seconds T + 320 seconds
5 T + 320 seconds T + 554 seconds
6 T + 554 seconds T + 707 seconds
7 T + 707 seconds T + 1889 seconds
8 T + 1889 seconds T + 2277 seconds
9 T + 2277 seconds T + 2349 seconds
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Within the grouping of reentry accidents, a distinction is made as to whether the accident occurs
before or after the second Centaur main engine burn because the time of reentry is not immediate if the
second Centaur burn is completed. Accidents that occur in phase 3 through phase 8 prior to the second
Centaur main engine burn are considered out-of-orbit reentry accidents. These accidents are further
divided into sub-orbital, orbital nominal, and orbital off-nominal categories.
Phase Key Event
0 Complete RTG Installation to SRMU Ignition
Complete MST Rollback
Start Centaur Tanking
Complete Centaur Tanking
Centaur Go-Inertial
Ordnance Arm
Titan Go-Inertial
1 SRMU Ignition to SRMU Jettison
Launch Umbilicals Release
Clear Launch Complex
Clear Land
Reach 10,000 m Altitude
Centaur Pressure Control Shift
Safe SRMU and Centaur Auto Destruct Systems
Stage 1 Ignition
2 SRMU Jettison to PLF
SRMU Separation System Fire
3 PLF Jettison to Stage I Jettison
PLF Separation System Fre
Safe Stage Auto Destruct System
Stage 2 Ignition
4 Stage Jettison to Stage 2 Jettison
Stage 1 Separation System Fire
Safe Stage 2 Auto Destruct System
5 Stage 2 Jettison to Centaur MECO 1
Stage 2 Separation System Fire
Centaur MES 1
Pass the African Gate'
Attain Park Orbit
6 Centaur MECO to Centaur MES 2
Safe Centaur Flight Termination System
7 Centaur MES 2 to Earth Escape
8 Earth Escape to Centaur MECO 2
Figure 3-11: Cassini Mission Phases and Key Events Used in FSAR
49
Accidents that occur after the second Centaur main engine burn are considered inadvertent
reentry accidents during Earth Gravity Assist (EGA) maneuvers. These accidents are frther divided into
twvo groups according to the point during interplanetary travel the failure occurs. The first group is reentry
due to navigation failure during Earth swing-by. This accident group is referred to as short-term
inadvertent reentry because this failure would occur within to years of launch. The second ground is
reentry due to spacecraft failure at any other point during interplanetary travel. This is referred to as long-
term inadvertent reentry because the median time of earth impact for this accident group is 100,000 years.
During launch, accidents will result in the impact of the RTG with the surface of the earth known
as an instantaneous impact point (IIP). The lIP may be on a continent or in an ocean depending on the
location of launch vehicle at the time of the accident. Figure 3-12 shows the trajectory of the launch
vehicle during these during phases 1 through 6 and the locations of the lIP if an accident occurred.
.1
90-90 -70 -50 -30 -10 10 30 50 70
Longitude (deg)
Figure 3-12: Cassini Instantaneous Impact Points
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Launch Accidents
Fourteen launch accident scenarios were identified as displayed in Table 3-3. Cases 0.1 and 0.2
are prelaunch accidents and cases 1.1 through 1.12 are considered early launch cases. No accident
scenarios were defined for Phase 2 because the accident conditions would not result in a fuel release and
the RTGs would crash into the ocean, which was also found not to result in a fuel release. Below is a
short description of each accident scenario.
Table 3-3: Launch Accident Cases from FSAR
Cse Description M:l ii e POF
0.1 On-Pad Explosion 1.4 x 104
0.2 On-Pad Explosion with SRMU Aft Segment Impact 43 x 10-6
1.1 Total Boost Vehicle Destruct 4.2 x 10-3
1.2 Command Shutdown and Destruct 6.6 x 10-4
1.3 Total Boost Vehicle Destruct with SRMU Aft Segment 8.0 x 10-4
Impact
1.4 SRMU Forward Segment Explosion 1.2 x 10 4
1.5 Space Vehicle Explosion 7.6 x 10-14
1.6 Total Boost Vehicle Destruct without Payload Fainring 9.0 x 10-6
1.7 Command Shutdown and Destruct without Payload 1.5 1-6
Fairing
1.8 Space Vehicle Explosion without Payload Fairing 1.4 1-6
1.9 Centaur Explosion 1.4 x 14
1.10 Space Vehicle/RTG Impact Within Payload Fairing 2.4 x 10-4
1.11 Payload Fairing /RTG Impact 1.9 x 10-6
1.12 Payload Fairing /RTG Impact, RTG Falls Free 1.9 1 -6
Case 0. 1, the On-Pad propellant explosion, involves an explosion or fire on the launch pad during
prelaunch procession resulting in an explosion of the hypergolic propellant of the core vehicle or Cassini
space vehicle, or an explosion of the cryogenic propellant in the Centaur. The core vehicle will lose
integrity resulting in the SRMUs breaking away from the launch vehicle and the payload fairing
collapsing into the core vehicle debris. The payload fairing collapse would then rupture the space vehicle
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propellant tanks and ignite the hypergolic propellant. Case 0.2, the On-Pad explosion with SRMU aft
segment impact, is very similar to Case 0.1 except that in this accident the SRMNIUs may have a propellant
fire or impact the ground near the RTGs.
Case 1.1 is the Total Boost Vehicle Destruct accident. This occurs if any of the four automatic
destruct systems are activated during phase 1. Activation of these systems occur if the vehicle begins to
break uip, the powered stage separates prematurely, or a malfunction occurs in the guidance, navigation,
attitude control, or in-flight thrust system. Case 1.3. the total boost vehicle destruct with SRMU aft
segment impact, is similar to Case 1.1 except the destruct system is activated by a rupture in the center
segment of the SRMU with the adjacent aft segment falling intact to the ground. Case 1.6 is a destruct of
the launch vehicle due to premature separation of the payload fairing.
Case 1.2 is the command shutdown and destruct accident, which is a command destruct of all
stages except the Cassini space vehicle issued by the Flight Control Officer if there is significant flight
path derivation. It is assumed the space vehicle remains essentially intact. Case 1.7 assumes separation of
the payload fairing results in severe flight path derivation.
In Case 1.4, the SRMU forward segment explodes due to a random failure of the forward segment
of the SRMUs. This failure could be a rupture of the case, debonding of the propellant, or joint failures.
The pressure from the explosion will create fragments of the SRMU that could endanger the integrity of
the RTG. Furthermore, the explosion will offset the vehicle, which will in turn activate the automatic
destruct systems.
Case 1.5 involves the explosion of the space vehicle propellant due to failure of the propellant
containment system. A possible outcome of this accident is that the RTGs break away from the space
vehicle. The explosion will damage the Centaur propellant tanks consequently activating the automatic
destruct systems. Case 1.8 is an explosion of the space vehicle propellant. Case 1.5, caused by premature
separation of the payload fairing.
Case 1.9 involves an explosion of the Centaur cryogenic propellant due to a collapse of the
Centaur propellant tanks, which would consequently activate the automatic destruct systems. The space
vehicle will either be propelled out of the debris field by the explosion or caught in the explosion resulting
in an additional explosion of the space vehicle propellant.
In Case 1.10, the Centaur liquid hydrogen tank bursts propelling the space vehicle into the
payload fairing with a velocity between I and 10 feet per second. The space vehicle and payload fairing
are overtaken by the launch vehicle and collide with the remnants of the Centaur tanks. Case 1.11 is
similar to Case 1.10 except the payload fairing fails, impacts the RTG, and separates it from the space
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vehicle. The free RTG then collides with the launch vehicle activating the automatic destruct systems.
Case 1.12 is similar to Case 1.11 except the RTG does not separate from the space vehicle.
The associated accident conditions for these accidents are classified as Liquid Oxygen/Liquid
lHydrogen & Core Hypergol Blast, SRMU Fragments, Space Vehicle Monoinethylhydrazine/Nitrogen
Tetroxide Blast and Fragments for Intact Impact, Space Vehicle Pressurant Tanks Blast and Fragments,
Solid Propellant Fall Back Blast and Fragments, Titan IV/Centaur Liquid Propellant Fires, Space Vehicle
Flypergol Fire, SRMU Solid Propellant Fire, and Flight Hardware/RTG Impact. These conditions are
briefly described below. The possible accident conditions and accidents where these conditions occur are
shown in Table 3-4 below.
Liquid Oxygen/Liquid Hydrogen & Core Hypergol Blast is an explosion of the cryogenic
propellant of the Centaur stage. The RTGs will be exposed to a blast environment with static and dynamic
blast overpressures. The overpressure can range from 8 psi to 232 psi. If the payload fairing is absent, the
overpressure and fagment velocities are reduced by the ratio of air density at explosion attitude to air
density at sea level. This condition includes fragments of the launch vehicle that could collide with the
RTG.
If the accident scenario involves an explosion or breakup of the Titan IV SRMUs. the only
fragments of this hardware that could collide with the RTG in air and cause damage are fragments of the
nose cone hardware.
The Space Vehicle Monomethyl Hydrazine/Nitrogen Tetroxide Blast and Fragments for Intact
Impact accident corndition is a result ofthe space vehicle propellant, the Monomethyl Hydrazine/Nitrogen
Tetroxide, exploding upon intact ground impact. The orientation at impact is assumed led by the launch
vehicle adapter. Ground impacts on sand can occur at 91 m/s and on concrete at 56. 69, and 85 m/s. The
Databook states this accident condition is the most severe. A fragment field is also generated.
An explosion in the space vehicle pressurant tank will produce a blast environment with
overpressures dependent on distance between the RTG and the center of the pressurant tank. Overpressure
can be as high as a fev hundred psi. Fragments are also generated that can threaten the RTGs.
If the SRMUs fall backwards, the impact will produce fragments that may then collide with the
RTGs in a segment or whole motor. The fragment may then ignite and burn, burn explosively, or detonate
depending on the velocity of impact. In addition, SRMU Solid Propellant Fires have temperature that can
reach 2394 K with a burn rate of 0.04 inches per second.
If the liquid propellant of the Titan IV/Centaur launch vehicle catches fire, a fireball may occur at
an altitude below 170 feet and it is assumed all on-board liquid propellants are available for the fireball.
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Between an altitude of 170 feet and 3800 feet, an airborne fireball will occur but will be smaller as
altitude increases. Above an altitude of 3800 feet, no fireball is produced.
The Space Vehicle Hypergol Fire accident condition is when ground impact of intact space
vehicle results in "catastrophic failure"' of hypergol tanks causing a fireball.
Lastly, the flight hardware/RTG impact accident conditions is when the Centaur hydrogen tank
overpressure propels the Cassini spacecraft as high as eight feet above nominal into the payload fairing
resulting in a rupture of the RTG casing. Other failures will propel the spacecraft upward but not as far as
the hydrogen tank. A fuel release may occur if an explosion occurs within a few milliseconds of RTG
rupture or the ruptured RTG impacts the ground.
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Reentry Accidents
As mentioned earlier, there are two types of reentry accidents: out-of-orbit and gravity assist.
Out-of-orbit reentry accidents occur during the late launch stages prior to insertion into the interplanetary
trajectory. Table 3-5 lists the four different out-of-orbit accidents that have the possibility of fuel release.
Table 3-5: Out-of-Orbit Ground Impact Accident Cases
Case # . . Description Mean POF
, - ~~~~~.m, . . .' -- .,
3.1 Sub-Orbital Reentry 1.4 x 1- 3
5.1 CSDS, Configuration 5 (Sub-Orbital)1.2 1 -2
5.2 Orbital Reentry (Nominal) 7.1 x 10-3
5.3 Orbital Reentry (Off-Nominal, Elliptical Decayed) 8.9 13
The first two accidents, case 3. I and 5.1, are classified as sub-orbital accidents. Sub-orbital means
the accident occurred prior to the Centaur first burn, which places the Cassini spacecraft into parking
orbit. As depicted in Figure 3-12, these accidents can lead to surface impact of the RTG in the Atlantic
Ocean., on the African continent, or on Madagascar. These accidents are triggered by command shutdown
and destruct, as in case 5.1, automatic destruct, or other malftunctions, as in case 3.1.
Case 5.2 involves reentry of the Cassini spacecraft due to a malfinction while in nominal parking
orbit. This is classified as a nominal orbit reentry accident because the malfunction was the failure of the
Centaur to perform its second burn to achieve Earth escape. Ground impacts. because of nominal orbit
reentry accidents, can occur anywhere between 38 degrees north and 38 degrees south latitude.
Case 5.3 is an off-nominal orbital reentry from an elliptical decaying orbit as a result of
premature cut-off of the Centaur burn before insertion into the interplanetary trajectory. Ground impact
can occur in the same region as for nominal orbital reentry accidents. The lifetime of an elliptical orbit
can range from slightly more than 10 days to tens of years.
It is possible for the elliptical orbit in off-nominal orbital reentry accidents to have one of the
orbit perigees inside Earth's atmosphere. Though unlikely, this orbit can result in a prompt or delayed
direct reentry. As a result, ground impact is possible anywhere between 55 degrees north and 55 degrees
souLth latitude.
In out-of-orbit reentry accidents, the space vehicle is subjected to aerodynamic heating and loads
that result in the rapid breakup of the vehicle. Breakup of the Cassini spacecraft was predicted at altitudes
between 330,000 feet and 300,000 feet, which is consistent with observed spacecraft breakup altitudes. As
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a result, the GPHS modules from the three RTGs are released and subjected aerodynamic forces and
heatin.
The last type of accident possible is an Earth Gravity Assist (EGA) reentry accident. To reduce
launch energy requirements and mass, interplanetary travel is accomplished by using the gravity of other
planets to increase speed as the spacecraft swings by. For the Cassini mission, the proposed trajectory for
interplanetary travel was a Venus-Venus-Earth-Jupiter Gravity Assist (VVEJGA). The danger of reentry
into Earth's atmosphere comes from the possibility that the swing-by occurs at an insufficient angle or
comes too close to the Earth. This is referred to as a short-term reentry accident. NASA mandated the
mnission be planned so that the probability of reentry due to the Earth swing-by was less than 10-6. Reentry
can also occur as a result of a navigational malfunction that places the spacecraft into an orbit around the
SLIn.
The failure modes that would result in a short-term reentry accident were examined. The main
failure mode was found to be micrometeoroid-induced rupture of a propellant or pressurant tank resulting
in a change in the velocity of the spacecraft. Failures in mechanical systems. spacecraft software errors,
and erroneous ground commands were other types of failure modes considered. The probability of these
failure modes was estimated using historical data, analysis, and engineering judgment.
Long-term reentry accidents were also examined for possible failure modes and it was found the
dominant failure mode is spacecraft internal systems failures, such as failures of electronics or hardware,
software errors, and common-mode failures. Probability of Earth impact for all failure modes was
estimated for a 100-year period beginning at the scheduled date of Saturn orbital insertion.
3.2.1.2 AccidentAnalyses
RTG response to the accident conditions is determined from experiment and computer
simulations called hydrocodes. These codes calculate time dependent displacements and deformations in
or on body surfaces. The results are benchmarked against experimental data. The fuel release distribution
is calculated from hydrocode distortion calculations and a probabilistic model. Experimental testing of the
RTG included:
1. Shock Tube (Explosion Overpressure)
a. Bare Module Tests
b. Converter Segment Tests
2. Fragment/Projectile Impact
3. Fueled Clad Impact
a. Bare Clad Impact
b. Cold Process Verification
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4. GPHS Module Impact
a. Safety Verification Tests
b. Design Iteration Tests
5. Solid Propellant Fire
6. Solid Rocket Booster Fragment Impact
a. Solid Rocket Booster Fragment Tests in Gas GLun
b. Large Fragment Impact Tests
7. RTG Converter Impact
a. Converter End-On Test
b. Aluminum Fragment End-On Test
Launch accident that occur during phases 0 and 1 were simulated using a code called Launch
Accident Scenario Evaluation Program for the Titan IV (LASEP-T), which was developed from a code
used for the mission risk analysis of the Galileo and Ulysses missions. LASEP-T simulates the effects of
environments that are threatening to the integrity of the RTG because of a launch accident. It then
determines if a fuel release occurred based on the location and state of the RTG or component during the
accident all the way through ground impact. If fuel is released, LASEP-T returns the characteristics of the
release, namely size, mass, location, particle size distribution, and particle density. LASEP-T is a Monte
Carlo code so it performs this evaluation for each accident scenario thousands of times and develops
statistics as to the frequency of fuel release and distribution of fuel release characteristics. The result of a
LASEP-T evaluation of an accident is the conditional probability of fuel release and the probability
distribution of each isotope released in the pre-launch and launch phases of the mission. For more
information on the specifics of the LASEP-T code, please see Section 4.1 of the Accident Model
Document of Reference [33].
For the Cassini mission, 10,000 to 20,000 Monte Carlo trials were conducted for each launch
accident case except accident scenario 1. 1, which was derived from only 350,000 trials to ensure accurate
results for large releases. Phase 2 accidents do not seriously threaten the integrity of the RTG because the
payload fairing has been jettisoned and surface impact occurs on the ocean, which is not expected to
breach the RTG.
In out-of-orbit reentry scenarios, the RTG outer shell fails due to reentry heating and
aerodynamic loading. The GPHS modules were treated individually and analyzed by a three degree-of-
freedom trajectory prediction tool. This tool predicts both the trajectory of the GPHS module and the
aerothermnal environment using the three translational equations of motion that include the effects of
Earth's gravity, aerodynamic drag, and atmosphere.
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In addition, analyses were performed on the performance of the GPHS aeroshell and concluded
the GPHS modules will survive the reentry environment of all out-of-orbit reentry accidents. Since the
module remains intact, a ground impact analysis also had to be conducted. The fall of the GPHS modules
were modeled using the Module Impact Model code, a Monte Carlo-based code, which predicts a latitude
and longitude of impact. A worldwide database provides the surface type at these coordinates that is then
used in algorithms derived from the LASEP-T code. Test data on the GPHS modules indicate ftuel release
"ill occur only when the impact surface is hard rock. Each out-of-orbit accident was simulated 100,000
times to obtain adequate statistics. The simulations found 73% of out-of-orbit reentry accidents result in
no release of fuel because this is the percentage of surface impacts on water. The source terms were then
predicted using LASEP-T.
For EGA accidents, the probability of this type of accident was determined by a Monte Carlo
analysis of all potential spacecraft trajectories and the associated probability of a resulting Earth impact.
This analysis showed failures occurring in the latter half of the mission result in ejection from the solar
system due to the gravity of the massive outer planets.
If an EGA accident occurs, reentry will result in the failure of the RTG outer shell due to heating
from the atmosphere. The aerothermal response of the GPHS modules was calculated using a series of
computational fluid dynamics aerothermal analyses for steep (90°), shallow (7°), and intermediate (20 ° )
reentry angles. Then, a finite element analysis. including anisotropic and non-linear properties, was used
to determine the thermal stress and aerodynamic loading on the modules. The combination of these
analyses predicts aeroshell recession, extent of aeroshell ablation, and the mechanical integrity of the
aeroshell. These analyses are also conducted on the GIS, if the aeroshell failed to determine how the GIS
and fuel vould behave. Like the out-of-orbit reentry accident analysis, a three degree-of-freedom
trajectory program was used to predict the trajectory of the GPHS modules.
3.2.1.3 Nuclear Risk Analysis
Using the information from the accident scenario analyses, the radiological risk for the mission
can be determined. Risk is defined as the expectation of radiological consequences. This is computed by
summing the product of probability and consequence for all accident conditions in each accident scenario.
The probability represents both the probability of the initiating accident and the probability of release
given the accident conditions. The source term characteristics determine the consequence.
Consequences are measured in terms of individual and collective doses, number of health effects,
and land contamination. The two former consequences depend upon the characteristics of release, the
method of transport and dispersion through which people are exposed to the PuO2, geographic conditions
and features at the location of release, and the population distribution at the location of the release. A
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series of codes, called the Space Accident Radiological Release and Consequence (SPARRC) codes,
model these areas of concern.
For each accident scenario, the risk analysis consists of three parts. First, the treatment of the
release source terms was determined because the conditions at release affect the transport and dispersion
of the fuel particles. Second, the correct calculation method and databases must be identified. The last
step consists of determining the number of analyses to be pertformed. Figure -13 shows the flow chart
depiction of this process. As the figure shows, after the transport and dispersion analysis of the source
terms, PARDOS of the SPARRC codes calculates the dose and health effects. Below an example is given
of this process for the pre-launch/early launch analysis process.
In the pre-launch/early launch process, the location of fuel release determines if the release is
inside or outside of a liquid propellant fireball. If so, the source term for airborne fuel particles in the
fireball plume must be accounted for in the analyses as well as the releases from ground impact and air
releases outside of the fireball plume. The source terms are then used in four modules of the SPARRC
codes.
The liquid propellant fireball source term is entered into the PUFF code that estimates the altitude
of the plume rise and calculates the vertical distribution of the source terms in the plume. SATRAP, the
Site-specific Analysis of Transport and Dispersion of Radioactive Particles module, performs transport of
the fuel particles in the debris cloud and performs a dose analysis within a 200 km square grid of launch
complexes 40 and 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station/Kennedy Space.
For simulation of the non-fireball source terms. LHS was used. LHS. the Latin Hypercube
Sampling code developed by Sandia National Laboratory, uses a sampling technique for the analysis
because the individual accident simulations are too numerous and the consequence analysis is too
complex to be performed on each simulation. The sampling divides the complementary cumulative
probability distribution function of the fuel mass release into three sections ranging from 0 to 0.726
grams, 0.726 to 3.0 rams, and greater than 3.0 grams and randomly selects individual simulations from
each section. Meteorology is also accounted for in LHS using data from a database of Kennedy Space
Center conditions grouped into 10 groups of representative weather days. Each accident simulation
selected from the sampling is used with a weather day selected from each of the 10 weather day groups.
This large number of trials is used to ensure variability of conditions is included in the analysis. A
cumulative probability distribution is then created from the results of the trials to represent the accident
scenario.
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Repeat for each
case of analysis
DATABASE OF:
-METEOROLOGY COND.
-DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
-GEOGRAPHIC DATA
-HEALTH PHYSICS, ETC.
Figure 3-13: Consequence and Risk Analysis Process
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For the late launch and EGA accidents, similar approaches were used in terms of the process and
codes were chosen according to the characteristics of the accidents. Since the results of these analyses are
probability distributions, an uncertainty and variability analysis is performed using probabilistic risk
assessment.
In the consequence analysis performed by PARDOS, the nominal exposure time is 50 years. The
pathways of exposure considered are exposure from the radiation cloud, exposure from ground
deposition, direct inhalation from the radiation cloud, ingestion, and inhalation from resuspended
material. The whole body dose is determined for each pathway by summing the weighted individual
organ doses. Next, this dose is multiplied by the expected population to determine the collective dose of
the population. Then, the collective dose is multiplied by the health risk estimator factor. 5*10-4 latent
cancer fatalities per person-rem, to determine the health effects of the population exposed.
3.2.2 Review of Cassini Final Safetv Evaluation Report
INSRP performed a safety analysis of the Cassini mission on its own and compared the results to
the NASA safety analysis presented in the FSAR. Probabilistic risk assessment was used throughout the
INSRP evaluation to identify the accident scenarios to evaluate, calculate probabilities, and to calculate
the risk of the Cassini mission. The same data was used tfor both the Cassini FSAR and the INSRP FSER
however, the treatment of the data differed. Below is a brief description of the characteristics of the
analyses performed in the FSER and the differences between the FSAR and the FSER. All of the
information in this section is from Reference [25]. unless otherwise stated.
INSRP evaluated the information in the Titan IV/Centaur Databook and determined that two
scenarios enveloped the radiological risk of the mission: an explosion of the launch vehicle on or near the
launch pad resulting in a ground impact of the spacecraft on concrete or steel and inadvertent reentry from
an EGA maneuver. Three other accident scenarios were also evaluated because of the threat perceived by
the public that these accidents pose. These accidents were a loss of attitude control resulting in a ground
impact of the intact launch vehicle and spacecraft, sub-orbital reentry, and orbital reentry. The latter two
vwere found to pose a very small radiological risk to the public whereas the FSAR found the major
contributor to mission risk was from orbital reentry.
In the launch vehicle explosion accident, only three accident conditions were considered a threat
to RTG integrity, high-velocity ground impact on concrete or steel, impacts from spacecraft fragments
due to the explosion, and impact of SRMU fragments falling on the RTGs. Source terms were only
calculated for these conditions. Transport and dispersion of the resultant fuel particles was simulated
using a numerical code called HYSPLIT-4 from the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Association.
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For the sub-orbital and orbital reentry accidents, it was assumed the RTG would be subjected to
aerodynamic heating, very high atmospheric drag forces, and a high-velocity ground impact. The source
terms for these accidents were determined to be very small because it was assumed only an impact on
rock would release fel, and even that release would be very small because the graphite elements of the
GIPHS would contain most of the fuel.
Health effects, in terms of latent cancer fatalities, were estimated to be one fatality per 2.000
person-remn. This estimator was seen as a very conservative upper bound for the health effects because the
average individual 50--year dose will be very small. The effects of radiation on the human body are not
entirely understood in the area of very low chronic exposures thus it was deemed reasonable to use this
estimate as an upper bound and a lower bound of zero fatalities. NSRP sites the Health Physics Society.
which stated in its position statement in 1996 that annual doses less than 5 remin and lifetime doses less
than 10 rem cannot be evaluated analytically because health effects due to these radiation exposures are
either too small to observe or non-existent. Thus. INSRP emphasized that the health effects estimates are
conservative and the actual latent cancer fatalities will most likely be much smaller than the estimate.
The SER included a comparison of the total mission risk calculated by the Cassini program and
INSRP. Figutire 3-14 shows the total mission risk for Cassini. The curves labeled INSRP are the sum of
the risk of orbital reentry, EGA reentry, and on-pad/near-pad launch vehicle explosions. In the utipper
INSRP curve, launch pad accidents dominate below 30 latent cancer fatalities and EGA reentry accident
dominant above 30. The FSAR labeled curves are a smoothed replication" of the total mission risk from
the FSAR. For the upper FSAR curve, the EGA reentry accidents dominate the region above 100 latent
cancer fatalities and sub-orbital and orbital reentry accidents dominate below 100. The lower FSAR curve
reflects orbital and sub-orbital reentry accident below one, EGA reentry and launch accidents between
one and 10 latent cancer fatalities, and EGA reentry accidents alone above 0 fatalities.
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Figure 3-14: Comparison of INSRP and Cassini Program Mission Risk
The main reason for the visible difference between the two analyses in Figure 3-14 is the
treatment and interpretation of the data during the analytical development and dispersion of source terms.
For instance, during orbital reentry accidents INSRP assumed Plutonium Would not escape the GPHS
mIodules even after ground impact whereas the Cassini program assumed all releases escaped the GPHS
modules. NSRP also assumed little to no atmospheric dispersal in orbital reentry accident cases, resulting
in a large difference between the curves. The launch accident risk curves are comparable below 20
fatalities but above this differences in meteorological and biological models result in a slightly lower
mnission risk calculated by INSRP as compared to the Cassini program calculated mission risk.
For the EGA accidents, there are three reasons for the difference between the two curves. First,
the Cassini program corrected an error in the surface energy balance. Second, the GIS orientation upon
reentry differs. Third, there is an extreme sensitivity in the heat shield response during atmospheric
reentry given small changes in the heating rates and ablation chemistry. These differences result in a large
difference, between 20 and 30, in the number of GIS and clad that fail consequently changing the source
terms. INSRP assurned most modules would fail during reentry while the Cassini program assumed most
would survive reentry and hit the ground.
Despite the differences, NSRP found no errors in the Cassini FSAR and recommended Cassini
for flight approval.
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3.3 Comparison ofRTGs to Nuclear Reactors
There are two main differences between a RTG and a nuclear reactor: the activity of the material
and the safety requirements. First, the activity of a RTG is much greater than the activity of a nuclear
reactor. The Cassini RTGs emitted 132,920 Ci each for only 10.8 kg of fuel [45] while the MSR produced
12.9 Ci for about 690 kg of fuel. The activity of Uranium is much lower than Plutonium and varies
according the enrichment. Figure 3-15 shows the relationship between specific activity and enrichment
using data from Reference [6].
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Figure 3-15: Specific Activity versus the Weight Percent Enrichment of U 235
Using the relationship between specific activity and Uranium enrichment, the A mission multiple
ranges used to determine the steps taken in the NLSA process can be translated into mass ranges
according to the enrichment of the fuel. This measurement would be more useful in the design of the
reactor because the mass and enrichment of the fel are important factors in the design of a space nuclear
reactor, not the activity of the freshly fuieled core. Figure 3-16 below shows these curves and the diamond
represents the MSR. A majority of the designs using highly enriched Uranium, which is fuel enriched to
over 10 weight percent U23 5, will be around or just greater than an A2 mission multiple of 10 because this
corresponds to range of masses of 14,164 kg of natural Uranium to 109 kg of 95 weight percent UraniuLm-
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235 fuel. Table 3-6 shows the masses of different enrichment level fuels corresponding to the A2 mission
mnultiple ranges.
Since the A, mission multiple is used to determine the launch approval procedure, it is pruLdent to
compare the A, value for the Cassini mission to the A, value for the MSR. The A, mission multiple for
the Cassini RTG was 1.5*10' using the RTG activity from the Cassini FSAR. For the MSR. the A,
mission multiple for the MSR is approximately 12.9. This was calculated using the enrichment and mass
of fuel used in the MSR and the procedure for calculating the A, mission multiple from Reference [36]. In
Figure 3-16. the MSR is shown as a diamond with a plaid hatch.
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Figure 3-16: A Mission Multiple Ranges Converted to Mass Ranges of Enriched Fuel
Table 3-6: Mass of Enriched Fuel (kg) That Corresponds to A2 Mission Multiple Range Limits
A, Weight Percent U235 Enriched Uranium Fuel
Mission
Multiple 0.711 I1 5 20 33.1 50 90 95
0.001 1.4 1.3 0.4 0.1 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01
10 14164.3 12613.8 3703.7 1000.0 533.8 400.0 172.4 109.9
500 708215.3 630689 185185.2 50000.0 26690.4 20000.0 8620.7 5494.5
1000 1416430.6 1261378 370370.4 100000.0 53380.8 40000.0 17241.4 10989
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Under existing federal regulations, the procedures for NLSA of the MSR is quite simple due to
the low A, mission multiple. The PM submits a Nuclear Launch Safety Approval request and other
necessary documentation to the NFSAM. For the MSR, the documents required tfor submission and
review are a Radioactive Materials Report, a NLSA request, a description of the mission, and any
additional radiological risk scoping materials. An in-depth safety analysis for a Safety Analysis Report is
not required nor is an NSRP. In addition, the Executive Office of the President is not involved because
the fulel is not considered significantly radioactive. [34]
However, at this point the second difference between RTGs and nuclear reactors comes into play,
safety concerns. The amount of fel in RTGs is not enough to become critical or supercritical if the
material is compacted due to ground impact. For nuclear reactors, which are designed to become critical,
inadvertent criticality is the primary safety concern. As a result, it is unlikely that a reactor can be
launched without being reviewed by INSRP and given presidential approval [53 
Inadvertent criticality means the reactor undergoes a sustained or uncontrollable fission reaction
without initiation from the control systems. This could occur in two main ways. First, criticality can occur
upon ground impact due to a compaction of the core. The second way is the immersion of an unreflected
core in water, wet sand, dry sand, or soil. In this accident, the material surrounding the core acts as a
reflector and a moderator. By moderating the neutrons exiting the core and reflecting them back into the
core, criticality can occur because the probability of absorption and fission increases as energy decreases.
All of' these scenarios must be simulated and proven to either be of extremely low probability of
occurrence or the safety risk to the public and the environment is negligible. [351
Inadvertent criticality would result in overheating the system and possibly an explosion if the
coolant is volatile when exposed to water. In addition, large amounts of radiation and fission products
would be created almost instantaneously posing a threat to any population in the vicinity'. A water
immersion may not be as dangerous because people would not be in proximity, but damage would be
inflicted on the surrounding wildlife and environment.
Immersion accidents resulting in criticality can be avoided by design of the materials used in the
reactor or the addition of extra control elements. The materials of the reactor can be chosen such that the
reactor avoids criticality in the case of an immersion accident. The arrangement of materials will
determine where the neutrons are absorbed. If the reactor is a fast reactor, then an immersion accident is
dangerous because the control elements are designed to absorb fast neutrons not epithermal or thermal.
By adding a material that has a high thermal absorption cross section and a low fast absorption cross
section to a fast reactor, such as cadmium or hafnium, the reactor could be prevented from becoming
critical. In such a scenario, most of the neutrons will be absorbed by that material instead of being
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absorbed by the fuel and fissioning the fuel. A similar way of doing this is by adding a control rod added
to the design. which is later removed prior to operation. An alternative would be adding strips of boron in
the core to absorb thermal neutrons.
Another mode of inadvertent criticality is unintentional movement of the control mechanism.
This could occur during the launch period due to the mechanical shock and vibrations experienced during
this timrne. Prevention of this accident requires only a locking mechanism on the control elements to inhibit
any motion. One approach to this could be a lock that is deactivated when the heat shield is ejected.
Launch period vibration can pose a danger to the success of the mission if it damages the reactor
without causing criticality. For the SNAP-I OA, shock and vibration loads tfor the reactor were assumed to
range between 35 Earth g's and 100 Earth g's [47]. Thus, the reactor was vibration and shock tested to
ensure the reactor would not be dlamaged by launch. A similar testing regiment is advisable for all space
nuclear reactors.
The last area of concern with regards to safety is reentry into the atmosphere due to a malfunction
of the launch vehicle. This concern applies to all radioisotope systems but is a bit different for nuclear
reactors. In the design of the radioisotope power sources, a decision must be made as to the response of
the system to reentry conditions. Specifically, whether the power source should be designed to ablate in
the uipper atmosphere so the fuel and radioactivity is dispersed evenly over the entire planet or survives
reentry intact without fuel release.
Up to now. all RTGs and reactors have been designed to ablate in the atmosphere, though it is
difficult to ensure complete ablation as demonstrated by the Cosmos 954 accident [43]. By designing for
ani intact reentry, the subsequent debris field will be much smaller. A small debris field is preferable
because cleanup is consequently more efficient and simpler and the debris field will be located quicker
[35]. In addition, intact reentry and quicker cleanup reduces the risk of proliferation and poisoning due to
the inherent toxicity of heavy metals. Intact reentry could be accomplished by designing the reactor vessel
to withstand reentry conditions or provide a special containment vessel around the reactor to protect it
during reentry.
3.4 Conclusions
Launching a nuclear reactor into space is not a task that will be addressed lightly. An in-depth
safety analysis, similar to the analysis performed for the Cassini mission, will be required to address the
response of system to all accident conditions and representative scenarios. Extensive testing of the system
will be needed to know how the system will respond to minimal and accident conditions as well as
extensive simulation. Unlike RTGs and other radioisotope sources, it must be proven the reactor will not
become critical inadvertently in any accident and the chosen response to reentry is ensured. It is judged
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the reactor system should remain intact upon reentry. Lastly, presidential approval will be necessary to
launch a reactor regardless of the activity for safety and public awareness reasons despite the fact this is
not strictly required by the current regulations.
3.5 Suggested Changed to Reference Design
First. the reactor must avoid criticality in all accidents. Monte Carlo Neutral Particle simulation of
the MSR reactor in a water and wet-sand immersion accident demonstrated the reactor would not become
inadvertently critical as long as the core is contained within the Hafnium reactor vessel. The core was
simulated as surrounded by water or wet-sand, with and without the reflector, and all the heat pipes were
assumed to be ruptured and filled with water or wet-sand. In all of these cases, the multiplication factor
was less than one. The model did not include a flly detailed core, thus more analysis is needed in this
area to say with certainty the MSR would not become critical.
The other possible change to the reactor is an additional shutdown feature to protect redundantly
against inadvertent criticality. This feature, such as a control rod or boron strips, would need to be
autonomously removed prior to startup but remain locked in the core dring all accidents. This extra
shutdown feature would be very useful at end-of-life to permanently shutdown the reactor.
Adding an abort system to the launch vehicle may be able to decrease the probability of
radiological consequences. Manned systems. with the exception of the Space Shuttle, use an abort system
in case of a launch accident to save the astronauts, and it may be worthwhile to employ such a technique
for the reactor. By employing an abort system for the launch period, the reactor can be pulled free from
any explosion of the launch vehicle and possibly avoid compaction, because the abort system would
incorporate a parachute to decrease acceleration and the resultant force upon round impact. The abort
system, which is assigumed to be an escape tower such as is currently used for Russian astronauts and was
used on Mercury and Apollo missions, would probably prevent dispersal of the fuel and keep the reactor
intact. A trade analysis should be investigated in this area to determine if the abort system would in fact
provide an extra measure of protection for the reactor and if this extra protection is worth the extra mass
and cost necessary for such a system.
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4. Transportation
Given a successful launch out of Earth atmosphere, the power station must travel to the Moon or
Mars. The main risk in transit to the Moon or Mars is damage to the power station materials or
electronics. No malfunctions were assumed to occur in the navigational system during transit. Once the
vehicle with the power station reaches its destination, the vehicle enters orbit around Mars through
aerocapture or enters orbit around the Moon through propulsive means.
4.1 Transport Between Earth and the Moon or Mars
Traveling between LEO and the Moon or Mars will subject the power station to two mechanisms
of damage: meteoroids and radiation. Meteoroids are pieces of cometary ice or rock that pose a threat in
geosynchronous orbits, altitudes around 35000 km, and interplanetary space. In Earth orbit, meteoroids
have an average speed of 20 km/s but velocities can reach 70 km/s in interplanetary space. Collisions with
these objects can cause a variety of effects such as component damage, craters, wall perforation, and even
explosions. [4]
There are two methods to prevent damage tfrom meteoroids during travel. First, the vehicle can
include shielding to withstand impact. A second method would be active monitoring of objects near the
vehicle by round command, a satellite, or a sensor system on the vehicle. The system would identify
objects that pose a danger to the vehicle and activate engines to avoid the object or activate "shutters" to
protect the vehicle. The latter method, however, is not practical during interplanetary travel. [4]
The other risk to the nuclear power station is damage from radiation during interplanetary travel.
After a certain point, the Earth's magnetosphere will no longer protect the vehicles from solar radiation
and galactic cosmic rays. Radiation levels are elevated on the Moon, as compared to Earth, because the
Moon is outside the Earth's magnetosphere. However, travel to the Moon is relatively quick, about three
days for the Apollo missions, so radiation during transit will not be a significant concern for the lunar
missions. For the journey to Mars, which does not have a magnetosphere, the electronics and computer
system will be endangered by the energetic charged ions of galactic cosmic rays and protons from the
Sun.
In terms of electronics, the secondary ions created by the initial heavy ion induce currents and
faulty signals. In computing systems, bits can be irrevocably switched resulting in a failure of a particular
part of a program. These can be extremely dangerous faults for a system controlling a reactor.
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4.1.1 Design Considerations
For the MSR., this means the surface cargo module the reactor travels in should include a
micrometeoroid shield to protect the module and reactor from danger. The reactor does not necessarily
need to be specifically altered in order to provide protection against the meteoroids but a reactor vessel is
advisable to prevent damage to the fuel if a meteoroid penetrated completely through the cargo module.
The MAV heat shield also needs protection against meteoroids.
All of the electronics used in the MSR should be radiation hardened to the best extent possible.
This is also important for control of the reactor during operation because the neutron and gamma flux at
filll rated power will be very high. The neutron flux of the MSR will be on the order of 5* 10 '' neutrons
per cm 2 per second [12]. Therefore, it is assumed the MSR will be equipped with standard space vehicle
radiation-hardened electronics that can withstand solar radiation, cosmic rays, and the radiation from the
reactor.
4.1.2 Suggested Changes to Reference Design
Beyond radiation hardening the electronics, there are no recommended design changes to the
MSR. The vehicle used for transporting the reactor to the Moon or Mars should include a system to
protect the power station from damage by micrometeoroids.
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5. Landing on Moon or Mars
Arriving at the body of interest intact, the next feat is to land safely. The possible methods to land
cargo on the surface are numerous but not all are feasible, precise. or safe enough for use with a reactor.
The reactor must land on the surface without damage due to collisions, mechanical shock, or vibration.
The distance between the reactor and the habitat for the astronauts will be discussed in this section
because it is relevant to the discussion on the requirements of the landing vehicle.
5,.1.1 Method
The current MIT/Draper CE&R study plans to use a landing architecture on Mars that involves
four major steps: aerocapture to orbit, entry from orbit, powered descent, and touchdown [51].
Aerocapture is a technique to slow the transport vehicles down to orbital velocities using the planet's
atmosphere instead of propulsion [8]. This method saves a great deal of propellant resulting in smaller
vehicles. On the Moon, only a propulsive descent is possible due to the lack of atmosphere.
Parachutes and ballutes were investigated by the Draper/MIT team but were not as feasible as
propulsive descent. The lack of atmosphere on the Moon rules out parachute and ballute landing methods.
On Mars, these methods are possible but are not as effective as here on Earth due to the much thinner
atmosphere. The thinner atmosphere requires much larger parachutes and ballutes to provide adequate
deceleration on the drop from orbit to the surface. In addition, parachutes and ballutes will result in a
large touchdown impact when reaching the surface. Airbags are out of the question for the reactor due to
the large touchdown impact loads and inability to provide precision landing.
A propulsive descent was thus chosen due to the large landing mass expected, commonality
between architectures necessary fr Mars-back approach, precision landing capability, and soft-landing
capability. Propulsive landing vehicles will also provide more control over the placement of the power
station on the surface. Assuming a specific location, or small area, will be desired for placement of the
reactor, the propulsive landing can correct for mistakes whereas parachutes and ballutes cannot.
In the reference mission, the power station will land in the cargo module of the MAV on a
landing stage with liquid oxygen/methane engines. The arrangement of the engines has not been
determined. The communications time lag to Mars varies from about 20 minutes to 60 minutes, so
landing cannot be teleoperated. Thus, the vehicle will have to be landed autonomously. This involves a
high fidelity navigational system that can control descent without communication to Earth ground
command. It is assumed soft-landing and autonomous landing capabilities will be available to land the
nuclear power station.
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5.1.2 Issues
There are two issues with landing- precision, and damage. Precision refers to the radius of the
circle around the targeted location in which there is a 95% probability the vehicle will land. As an
illustration, assume the Transfer and Surtface Habitat should be landed within 3 km of the MAV. The
precision of landing the Transfer and Surface Habitat would be I km and a targeted landing location 2 km
from the MAV to ensure the largest distance between the MAV and Habitat is 3 km. Damage refers to
damage to the reactor during landing due to deceleration in nominal conditions and damage sustained due
to a collision of the reactor with large natural surface features or man-made objects already deployed to
the surface.
The precision necessary will depend on the distance required for radiation protection of the
human crew, access to the reactor, and the power losses due to transmission along the specified distance.
Most articles reviewed for this study state a distance of one kilometer is expected between the reactor and
the habitat. The MSR requires a distance of 1 km as well to ensure astronauts do not exceed the dose
limits for radiation exposure. If mass and the power drop across the transmission line are more
constraining than the exposure to the astronauts, then a more in-depth trade analysis of radiation
protection versus transmission line mass and power drop should be conducted.
Access to the reactor should also be considered. Robots are expected to interact with the reactor,
to connect the power transmission line in the reference mission, and astronauts may need to perform
maintenance. The latter is not recommended, especially if the reactor is the primary power source,
because the reactor will have to be shutdown for a period to allow decay of fission products to safe level.
Therefore, the precision should not be more than a kilometer.
For power transmission, the MSR assumes the use of 25 12 AWG cooper wires to transport
10,000 kV of electricity at 9.3 A to the habitat. The 12 AWG wire has a specific resistance of 5.209 f per
kmi [40] and specific weight of 19.77 lb per 1000 ft [2]. which equals 29.42 kg per km. Lighter wires are
prohibited by the current carrying capacity of the wire size. Table 5-1 showvs the power losses, voltage
drop, and weight of the 12 AWG copper wire for lengths between 100 m and 2 km. Power losses were
calculated using Ps = [2R and the voltage drop was calculated by V= IR.
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Table 5-1: Power Loss, Voltage Drop, and Weight of Power Transmission Wires
Distance Power Loss Power Loss Voltage Drop Voltage Drop Weight Total Weight
(m) (W) (%) (V) (%) (kg/cable) (kg)
100 45.05 0.05 4.84 0.05 2.94 73.55
250 112.62 0.11 12.11 0.12 7.36 183.88
400 180.20 0.18 19.38 0.19 11.77 294.21
550 247.77 0.25 26.64 0.27 16.18 404.54
700 315.35 0.32 33.91 0.34 20.59 514.87
850 382.92 0.38 41.17 0.41 25.01 625.20
1000) 450.50 0.45 48.44 0.48 29.42 735.52
1150 518.07 0.52 55.71 0.56 33.83 845.85
1300 585.64 0.59 62.97 0.63 38.25 956.18
1450) 653.22 0.65 70.24 0.70 42.66 1066.51
1600 720.79 0.72 77.50 0.78 47.07 1176.84
1750 788.3 7 0.79 84.77 0.85 51.49 1287.17
1900 855.94 0.86 92.04 0.92 55.90 1397.50
2000 900.99 0.90 96.88 0.97 58.84 1471.05
The shorter the transmission line, the smaller the power loss and weight of the wires. A distance
of one kilometer is not prohibitive but it is rather heavy with a total weight of 735 kg. A shorter distance
of 0.7 km would be more reasonable, in terms of weight: however, this is prohibited by the radiation
exposure rate of 9.6 mrem/hr [28] in the area not covered by the shadow shield. Though the dose rate in
that area is not immediately harmftill, it is best to keep the astronauts exposure as low as reasonably
achievable, one of the main requirements of the NASA radiation protection standard [10]. Thus, it is
recommended a distance of one kilometer between the habitat and the MSR will not exceed the
astronaut's yearly dose limit and keeps the power transmission line mass reasonable.
Therefore, the precision of the landing vehicle should be at most 100 mn and a targeted landing
site should be 1000 m from the projected site of the habitat. If the power station lands at 900 m, simple
precautions such as careful monitoring of astronaut exposure can be used to ensure the dose limit is not
exceeded. If the power station lands much closer, astronauts will have to walk further away from the
habitat and power station during exploration to ensure the dose limit is exceeded, which takes away
valuable time from science and exploration. Section 6.5 evaluates the radiation protection options in
detail.
Another trade to examine in this area is a comparison of the propellant mass necessary for
precision landing of varying distances versus transmission line mass and power drop versus shielding
mass. This trade should determine which of these masses is the most constraining because that parameter
will drive the base design. In addition, NASA should consider whether the dose limits on man-made
radiation exposure are reasonable.
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Wireless power transmission is an attractive solution to the problem above because it eliminates
the risk of landing the power station too far away from the habitat. Eliminating the power lines also
eliminates the concerns with insulating the power transmission lines and connecting the power
transmission lines to the habitat and power station. Currently, wireless power transmission is less efficient
than using wires, but it is worth examining the possible benefits of the system to determine if
development of this technology is beneficial to the Mars missions. However, this area of investigation
was beyond the scope of this thesis.
The other issue to address in landing is the concern of damaging the reactor. This can occur either
in nominal conditions or during an accident. Damage should be avoided for many reasons. Mainly. the
reactor is meant to be stand-alone without maintenance by robots or the astronauts. Therefore, any
damage sustained during landing cannot be repaired. As a result, any damage rendering the reactor
inoperable means a loss of the mission because the reactor would be the primary power station for the
erntire base. Astronauts will have an independent solar power system for the Transfer and Surtface Habitat
but that system will not support surface mobility vehicles or ISRU.
Under normnal landing conditions, the reactor will be subject to both linear and impact
decelerations. Dr. Robert Braun from Georgia Institute of Technology has been analyzing the linear
deceleration during descent for the MIT/Draper CE&R study and has determined the maximum possible
deceleration is 4.5 Martian g's ( 1.7 Earth g's) during aerocapture and 13 Martian g's (5 Earth g's) during
Entry from Orbit for the manned landing vehicle [8]. These decelerations create a constant force on the
reactor elements and should not result in damage. These forces, as well as the forces experienced during
launch, should be considered the minimum tolerated forces for the design of a space reactor.
The main concerns for damage are the impact deceleration at touchdown and vibration during the
landing phase. The impact deceleration in the reference mission is about one Earth g because the landing
legs act as shock absorbers [21]. The resultant compressive force on the radiator heat pipes could cause a
dent or fracture but this can be easily avoided by providing support to the radiator, reactor core, and
shadow shield. During these missions. NASA will land many critical systems thus it can be assumed
reliable soft-landing capability will be available for landing the power station.
Vibration during entry, descent, and landing could result in dents or fractures in the fuel pins, heat
pipes, and thennrmionics due to the quick reciprocating movement. However, the NASA Man-System
Integration Standards state vibration during reentry into the Earth atmosphere is not as intense as
vibration during launch [10]. Since gravity and the thickness of the atmosphere on Mars is less than
experienced on Earth, it is logical to conclude if the reactor can survive launch vibration without damage,
it will be able to survive landing vibration without damage.
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In tennrms of accidents, the failure probability of the landing vehicle will have to be very low to
avoid crash landing the reactor into the surface. The autonomous landing system will have to be highly
reliable with an active imaging system of the ground so that if the predetermined landing coordinates are
not feasible, the system can land the vehicle by sight." Extra propellant is advisable to allow
mianeuvering during descent to the surface.
In the case of a malfunction, the vehicle or compartment containing the reactor should inflate
airbags and possiblx a parachute to prevent a ground impact and fuel release. Though the parachute and
airbag will not prevent damage to the reactor, a fuiel release and inadvertent criticality must be averted if
the site is to be used by the astronauts in the future. The condition of the planet must be protected for
fulltire exploration purposes. Despite the low radioactivity of a freshly fuieled reactor, the resulting debris
would contaminate the site radiologically. Exploration of the site would no longer be desirable and could
result in the loss of the mission or even the loss of the entire Mars campaign if backup sites were not
prepared or technologically feasible at that time.
For this reason, a safety analysis similar to the safety analysis conducted for launch should be
conducted for landing. This safety analysis would assess the probability of failure of the landing vehicle,
possible accident scenarios, and evaluation of the consequences. The accident scenarios will mainly
involve ground impact and entry into the Martian atmosphere through free-fall from different altitudes
due to failure of the landing vehicle. The analyses of the accident scenarios must include the possibility
and source termns of fuel release due to atmospheric heating or ground impact and inadvertent criticality
upon ground impact. The consequences of these accidents will be mainly land contamination.
5.1.3 Suggested Changes to Reference Design
Two possible problems could arise from the design of the MSR. These issues are similar to the
vibration and mechanical shock tolerance issues during launch, namely the integrity of the tricusp heat
pipe/futel pin arrangement and thermionics. The heat pipes and fel pins are surrounded by the tricuLsp
materials but if spaces exist between the tricusps, the tricusps could knock back and forth damaging the
system. It is important to prevent any damage to the system that could hinder operation so the triceps
should be fitted as tightly together as possible and held in place by a reactor vessel. The touchdown shock
does pose another challenge in the development of an extra-terrestrial surface nuclear reactor because
terrestrial and space reactors do not have to withstand a multiple Earth g landing shock whereas a surface
nuclear reactor will. I'his is vital regardless of the design of the space reactor.
For the thermnionics, it may be difficult to maintain the estimated 0.1 3 mm inter-electrode spacing
necessary for the operation of the thenrmionics [121. If this spacing is not maintained, the thermionics may
76
not operate or may operate with much lower efficiencies than necessary. Steps should be taken to ensure
the adequate spacing is maintained regardless of the vibrations the reactor undergoes during landing.
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6. Surface Operations
In the area of surface operations, very little has been studied in terms of surface nuclear power.
Below is a strategy for deployment, startup, control, and radiation protection tfor a surface nuclear reactor.
In addition, several questions are discussed that need frther consideration and analysis. Lastly, the
impact of nuclear power on the base design is briefly discussed and the activity of astronauts in proximity
to the reactor.
6.1 Deployment
After landing safely on the surface, the reactor must be moved into place for operation. This
could be done in numerous ways but the logistics depends upon the mission and method of landing. For
the reference mission, the nuclear power station is one of a set of equipment contained in the surface
cargo module of the MAV. It will land along with the other equipment on one landing stage. Landing the
power station with other equipment eliminates the need for high precision in the landing vehicle, but
precision landing is expected to be necessary for the manned vehicles.
There is a problem with landing the nuclear power station along with the other equipment:
radiation protection. The fission process produces neutrons and gammas, which can be very energetic, at a
very high flux. As seen in Section 5.1.2, the dose rate on the uinshielded side of the MSR is rather high
and can be dangerous to astronauts over long periods or damaging to electronics. As a result, the reactor
must be moved a certain distance away from the landing vehicle, other equipment, and habitat to offer
this protection. In Section 5.1.2 it was determined the reactor should be about 1 km away to meet
radiation protection regulations for astronauts. It is assumed a similar distance is desired for other
equipment to protect electronics and provide for access by the astronauts without exposing them to high
radiation levels. Otherwise, additional shielding will be necessar'.
The difficulty' is moving the nuclear power station off the landing stage and 1 km away from the
module. Moving the reactor requires attaching the reactor to a surface mobility vehicle capable of
carrying or towing the power station down a ramp to the surface and then across the Martian or Lunar
surface to the desired location for reactor operation. If the reactor is carried, the surface mobility vehicle
must be able to drive on the surface with the weight of the nuclear power station, 6.5 MT for the MSR,
and set the reactor on tlo the surface. If the reactor is towed, the supporting structure of the reactor must
have a bottom surtface that can slide on the Martian regolith or lunar sand with as little friction as possible.
The reference mission does have the advantage that the vehicles will be on Mars for about one
year and 8 months before the astronauts arrive. If trip in space for the astronauts is 8 months and a 4-
78
month period is provided between verification of operation of the reactor and launching the astronauts,
the power station has about 8 months to be transported to the location of operation on the surface and
started Iup. Therefore, the vehicle that must move the power station can move slowly, decreasing the
demands on the engine. Relocation will be robotic because astronauts will not have landed by the time of
deployment.
There are many opportunities for damage to the reactor, or other possible failures, which make
this method of deployment undesirable. First, the ramp used to move the reactor off the landing stage and
module must be at a small angle to prevent the reactor and/or surface mobility vehicle from quickly
moving down the ramp and toppling over at the bottom. Second, the ramp must be wide enough for the
surface mobility vehicle to drive down the ramp automated without danger of going over the side of the
ramp. Third, a ramp that could support at least 6.5 MT, has a small angle to the surface, and wide enough
to accommodate the nuclear power station will be heavy.
The next areas of risk involve the trip to the operation location. Is it reasonable to design a system
to transport the reactor by carrying or towing withoutt knowing the composition and characteristics of the
Martian regolith'? There is no definitive information as to the characteristics of Martian regolith beyond
the fact it is similar to Earth soil. Though more is known about lunar soil, a major technological
development will be necessary to provide a surface mobility vehicle capable of moving several tons of
equipment. The toving or carrying vehicle must go slow enough to avoid tipping over and include a
sensor system to halt the vehicle if the vehicle or begins to tip, or the towline is under more force than it is
rated.
Lastly, the power supply for the surface mobility vehicle must be able to supply enough power
for the vehicle to tow the reactor to its operation location without recharging. The reactor will not produce
electricity during deployment, so the power supply must be very large to provide power to the vehicle
over a long period. All of the difficulties make landing the reactor with other equipment and then moving
it to the location of operation unlikely and technologically infeasible for the first reactor landing on the
Moon.
A better method of deployment is to launch and land the reactor separately from the other
equipment. This way, the reactor can be landed in position and the only difficulty will be moving the
reactor off the landing stage and on to the surface. As a result, the reactor would require its own launch
vehicle, landing vehicle, and propellant. The landing vehicle used will require a precision landing
capability of 100 m as discussed in Section 5. 1.2.
The idea of letting the reactor remain on the landing stage is an interesting idea if the heat
removal system can adequately cool the interface between the landing vehicle and the reactor. For the
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MSR, the very high operating temperature makes this unlikely. In addition, robots need to be able to
access the reactor and possibly astronauts if there is a failure of the electronics. Therefore, the reactor
must be moved off the landing vehicle to the ground.
This could be accomplished in the method of landing. As discussed in Section 5.1.1, a propulsive
landing is best to ensure no damage to the reactor. An advanced landing system for propulsive landing
would be a flying crane." The engines are positioned on the outside of the nuclear power station module
and hover just above the surface. Because the engines are mounted on the side of the module, the power
station could be lowered to the surface using a winch or crane system.
If the flying crane" approach to deployment were chosen, a vehicle or module would be
designed to provide protection for the power station during launch, transit, and landing. This includes an
abort system, meteoroid shield, radiation shield, heat shield for aerocapture, and backup landing system to
prevent ftiuel release on Mars. In terms of mass and money, this system is more expensive due to the
separate launch. separate vehicle, and propellant costs of a propulsive landing on Mars that requires
hovering above the surface for a period.
However, if the flying crane" idea could be reused to a pick up a small habitat, for one to two
weeks, and transport it to another location hundreds of kilometers away, the extra cost may be
worthwhile. The value of the increase in science and exploration made possible by a propulsive vehicle
capable of flying hundreds of kilometers away from the base site would allow much more of the Martian
surface to be explored by the astronauts per mission. In addition, the propellant for these trips would be
made through ISRU, further justifying the use of nuclear power. Though this poses an entirely new
challenge, the reusable flying crane" would be more versatile than a vehicle capable of towing several
tons especially since the "flying crane" could fulfill the role of that vehicle as well.
6.2 Impact on Base Design
The design of the lunar or Martian base will be affected by the choice of a nuclear power station.
By choosing a nuclear power station instead of a solar power station, the landing site selection is not
affected by solar flux or latitude. Therefore, the landing site can be chosen by the value of possible
sc ience and exploration rather than the needs of the power system.
Next, the lifetime of the reactor can be designed to suit the type of base design desired. For
example, if an accretion-style base concept is desired, which means that vehicles and assets are slowly
build tip through numerous missions, a long lifetime reactor of say 30 years would be better suited. The
long lifetime saves mass because the nuclear power station only has to be launched once to provide power
for 5-6 missions to Mars. Conversely, if a base is only used for one mission, a reactor with a lifetime of
about 5 years is more desirable because it will be smaller and one mission will use the power station to its
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full potential. If the base is only used once, there is no need to design the reactor to last longer than the
period of use of the base.
The next impact on the base design is the use of the power station. If the power station supplies
power to the habitat, the power station should be situated close to the base to avoid major power losses in
the power transmission. If the power station only provides power for ISRU and charging surface mobility
vehicles. it may be more advantageous from a radiation protection standpoint to set the reactor off from
the base. The reactor does not have to connect to the habitat so it does not need to be close by. Instead, a
garage could be set up for the surface mobility vehicles including a charging station connected to the
reactor and the ISRU plant can be farther off. Figure 6-1 shows a conceptual comparison of these two
concepts. The base on the left side involves direct powering of the habitat (HAB) by the nuclear power
station (NPS) as well as the ISRU plant, MAV, and surface mobility vehicle garage (SMVG). The base
on the right shows a base where the habitat has an independent solar power system so the nuclear power
station only provides power to the SRU, MAV, and SMVG. LP stands for the landing pad or area where
vehicles are landed. The difference in the two base concepts is the base involving direct powering of the
habitat will be more compact than the base where the habitat has an independent power system.
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Figure 6-1: Conceptual Diagram of Bases With and Without Direct Powering of Habitat by Nuclear Power
Station
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The other factor that influences the placement of the nuclear power station in regards to the
habitat is the necessary amount of crew interaction with the power station. Crew interaction with the
power station will depend on the lifetime of the reactor and the mode of power conversion, i.e. static
versus dynamic systems. If the power conversion system is static, the crew will not be able to perform
maintenance on the reactor because static power conversion systems are internal to the reactor and require
high temperatures. For dynamic power systems, the crew could be expected to perform repairs or
maintenance on the turbine or generator given a short shutdown of the reactor. The reactor itself will not
be accessible to the crew at any point. For both power conversion modes, the crew is not expected to
operate the reactor but will have the ability to manually control it if necessary.
6.3 Startup
Though not mandated, it has been general practice in the space nuclear community that reactors
should not be started until the reactor has reached a "nuclear safe" orbit. A "nuclear safe" orbit is defined
as an orbit with an Earth orbital lifetime that exceeds the time required for the radioactive inventory of the
reactor to decay to an activity essentially equal to the activity of a freshly-fueled reactor [43]. By using a
"nuclear safe" orbit as the lowest possible point of startup. additional issues concerning the release of
reactor materials and radiation exposure are avoided [35]. For a surface nuclear reactor, no benefit is
obtained by starting the reactor up before it has landed and been deployed to the desired location for
operation. As with the Cassini mission, there exists a possibility a failure could occur that would result in
a reentry accident even during interplanetary travel. To keep mission risk to the population of the Earth as
low as possible and avoid heavy radiological consequences if an accident were to occur during landing, it
is recomlnended a surface nuclear reactor should not be started up until after it has been landed.
Prior to startup, the reactor is producing a few Curies of radiation, no electricity, and no heat. The
reactor has also been subjected to many possible damage mechanisms. Thus, some preoperational testing
on the surface of the Moon or Mars must occur to verify all systems are still in working order. The startup
procedures then involve thawing the coolant, in the case of the MSR and similar liquid metal systems, and
slowly powering the reactor up to standby power. It is assumed any space reactor system will be fully
flight-tested and expected operation demonstrated before the reactor is launched into space. This
procedure would involve a full mission simulation of at least one prototype. testing for response to
nocminal and accident conditions, and testing of the major systems at various points during operation. This
section will focus on the preoperational and startup procedures on the Moon and Mars. not on flight-
testing procedures.
To understand the startup process better, the startup procedures for a commercial power reactor
and the SNAP-1OA were first researched. After presenting these procedures, the process for thawing
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liquid metal heat pipes is discussed and then preoperational and startup procedures for the MSR are
proposed.
6.3.1 Examples of Reactor Startup Procedures
6.3.1.1 Commercial Power Reactor Startup
For commercial power reactors, the testing and operation procedures are defined in the final
safety report of each plant. As an example, presented here is a brief description of the preoperational and
startup procedures of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, Massachusetts relevant to a space
nuclear reactor system. All information in this section, unless otherwise stated, is summarized from
Reference [71. Appendix B displays the complete list of preoperational and startup procedures from the
Pilgrim Final Safety Report and describes some of these tests in further detail.
Preoperational Tests
Three sets of tests are performed prior to startup as part of the preoperational test program. These
tests are the construction tests, formal preoperational tests, and the acceptance tests. The construction tests
are to determine if equipment and systems are complete and could be put into operation as construction
finishes in other areas, of the plant. The formal preoperational tests calibrate systems associated with
nuclear safety to the extent possible in the empty plant. Acceptance tests check the condition of other
systems and equipment not associated with nuclear safety to prepare for initial fuel loading and startup.
These series of tests are mainly applicable to ground testing of the flight reactor before the fuel
has been loaded. Tests involving the water coolant are not applicable to most space systems however,
tests such as the formal preoperational reactor recirculation systems test are relev ant to space systems that
use a pumped liquid coolant. Tests related to fuel storage, the turbine building, containment, and
emergency cooling systems are not relevant. The most important of these tests for space systems are the
checks and calibration of the electrical systems, control rod systems, radiation-monitoring systems, and
the process computer. In fact, testing of the process computer should be performed not only during
ground testing but also during preoperational testing of the surface reactor prior to startup.
Startup Tests
After all of the preoperational tests have been completed on the commercial reactor, the startup
and power tests can be performned. This test program includes fuel loading and tests at atmospheric
pressure. the heat up from ambient temperature and pressure, and raising the reactor from rated
temperature to 100%o power. Initial fuel loading and critical testing are performed at approximately zero
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power with the reactor pressure vessel open. Zero power means criticality has been obtained but there is
no net heat production [31]. Rated temperature is the expected. and licensed, operating temperature.
Fuel loading and atmospheric pressure tests are the first set of tests that characterize the reactor in
terms of the nuclear properties. Of these, the relevant tests are the control rod drive sstem test, source
range monitor performance test, and the process computer verification test. The control rod drive system
test ensures all control rod drives are working properly and the operating speed is measured. The
performance of the short-range neutron monitors is determined by data taken of the operational neutron
sources. It is assumed space systems will not use operational neutron sources because the sources cannot
be removed from a space reactor, but this test is important for calibration of the neutron detectors before
launch. Process computer verification of process variable signals is performed by the computer and
system performance calculations are checked. Both the control rod drive system test and process
computer verification can be used during ground testing and preoperational testing on prior to startup.
After zero power criticality tests have been performed on the commercial reactor, the reactor head
is installed. The reactor vessel gradually pressurizes to rated pressure by the universal gas law and active
reactor pressure control. Of the tests performed during pressurization, only the radiation measurements,
reactor vessel temperature measurements, and core performance evaluations are relevant to a space
reactor system, specifically to startup. The reactor vessel temperatures and radiation environment is
monitored throughout heat tip to ensure the reactor is performing as expected. Core performance
evaluations including a reactor heat balance at rated temperature are made at the end of the heat up
process.
The very last part of the startup process for both commercial and a space reactor is ramping from
zero power to fll power. For commercial reactors, the reactor power is increased in increments of 25%
power throuLgh control rod withdrawal. Tests are performed at each 25% power increment with the last
tests at full power. The commercial tests relevant to the startup procedures of a space system are flux
response, core performance evaluations, and axial power distribution measurements.
Flux response to control rod movements is examined during equilibrium and transient conditions
throughout the increase in power to characterize the reactor. Core performance evaluations are also
conducted periodically to show local surface heat flux and the critical heat flux ratios are within
acceptable limits. Axial power distribution measurements are also important for space reactors to verify
the axial power peaking is also within acceptable limits.
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6.3.1.2 SNAP-OA Startup
As discussed earlier, the SNAP-IOA was the first and only nuclear reactor launched and operated
in space b the United States of America. The SNAP- I OA reactor was cooled by NaK-78 and converted
the heat from the nuclear fission reaction to electricity by thermoelectric converters. Section 0 contains a
complete description and diagram of the SNAP-1i0A. Extensive testing of all the mechanical and
electrical components were performed before the reactor was flight qualified. These tests included
structural shock and vibration tests, electrical mockup tests, non-niuclear simulation of the flight sequence,
nuclear dry criticality, and fll startup and operation of a sister system. Thus, the reactor is characterized
before launch. [44]
The following is a description of the startup process by Smith and Zerbel of Atomics
International.
i"Upon receipt of the startup command from the Agena, which is only given after verification that
a suitable long life orbit has been obtained, the [squib activated] pin pullers release all four control
drums. Two of the drums (designated course [sic] control drums) are immediately snapped to the
full in or most reactive position where they reduce the shutdown margin, but do not introduce
sufficient reactivity to obtain criticality. The startup command also releases the two fine control
drums which are then inserted by control drum actuators at a constant rate of one-half degree of
drum rotation every 150 seconds. The control drum actuators respond to startup controller output
signals resulting from the energization of the controller by the startup command and the existence
of the low temperature conditions of the primary coolant. The startup signal is interlocked with the
nose tiring ejection by limit switches to prevent premature reactor startup. Control drum insertion
continues for about 6 hours at this constant rate at which time nuclear criticality occurs. Sensible
heat is reached about 17 minutes after criticality followed by peak thermal power transient and
relatively rapid rise in reactor outlet temperature. About 6 minutes after sensible heat production is
initiated reactor outlet temperature increases to the heat shield temperature switch setpoint and
results in switch actuation. A control signal from this switch results in the firing of heat shield
ejection squibs, actuation of the pin pullers, and heat shield ejection. With the firing of the heat
shield squibs all pyrotechnic actuated function on the NPU are completed. Pyrotechnic power is
supplied from the Agena pyrotechnic systenm.
After heat shield ejection is completed, reactivity insertion continues to raise the reactor
outlet temperature and output power until a temperature corresponding to the reactor control
temperatures setpoint of about 1010°F is reached. At this time control drum actuation ceases and
reactor startup is considered complete. During the next approximately 140-hour period, the system
experiences slight temperature and power transients resulting from hydrogen redistribution,
reflector temperature increases, and fission product poison buildup in the core. During this period,
(lefined as the stabilization period, active control of the reactor is maintained. Reactivity insertion
is accomplished in response to low reactor control temperature signals to maintain system
operating temperatures. The control system is designed to permit use of a ground command to
override the temperature switch signal and insert additional reactivity. This feature is used to trim
the output temperature to a value calculated to maintain output power over the mission lifetime.
After inal power trim the control system is place on passive or static control by use of a command
designed to turn off the controller." [44]
The NaK-78 coolant remains liquid during all stages, so there was no need for a thaw period. I-o
prevent solidification of the NaK-78, the thermoelectric pump must be running constantly prior to startup.
The thermoelectric pump was supplied with power by two 1.5V batteries connected in series. [44]
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The SNAP-I OA was mainly controlled by thermocouples during the startup stage. The negative
temperature reactivity coefficient of the SNAP-IOA design makes this control possible. A negative
temperature reactivity coefficient means the reactivity decreases as the temperature of the reactor
increases. Therefore, if the temperature increases dramatically., the reactivity will consequently decrease
dramatically and result in a temperature decrease. Eventually, an equilibrium is established for the given
power level. This control mechanism is simple to automate because it depends only on the readings from
the thermocouples and the set point temperature. Figure 6-2 shows a flowchart of the decision process
involved in the SNAP- I OA startup during the stabilization period.
Figure 6-2: Flowchart of SNAP-1OA Startup Control During Stabilization Period
6.3.2 Heat Pipe Startup
Both the commercial power reactor and SNAP- 1 OA use a coolant that is liquid at startup and flow
freely through the core. The MSR uses high-temperature Lithium heat pipes, which means the coolant is
solid at room temperature. Since the MSR Lithium heat pipes are solid prior to startup, the thawing
process is more complicated than open liquid metal systems because heat pipes rely on capillary action
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and the phase change from liquid to vapor to transport heat. As a result, the startup must include an initial
thawing period.
In the past 15 years. heat pipes have been seriously investigated as a cooling system for nuclear
space reactors. Testing to understand the characteristics of heat pipes in a nuclear system have been
conducted, mainly at Los Alamos National Laboratory, in regards to lifetime and startup. From these
experiments, the appropriate procedure for successfiul heat pipe startup was determined. In these
experiments, startup times ranged from 25 minutes to 48 hours and the coolants used varied between
Potassium, Sodium. and Lithium. All but one of the experiments were tested in a vacuum on Earth, the
other was tested in miicrogravity on the Space Shuttle. The heating mechanisms for these tests were
cartridge heaters, quartz lamps, induction coils, or electrical heaters. [20]
To begin, the evaporator region of the heat pipe needs to be heated. This could be nuclear heating
induction coils, or electrical heating. RHUs are not attractive for this purpose because heat is constantly
generated from RHIJs, which would keep the coolant a liquid the entire time. A solid coolant is preferable
during launch because it provides extra protection against rupture and does not produce superfluoLus
moments during gravity turns or complicated maneuvers.
As the metal absorbs heat, the metal coolant slowly changes to a liquid in the evaporator section.
Any vapor that exists behaves as a free-molecule gas. Limited circulation begins as more and more of the
metal turns to liquid. The active length of the heat pipe is less than the total length of the whole heat pipe
soc as circulation begins the vapor begins to travel LIup the pipe towards the condenser as the liquid travels
towards the evaporator in the wick. [20]
As the heat pipe wall temperature in the evaporator region increases and approaches the melting
point of the coolant in the wick, which for Lithium is 453 K at atmospheric pressure, the liquid begins to
transition to vapor. The wick thaws radially in the evaporator turning to vapor. The vapor will transition
from the free-molecule flow regime to the transition to the continuum flow regime as more vapor is
created. The thaw then propagates axially towards the condenser. During this period, three flow regimes
exist in the vapor: continuum flow in the evaporator, transition flow in the adiabatic section, and free-
molecule flow in the condenser. The continuum flow regime eventually fills the pipe as it filly thaws and
the temperature of the heat pipe approaches the operating temperature. Any excess liquid accumulates at
the end of the condenser so this must be accounted for in the design of the heat pipe. [20] Figure 6-3,
from Reference [20], depicts the thaw and startup of a high-temperature heat pipe.
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Figure 6-3: Startup Process of High-Temperature Heat Pipe
In order for heat pipes to operate, two phases of the coolant must exist in the heat pipe, liquid and
vapor. the vapor must perform in the viscous continuum flow regime, and no operational limits can be
violated. The major limits that affect startup and operation are the entrainment, capillary, sonic, and
viscous limits. The entrainment limit is the heat rate at which the shear force created between the liquid
traveling to the evaporator in the wick and the vapor traveling to the condenser in the vapor channel is so
great it impedes the travel of the liquid in the wick. The capillary limit is the heat rate where capillary
action breaks down. The sonic limit is the heat rate at which the vapor approaches the speed of sound and
impedes its own progress up the heat pipe by its shock waves. The viscous limit is the heat rate at which
the viscosity of the liquid limits the speed at which it can return to the condenser. [12]
These limits depend upon the physical properties, such as viscosity and density, so the limits
change as the temperature increases. Figure 6-4, from Reference [20], below shows hovw these limits
change. At startup. the entrainment, viscous, and sonic limits are the main concern while during operation
the capillary limit is the main constraint. The capillary limit is typically avoided during startup because
the active length is shorter than the entire length of the heat pipe [14].
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Figure 6-4: Operation Limits of Heat Pipes
Entrainment could be a problem in startup but can be avoided in the design of the heat pipe by
using a smaller pore size in the wick "at the liquid-vapor interface and/or increasing the cross-sectional
area for the vapor flow" [20]. The viscous limit is encountered because the viscosity of the liquid metal is
very high at low temperatures but decreases as the temperature decreases. To avoid the viscous limit, the
heat input must be kept low until the viscosity of the liquid is low enough to decrease the pressure losses
in the wick. [20]
The sonic limit is reached early during startup when the temperature of the heat pipe is near the
melting point of the working fluid and the vapor has not yet reached the continuum flow regime [20]. The
continuum flow regime is not reached until the heat pipe is at a relatively high temperature. For example,
a Lithium heat pipe with a vapor core of 20mm does not reach the iscous regime until 1025 K [20].
There is such a broad temperature range where the sonic limit can be encountered that this is a major
concern during startup and unfortunately, this limit cannot be avoided by design.
The experiments conducted at Los Alamos revealed one way to avoid the sonic limit; the heat
rejection in the condenser region must be effectively zero. In many startup cases, the sonic limit is
reached at relatively low temperatures due to the very low vapor pressure and density. At operating
temperatures, the sonic limit can be several kW/cm 2 but near the coolant melting temperature, the sonic
limit can be smaller than one mW/cm2 . Maintaining a restricted heat rejection in the condenser region of
the heat pipe and very slowly increasing the heat to the evaporator section limits the heat rate and keeps
the liquid and vapor circulating in the heat pipe. [20]
Restricting heat rejection implies that either the heat pipe should be heated evenly across the
entire length or the condenser section of the heat pipe should be covered with an insulator. One effective
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way to do this would be to coat the condenser end of the heat pipes with an insulating material that will
burn off once the heat pipe reaches the temperature where the vapor moves in the continuum flow regime.
It has also been suggested that if the core is cooled by heat pipes and the radiator uses heat pipes. then the
radiator should be covered with an insulation blanket to reduce heat rejection until all the heat pipes are
fully thawed [20]. Even if the sonic limit is reached, a successful startup can be achieved if the condenser
heat rejection is effectively zero, which is another reason to include this in the startup of a nuclear space
reactor [20].
Besides the operational limits, there is another way startup could end in failure: refreezing. In the
beginning, it is possible that startup could be disrupted by the liquid metal refreezing in the wick in the
adiabatic or condenser regions. Refrozen metal in the wick stops the return flow of liquid and could cause
the evaporator to dry' out resulting in startup failure. This results in a mass imbalance between the liquid
mass in the wick and the mass that freezes out on the solid-wick interface. If the latter is greater, the
liquid mass in the wick decreases and results in an insufficient liquid supply to the evaporator. This mass
imbalance can be avoided in careful design of the heat pipe and by keeping the initial temperature of the
frozen heat pipe close to the melting point of the coolant. [14]
In suLlmmary, a successful heat pipe startup from a frozen coolant to operating temperature can be
conducted if the heat input to the evaporator is low in the beginning and the heat rejection from the
condenser is approximately zero. As the heat pipe thaws, the heat input to the evaporator should be slowly
increased. Proper design can avoid the capillary and entrainment limits as well as a possible mass
imbalance due to the coolant freezing in the adiabatic or condenser section of the heat pipes. In addition,
the heat pipes should be designed to account for excess liquid and non-condensable gases. If heat pipes
are also used for the radiator, it is suggested that covering the radiator until both sets of heat pipes are
thawed will reduce the heat rejection in the condenser sections of both sets of heat pipes. [20]
The thaw process can be time consuming if it is conducted meticulously to avoid all limits.
Experimental startups., using non-nuclear heating. have ranged from 25 minutes to 48 hours. If a fast
startup is desired, the heat pipes can be loaded with a non-condensable gas. A non-condensable gas
accelerates the transition of the vapor from the free-molecule flow regime to the continuum flow regime.
However, the heat pipe design must compensate for the extra volume necessary for these gases. [20]
Since the MSR heat pipes use Lithium, extra volume must be designed into the heat pipe length to begin
with because neutron bombardment of Li7 produces helium gas.
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6.3.3 Proposed Startup Procedure for Reference Design
The following is a possible sequence for testing and startup of the MSR. Table 6-1 displays the
most important ground tests for the MSR flight reactor and a brief description of each test. It is assumed
all non-nuclear components of the design have been flight qualified prior to ground testing and full
mission simulation has been conducted on at least one prototype.
Table 6-1: Proposed Ground Testing for the MSR
After landing and deployment tests will be necessary' to ensure the reactor is in orking
condition before it is started. Figure 6-5 displays a flowchart of the processes and decisions involved in
the preoperational tests. Ground control will send a preoperational command that will initiate a diagnostic
of the process computer and communication systems. Once the diagnostic is completed, a repair program
will try' to fix any problems found by the diagnostic test. If the repair is successful, the diagnostic test will
run again to ensure the computer is working properly. If the repair is unsuccessful, a computer shutdown
command is activated that shuts off the computer in hopes that astronauts may be able to fix the computer
once they arrive. The MSR is fully automated by the process computer but commands from ground
control will be necessary at various points during the preoperational procedure, startup procedure, and
operation. These input commands will be explicitly stated in the description of the procedures below. If
no command is stated, it is assumed the process is fully automated.
91
Test Description
Leak Tests Perform leak tests on fuel pins, heat pipes, and the reactor
vessel.
Frozen Startup Perform startup of heat pipes from expected temperature in
space to operating temperature using non-nuclear heat
source.
Shield Movement Test Test motors to move shield segments. Time movement of
control drums for drive rate. Prepare motors and track for
dormancy and operation.
Electrical System Test Check all electrical systems for both control and electricity
production. This includes wiring tests, megger tests,
grounding, and calibration.
Process Computer Run diagnostics on computer used for control. Check
hardware, software, and associated equipment for proper
operation.
Radiation Monitoring Systems Check and calibrate all radiation monitors including wiring
for power and output signal.
Control Drum Tests Check the operation of the control dru actuators. Time
turning rate and scram prior to fuel loading. Calibrate
position indicators.
In order to perform any of these tests, a power supply must be present in the reactor system to
power the computer, communications system, and instrumentation. Sizing a power supply for these
systems was beyond the scope of this thesis because the power requirements depend upon the
characteristics of the systems used. However, a fuiel cell is recommended as the power source because it
has a high specific power, slow degradation over life, and a high radiation tolerance [52].
Figure 6-5: Preoperational Test Flow Chart
When the diagnostic test reports the computer is functioning properly, diagnostic tests of the
communications and power generation electronics are performed next. These diagnostics will be built into
the electronics and activated by the process computer. After these diagnostics, the communications
system begins to broadcast the radiation monitor readings and thermocouple readings back to Earth. Next.
an integrity test will be performed to determine if the reactor is damaged. Ideally, an imaging system
would perform this role so that ground control has a visual image to demonstrate the reactor is
undamaged. However., an imaging system would be heavy, require more startup power, and require an
external system that would be deployed separately from the reactor.
An alternative method to confirm integrity could be a pressure sensor in the reactor vessel. The
reactor vessel is hermetically sealed to prevent the Martian atmosphere from entering. As a result, the
pressure in the vessel can be predicted by Gay-Lussac's Law. The heat pipes and fuel pins will also be
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pressurized, but to a lower pressure than the reactor vessel, thus any breach of the heat pipes or fuel pins
would result in a lower pressure than predicted. The initial pressure and temperature will be the pressure
and temperature measurements taken before launch. The thermocouples will provide the temperature at
the time of the integrity test. Photographs of the exterior can confirm integrity of the radiator and radiator
heat pipes.
In addition to assuring physical integrity, the integrity test should include a test of the control
drum systems. This would involve rotating each of the control drums, one at a time, about 10 degrees out
and then back to fll-in position. It is very important each drum be rotated alone with all of the other
control drums in the full-in position to ensure criticality is not reached. Rotating each drum verifies all the
drums and the control drum drive systems are in working order.
Once the integrity test is completed, ground control will decide if the reactor can be started Iup
depending on the results of the integrity test. If the reactor appears to be damaged, then the mission may
be aborted or another power station sent. When ground control is satisfied the reactor is undamaged, the
startup process can begin. At the beginning of the startup process, the power station is not connected to
any systems. the astronauts and habitat are not present, and the radiator is covered with an insulating
blanket to limit heat rejection during startup of the heat pipes. Figure 6-6 and Figure 6-7 show the startup
procedure in flowchart form.
Upon receipt of the startup command from ground control, the power station conducts two
actions. First, the shadow shield is aligned with the projected location of the habitat. The MSR design
assumed a motor would be fitted to the bottom of the shield to rotate it to the correct position using
instructions in the startup command on how to rotate the shield. The alignment could be accomplished in
trwo other possible ways. If the reactor has to be moved to a new location after landing, the reactor could
be rotated during transport to the new location. The other method would be that the landing vehicle could
orient the shield through its roll during landing, which would be an additional requirement on the landing
vehicle.
The second action taken upon receipt of the startup command is initiation of the thaw process.
The thaw of the heat pipes begins by initiating the electrical heaters that are wound around the core heat
pipe evaporator sections. The addition of heat by the electrical heaters cannot exceed the viscous limit,
which is determined during testing of the prototype.
To thaw the Lithium heat pipes of the MSR from 100 K, the lowest temperature on the Moon, to
1200 K requires 12,935 kJ of heat. Two energy storage devices were modeled as possible sources for this
energy: a Lithium Sulfur Dioxide battery and a non-regenerative fuel cell. The Lithium Sulfur Dioxide
93
battery has a specific energy density ranging between 130 and 350 W hr/kg [52]. Using the conservative
energy density, the Lithium Sulfur Dioxide battery to thaw the MSR heat pipes would be 358 kg.
In determining the mass of the fuel cell, the mass of the reactants and the mass of the cell itself
are calculated. The mass of the reactants depend on the total energy output required, which is about 46.6
kW-hr. The reactant masses for this energy are 3.8 kg of Hydrogen gas and 15 kg of Oxygen. The mass of
the futel cell itself depends on the duration of discharge because the specific power of the fuel cell is 275
W/kg [52]. Table 6-2 shows the total mass of the fuel cell for thawing the MSR heat pipes over different
periods. Regardless of the duration, the fuel cell is more mass efficient than the Lithium battery.
Therefore, the fel cell will provide the power for thaw. Since there is no time constraint on startup, the
22.4 kg fuel cell is recommended.
Table 6-2: Total Mass of Fuel Cell for Thawing MSR Heat Pipes at Different Rates
Thaw Time Total Fuel Cell
(hr) Mass (kg)
1 188.17
5 52.70
12 32.94
24 25.89
36 23.54
48 22.36
During thaw, the control system relies on the thennrmocouples on the core and radiator heat pipes.
When the adiabatic section of the radiator heat pipes equals 700 K, a signal will be sent to the squibs on
the bands holding the blanket on the radiator to active and release the insulating blanket. The blanket will
fall off the radiator due to gravity. At the temperature of 700 K, the radiator heat pipes will be well within
the continuum flow regime, which begins at about 580 K depending on the design of the heat pipe [20].
When the evaporator section of the core heat pipes is 1025 K, the beginning of the continuum
flow regime for a Lithium heat pipe [20], the control drums will be unlocked and the two coarse control
drums rotated 90° into full out position. Each control drum has a reactivity worth of 1$ and only five of
the eight control drums are necessary at the beginning of life to shut down the reactor [12]. Rotating the
to coarse control drums out during startup will significantly reduce the shutdown margin and increase
the neutron flux without inducing criticality.
Next, the rotation of the fine control drums will be initiated as well as the monitoring of the
neutron flux in the control system. The control system uses the core neutron monitors to determine the
power level of the reactor and its reactor period. The reactor period measurements are used to predict
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when criticality will be achieved to slow down the rotation of the control drums to a moderate 0. l¢/sec to
limit power transients. [23]
The control system now uses both the temperature and neutron flux characteristics of the core.
Once criticality is reached and the temperature of the core heat pipes reached 1200 K, the electrical
heaters are shut off. At this point, the reactor is producing sensible heat and the temperature continues to
rise without the electrical heaters. This is known as the cold zero power level of the reactor because
criticality has been achieved and heat is starting to be produced but no electricity is produced. When the
core heat pipes reach 1600 K, the thermionics are just producing electricity. This state is hot zero power;
heat is being produced, criticality has been achieved, and electricity is just beginning to be produced. The
control drums are halted and the control system maintains hot zero power while a robot is signaled to
connect power transmission lines from the MAV, and any other vehicles present. to the reactor.
After the robot finishes this task, it will transmit a signal to the power station indicating whether
the connection was successful. If the connection is not successful, the reactor will maintain its current
temperature until the astronauts arrive to address the problem. If the connection is successful, the power
can be increased. The control drums will rotate out until the condenser of the core heat pipes have reached
1 800 K, which is the fill power operating temperature. Upon reaching this temperature, the control drums
will stop moving and the control system will maintain the temperature and flux level.
Ramping the reactor up to full power is a demonstration of the proper operation of the reactor and
power station. The reactor will stay at this level until ground control issues a power down command. The
power down command will initiate the control drums to rotate inwards to decrease the power and
temperature of the reactor. Without astronauts on the planet, the power station only needs to provide
enough power to maintain the MAV. Therefore, the control drums will continue to rotate in until the
electrical system produces 4.5 kW, the power required to maintain the MAV [241. Once this power output
is reached, the control drum movement will be stopped and the control system will maintain the
temperature and neutron flux level until astronauts arrive.
The control system maintains the ability to perform slight adjustments to the control drums in
order to maintain the temperature of the reactor at or above the temperature necessary to produce 4.5 kW.
Naturally, the temperature and neutron flux will vary slightly due to bum uip of the fuel and expansion of
the materials in the system. Once astronauts arrive, they will be able to increase or decrease the power
level as needed b sending commands to the reactor process computer and will have the ability to
shutdown the reactor if necessary.
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Figure 6-7: Continuation of Startup Procedure
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6.4 Control
As discussed briefly in the previous section, the reactor will have to be controlled autonomously
due to the lag time of about 40 minutes in communications between the Earth and Mars. On the Moon,
the lag time is very short, so the reactor could be controlled by ground command, but abiding by the
Mars-back approach requires operation on the Moon to be autonomous.
The main reason why the lag time prohibits operation via teleoperation is the reactor period. The
reactor period is the time required for the neutron flux in the reactor to change due to reactivity.
Typically, the reactor period is less than a second. The reactor period is given by Equation 6-1 below
T -- (6-1)
where p is the reactivity of the reactor and I* is the mean neutron generation time given by Equation 6-2
[30].
P 1
1*~~~~~~ = --- ~~~~~~~~~(6-2)
where 1) is the mean speed of the neutrons and VYf is the macroscopic neutron production cross section
[30]. For the MSR, the mean neutron generation time is 1.84 *10-6 seconds [12] hence, if the
multiplication factor k is 1.001 the reactor period is 1.84*10-3 seconds. For thermal reactors, the mean
neutron generation time is 10-4 seconds giving a reactor period of 0. seconds tfor the same multiplication
tfactor [30].
Another contributor to the response time of the reactor is the delayed neutron fraction. This is the
fraction of neutrons produced from the beta decay of fission fragments compared to the total number of
fission neutrons. The longest-lived group of these fission fragments in a thermal reactor has a half-life of
55 s. This makes the response a bit longer, about a minute fr a thermal reactor, but the reactor period is
always much shorter than a second. As a result, active remote control with a time lag is all but impossible
especially since small deviations in the multiplication factor of the reactor are very common. [30]
Automated control of a reactor requires automation through electronics and careful design of the
reactor. Automation through electronics is accomplished by a computer that monitors the reactor through
thermocouples and neutron flux detectors strategically place in and around the reactor. The computer will
also control the movement of the control mechanism to add or remove reactivity from the system as
necessary.
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Automation through design is accomplished through inherent feedback mechanisms, which affect
reactivity according to changes in the neutron flux. A positive feedback mechanism enhances the
condition that produced it and negative feedback diminishes the condition that produced it. A good
example of this is the fuel temperature feedback. Due to a phenomena called Doppler broadening. the
probability of absorption or fission decreases as temperature increases. Thus, as temperature increases, the
reactivity of the fuel decreases thereby lowering the temperature. This is a ood inherent negative
feedback mechanism. [130]
In addition to the fuel temperature, changes in the materials characteristics of the moderator (if
present), coolant fel. and thermal expansion of the system all create feedback on the reactor. Careful
design of the reactor can produce a net negative feedback system. This is the type of system desired for
surface nuclear power on the Moon and Mars because the net negative feedback system will always bring
the reactor back to equilibrium. External control would only be necessary at startup, to initiate and end
power transients, ad at shutdown. If the net feedback of the temperature of the system is negative, then
steady state control for a certain temperature can be run completely autonomously using a temperature
sensor to add reactivity when the outlet temperature drops below a set point. This was the situation for the
SNAP- OA.
For the MSR, the feedback mechanisms were not calculated due to time constraints. The MSR is
assumed to have a net negative feedback for both the startup procedure and steady state operation. As a
result, ground control or astronauts on the surface, only need to interact with the reactor at startup, for
changes in power level, and for end-of-life shutdown. Both will have the ability to change the power level
of the reactor and shutdown the reactor at any time during the mission. It is assumed that ground control
will monitor the behavior of the reactor but will not control the reactor in real time.
In the case of an accident, such as loss of flow or a failure of the power conversion system, the
control system must monitor for indications of the accident, which would be a sudden change in the
temperature of the system or a sudden change in the neutron flux. Both of these measurements are used
for control during startup and steady state operation. For a loss of coolant accident, the temperature of the
reactor would begin to climb dramatically. To deal with this situation, either the control system should
have an upper limit on the reactor operating temperature, which if exceeded results in a scram, or the
astronauts on the surface will have to monitor the system for temperature spikes. Since the time of the
astronauts can be used for more value tasks, such as the search for past life, the control system should be
able to recognize these situations and take appropriate action. Ground qualification of the reactor should
be able to characterize these accident conditions for the control system.
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For the MSR in particular, there are two main possible modes of failure. These modes are a control
drum failure and rupture of a heat pipe. In the former case, the control drum motor breaks and the control
drum either will not turn or is stuck in the full out position. This is not a major concern in terms of
operation because only five of the eight control drums are necessary for full shutdown of the reactor.
Transient analyses for a sudden addition of reactivity due to a single control drum failure was not
conducted but should be conducted to ensure the heat pipes can remove the resultant thermal energy
without exceeding the operational limits.
A heat pipe rupture will increase the heat flux on the surrounding heat pipes but will not result in a
melting of the heat pipe or violation of the heat pipe operational limits. The margin between the limits and
operation were designed so that each heat pipe could transport 7/6 the operational heat flux in case of
failure and still operate normally. For a fll description of this analysis, please see reference [12].
After a shutdown due to an accident, ground control will have to review data from the monitoring
system to determine the mode of failure. If the failure was caused by a failure in the electronics system, it
would be possible to repair because the electronics are located on the outside of the shield. If the accident
was caused by a loss of coolant or heat pipe, failure of a static power conversion system, or over
temrnperatuLre. it will not be repairable. The reason is that the reactor is not designed for access and the
fission products will continue to produce radiation for a long period after shutdown. Electronics can be
repaired after a day or two wait to allow the short-lived fission products to decay. A dynamic power
conversion system can be repaired given extra parts are provided for that system, time is allowed for the
fission products to decay, and the turbines are located on the shielded side of the reactor. After repairs, the
reactor can be restarted using the startup procedure outlined in Section 63.3.3.
If the system cannot be repaired or the reactor has come to the end of life, the reactor will have to
be permanently shutdown. A possible way of doing this is ejecting the reflector. Another way would be to
reinsert any launch safet mechanisms. Regardless of the method of shutdown, the cooling system must
be able to continue removing the heat until the temperature of the system is no longer a threat to the
materials. Heat pipe coolant systems and natural circulation systems are ideal for this purpose because
these systems do not use electricity. For a pumped gas or liquid metal system, an additional power system
may be required to provide power to the pumps for a few years after shutdown.
6.5 Radiation Protection
According to NASA standards, astronauts are considered radiation workers, however the
radiation exposure astronauts are subject to are higher than the guidelines set in 29 CFR 1910.1096. Thus.
NASA has established its own radiation exposure limits, which were recommended by the National
Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement. Limits pertain to both acute exposures in a month's
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time or year's time and a chronic exposure during the individual's career as an astronaut. Table 6-3, from
NASA's Man-Systems Integration Standards, displays these exposure limits in rem. [10]
Table 6-3: Radiation Exposure Limits for Spaceflight
Exposure Depth Dose-Equivalent Eye Dose-Equivalent Skin Dose-Equivalent
Interval (5 cm) (0.3 cm) (0.01 cm)
30 days 25 REM 100 REM 150 REM
Annual 50 REM 200 REM 300 REM
Career 100 to 400 REM 400 REM 600 REM
The career exposure limits are dependent upon the age and sex of the individual at the beginning
of exposure. Equations 5-1 and 5-2, also from NASA's Man-Systems Integration Standards, are the
expressions used to determine career exposure limits up to 400 rem maximum:
Cacreer Dose Equivalent Limit(Macle) = 200 + 7.5 * (Age - 30) (6-3)
Ccareer Dose Equivalent Limit(Female) = 200 + 7.5 * (Age - 38) (6-4)
Astronaut exposure limits are subject to extra requirements to ensure no astronaut receives the limit or
exceeds it. One of these requirements involves keeping planned exposures As Low As Reasonably
Achievable (ALARA). Another requirement is exposure from man-made radiation sources cannot exceed
the requirements set down in 29 CFR 1910.1096, except where mission objectives cannot be met
otherwise. Thus, the exposure to the astronauts from the reactor should be no more than 5 rem/year. [10]
As an example, the radiation protection needs of the MSR are examined. The MSR uses a shadow
shield system to protect the crew. In Section 5.1.2, the need for a separation distance of one kilometer
between the habitat and the reactor was already discussed. This distance is a necessity of the shadow
shield design of the MSR and radiation dose limit of 5 rem/year [10] to astronauts established by NASA.
As an illustration, Figure 6-8 from Reference [12] shows the shadow shield design used for the MSR. A
shadow shield was chosen because a similar shield that fully encompasses the reactor would be too
massive. If the same type and amount of materials used in the shadow shield were used to encompass the
reactor completely to achieve, the shield would weigh about 8.5 MT and result in a dose rate of 4
mrem/hr at I I m from the shield. The design of the MSR assumed the limit on the weight of the reactor
was 10 MT, so a full shield would far exceed the weight limit. [12]
101
B4 (
Core
W
Figure 6-8: Shadow Shield Design of the Martian Surface Reactor
Table 6-4 presents the neutron and gamma dose rates from the MSR shadow shield at various
distances in rem/year, calculated using unpublished work by Erik Johnson [28]. The shielded exposure
refers to the area within the shadow shield at the beginning of the MSR operating life. The shadow shield
will loose some of its effectiveness during the operating life due to the bombardment of the B4 C shield by
the neutron flux, but the change in shielding effectiveness was found to be negligible after a distance of
50 meters [12]. At a distance of I kilometer, the dose rates are 41.3 rem/year on the unshielded side and
about 3 mrem/year on the shielded side. The dose received on the shielded side is approximately
equivalent to the dose received by a person who received three dental x-rays in one year [3].
Table 6-4: Shielded and Unshielded Exposure Rates at Various Distances
Distance Total Dose (rem/year)
(m) Unshielded Shielded BOL
100 4126.0 3.04E-01
250 686.4 4.86E-02
400 257.9 1.90E-02
550 136.7 1.00E-02
700 84.2 6.20E-03
850 57.1 4.21E-03
1000 41.3 3.04E-03
1150 31.2 2.30E-03
1300 24.4 1.80E-03
1450 19.6 1.45E-03
1600 16.1 1.19E-03
1750 13.5 9.92E-04
1900 11.4 8.42E-04
2000 10.3 7.60E-04
The astronauts, however, are not going to spend all of their time in the habitat, thus some
assumptions must be made as to the frequency and characteristics of their activities to determine a more
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realistic yearly exposure than simply the shielded dose rate at a given distance. Astronauts wvill be
expected to leave the habitat and explore the surrounding area regularly during their stay on Mars. These
excursions are called Extra-Vehicular Activities (EVA), which encompass all activities outside of the
habitat.
In the Draper/MIT study, it is expected that during the 600-day mission on the Martian surface,
the following rules will govern EVA. First, the maximum time spent in an EVA per day is 8 hours.
Astronauts must wait one day between EVAs unless the EVA is a multi-day activity. Astronauts walk at a
rate of 3 km per hour and a workweek is 6 days long. [29]
Using these assumptions, a conservative estimate for the yearly dose exposure by the astronauts
on the Martian surface from the MSR was calculated. During EVAs, it is assuimed that the astronauts
would be exposed to a dose equivalent to that received if the astronaut walked around the MSR, on the
unshielded side, maintaining the same distance from the MSR as the habitat. This means if the habitat is
500 m from the reactor, the astronaut is assumed to spend their time during EVA at 500 m from the
reactor on the unshielded side. The time in the unshielded region is adjusted to account for the shadow
from the shield, meaning the time spent walking from the habitat to the unshielded region was subtracted
from the time spent in the unshielded region and added to the time spent in the shielded region. Equation
5-3 is the time spent traveling from the habitat to the unshielded region. No EVAs lasted more than one
day, and given the assumptions above. no more than 3 EVAs were conducted each week.
d * tan(40°)T =-dtan(40) (6-5)
3000
where d is the distance from the habitat to the MSR and the denominator is the Balking rate of the
astronauts in meters per hour.
Equation 5-4 and 5-5 show the yearly dose rate if an astronaut spends 4 clays per week in the
habitat, Dlab, and 3 days per week in EVA, DEVA.
DH,, = R * 24j * 4 * 52 w (6-6)d wk IT
D- (R. ( 6 + XT) *3 * 52 wk) + (Rc * (8 - 2T) * 3 * 52 k) (6-7)
where R is the hourly dose rate on either the shielded side (subscript S) or the inshielded side (subscript
U), which depends on the distance from the habitat. Time T is added or subtracted twice because the
astronaut walks to the unshielded region at the beginning of the EVA and then back to the habitat at the
end of the EVA. The yearly total dose rate is the sum of these values. This estimate is conservative due to
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the assumption that the astronaut would maintain a given distance and never go closer to or farther from
the reactor. Table 6-5 shows the estimated total yearly dose rate for various distances between the habitat
and the MSR.
Table 6-5: Predicted Yearly Exposure For Varying Habitat Distances
Distance Predicted Total Length of Shielded Region
(m) Dose (rem/year) at Given Distance (m)
100 583.97 167.82
250 96.13 419.55
400 35.73 671.28
550 18.74 923.01
700 11.41 1174.74
850 7.66 1426.47
1000 5.47 1678.20
1150 4.09 1929.93
1300 3.16 2181.66
1450 2.51 2433.39
1600 2.04 2685.12
1750 1.69 2936.85
1900 1.41 3188.58
2000 1.26 3356.40
Maintaining the NASA standard for radiation protection from man-made radiation sources, the
closest the habitat could be is between one kilometer and 1150 meters. Assuming the predicted dose is
conservative within 10%, a distance of one kilometer would be acceptable. If the habitat were much
closer, the radiation exposure would exceed NASA limits.
If a shield that encompasses the entire reactor were to be used instead of the shadow shield, the
reduction in dose rate will not need to be as extreme as assumed necessary for the shadow shield.
Assuming close proximity to the reactor, within only a few meters, is kept to a minimum, then the
shielding does not need to be as thick. For example, by reducing the thickness of the B4C and W shields
to 25 cm and 10 cm, respectively, the resulting shield would have a mass of 5.65 MT and the dose rate at
10 0 m would be 3.58 rem/year. Although this is about the same weight as the reactor itself, the mass may
be worthwhile because the restricted area around the reactor would only be about 0.0314 km2 instead of
3.14 k 2 and astronauts will not need to monitor their time spent away from the habitat due to radiation
concerns. In addition, the requirement on precision landing will not be as stringent because the exposure
will not exceed the limit as long as the habitat is no closer than 100 m to the reactor.
The mass constraint may be worth a reevaluation because if the habitat could be placed at a
distance of only 100 rm from the reactor, a much larger area around the reactor could be explored without
exceeding the dose limit. Astronauts at that distance would only receive a dose of 300 mrem per year for
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the full shield if they ventured no closer to the reactor than 100 m. For the thinner alternative full shield,
the same conditions apply except the astronauts would receive a higher dose rate of 3.58 rem/year, which
is still well within NASA dose limit regulations.
Abiding by the mass constraint, a method to reduce the mass of a full shield would be to
investigate the reactor design itself. Due to the choice of materials and enrichment of the fuel, the average
energy of the neutrons in the MSR is 0.5 MeV. Because of the extremely energetic neutrons, the control
drums and reflector are 30 cm and 20 cm thick respectively and made of a very dense material. By
softening the spectrum, the shield could be moved closer to the reactor because the amount of reflector
material would decrease. The type of reflector material could also be switched to BeO, a much lighter
material, to reduce the mass of the reflector. These changes would result in an overall lighter reactor
without necessarily decreasing the thickness or the effectiveness of the shield. This design change was
beyond the scope of this thesis but is worth further investigation.
Uncertainty exists in these calculations because the model used did not account for secondary
phenomena. Thus, these results are only estimates of the real dose rates. The neutron shield model ignores
the creation of secondary gammas from collision with the boron atoms and does not include attenuation of
the gamma flux through the B4C shield. Additionally, the neutron model does not geometrically attenuate
the neutrons as l/r_ at large distances when it is best to approximate the reactor as a point source. Lastly,
the model of the gamma shield does not include attenuation of neutrons. A better shielding model should
be developed tbor a more accurate representation.
The other option for shielding that does not involve launching extra mass is in-situ shielding. In-
situ shielding would involve an in-depth investigation of the use of regolith as the shielding material. This
approach involves either plowing material in a torus around the reactor or placing the entire power station
in a crater or hole. Figure 6-9 and Figure 6-10 from Reference [12] depict cutaway representations of
these two methods of in-situ shielding.
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Figure 6-9: Core Surrounded by Surface Material as Shield
Figure 6-10: Reactor Placed in Side of Crater (left), Reactor Placed Below Surface (right)
The difficulties with in-situ shielding approaches are two-fold. First, robotic equipment must be
available on the Moon or Mars to create a foundation for the power station in a crater, drill a hole into the
ground and lower the powver station into it, or push the regolith up and around the reactor. These vehicles
need power, autonomous control, and will increase mass due to the machinery necessary to dig or plow.
In the case of the crater, a vehicle that could scale the side of a crater would be necessary and the vehicle
may have to carry the reactor while entering the crater. The flying crane" approach to landing would
make placement of the reactor much simpler because these vehicles would not be necessary except for a
robot capable of connecting the power transmission line to the MAV and habitat. If the vehicles serve
multiple purposes, such as providing for in-situ shielding of the habitat and specimen collection, the extra
weight may be justifiable.
As a quick example, a previous design study in the MIT Nuclear Science and Engineering
Department calculated the thickness of Martian regolith necessary for shielding. The group used a density
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of 1.66 g/crnm and macroscopic removal cross section of 0.0792 cm-' for the regolith. For thicknesses of
170 cm, 180 cm, 190 cm, 200 cm, and 210 cm, the dose rate at the shield surface was calculated to be
75.5 mrem/hr, 31.7 n mirem/hr. 13.3 mrem/hr, 5.6 mrem/hr, and 2.4 mrem/hr respectively. The group
concluded from these calculations that a thickness of 200 cm would be best to provide a margin for
erosion and keep the dose to the astronauts as low as reasonably achievable. [18]
The second problem with in-situ shielding is access. If for some reason astronauts had to access
the reactor power station, the astronauts would not have any protection from the radiation of the reactor.
Granted, the reactor would have to be shutdown for a period before astronauts could access the power
station regardless of the type of shield, the residual radiation can still pose a threat. The dose rates after
shutdown have not been calculated because it is beyond the scope of this thesis but would further efforts
to evaluate this type of shielding.
6.6 Suggested Changes to Reference Design
An optimization of the neutron spectrum and enrichment would be beneficial for a few reasons.
First, the optimization would undoubtedly decrease the total mass of the system by reducing the size of
the reflector and shielding. By increasing the enrichment, the core can be smaller because the spectrum
would not be as hard and the core would not breed, which is only needed in very long life reactors.
The current reference mission should also be evaluated to determine if it is truly best to launch
and land the nuclear reactor in the same module as other equipment. The demands of moving the reactor
off a landing vehicle and a certain distance away introduce a lot of risk for damage to the reactor in as
simple an accident as tipping over. An evaluation of the benefits and cost of launching the reactor on its
ovn and using a ftlying crane" to land it will be worth the time and effort if indeed the benefits and
reduction of risk to the reactor outweigh the cost.
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7. Conclusions
After examining the different aspects of launch, transport, landing, and surface operation, general
recommendations for the design of space nuclear fission reactors can be made. In terms of launching the
reactor system, although extensive safety analyses must be conducted to demonstrate any fuel release
fiom a launch accident poses an insignificant risk to the public. The amount of radioactivity in an unused
nuclear reactor is far less than in recent RTGs, such as Cassini, so this is not expected to pose a major
problem. A unique safety requirement for reactors is to prove that criticality will not occur during an
accident. Careful design of an epithermal or fast reactor, in terms of the materials chosen and the
geometric configuration, can decrease the probability of inadvertent criticality. For a thermal reactor, an
additional satfety mechanism will be required to prevent criticality. This safety mechanism could be
additional control rods or removable boron strips along the fel assemblies.
It is recommended the reactor be designed to reenter Earth's atmosphere intact in case of an
accident, in order to decrease radiological consequences, reduce proliferation risk, and minimize the
debris field. This requires either the reactor vessel be designed to survive reentry or a special containment
vessel would surround the reactor to protect it during reentry. In addition, the reactor must be able to
withstand the extreme acceleration and vibration forces during launch and landing without damage.
Precautions, such as spacers to maintain the separation between anode and cathode in the thermionics,
should be included in the design of the reactor to prevent damage during launch and landing. The extreme
vibration environment can rupture fuel pins, if allowed to move in the fuel assemblies, and damage
turbine blades in a dynamic power conversion system. Both of these recommendations would likely entail
an extensive testing and simulation program.
It is recommended that the reactor and power electronics be packaged together in the transport
vehicle so that assembly of the power station, beyond connecting power transmission lines, is avoided. By
limiting assembly, the autonomous deployment of the power station is kept simple and allows for the
possible use of a "flying crane" landing vehicle. With the complete power station in one vehicle, it is vital
to provide meteoroid protection and possibly an abort system for launch accidents.
During transport of the reactor to another planet, a shield is recommended to protect against
meteoroids. The protection against meteoroids can be accomplished by wrapping the transport vehicle in
a ceramic fabric such as the Nextel fabric by 3M, which has already been adopted by NASA and tested in
space [I]. All electronics must be radiation hardened as is normal in standard space vehicle design.
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Landing the reactor should be conducted using an autonomous, propulsive landing vehicle with
precision and soft landing capabilities. In accordance with this, a flying crane" landing vehicle is
expected to have all of these features and would be able to land the reactor at the location of operation
without involving robots to move the reactor around the surface. Regardless of the method of landing, a
safety analysis similar to that conducted for launch must be conducted for landing accidents.
In shielding the reactor, special consideration must be paid to the mass of the system because
mass is proportional to cost in astronautics. A shadow shield design can be employed, but this poses an
additional challenge. The shadow shield must be aligned with the habitat to protect the astronauts.
Alignment could be accomplished through a special roll maneuver during landing, rotation of the reactor
during deployment, or a special motor on the shield. Eliminating shield mass all together would require
the use of in-situ shielding, which in turn requires bulldozer-type vehicles to create mounds of soil around
the reactor or bury the reactor.
The most important of these recommendations is that the reactor system must be designed to
operate autonomously and automatically shutdown in the case of a malfunction. This means the reactor
itself should have a net negative reactivity coefficient so the power level will decrease if reactivity is not
regularly added to the reactor through control mechanism movement. The fel should not have a high
breeding ratio to ensure reactivity at end-of-life is lower than at beginning-of-life. This is accomplished
by using very highly enriched fuel, on the order of 90 weight percent enriched. to keep the inventory of
Uranium-238 low.
In addition, a computer control system should be incorporated into the design to perform
preoperational tests, provide communications, and control the movement of the control mechanism to add
or remove reactivity as necessary. This control system will require thermocouples, pressure sensors, and
neutron detectors to monitor the reactor. Interaction with ground control is only necessary at startup,
shutdown, and to change the power level of the reactor. Ground control will monitor the reactor at all
times and will have the ability to change the power level or shutdown the reactor at any time. Astronauts
on the surface will also have the ability to startup, shutdown, and change the power level of the reactor.
As with any terrestrial plant, the nuclear plant on the surface will also have safety analyses
conducted for all feasible accident scenarios during operation. The results of these analyses will be used
to prove the reactor is safe for operation and will be used to program the control computer to recognize
the signs of accident from the instrumentation on the reactor.
Lastly, the design of the reactor must allow for permanent shutdown at the end-of-life on the
surface of the Moon or Mars. The cooling system of the reactor will have to continue to cool the reactor
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after shutdown to remove the decay heat of the fission products. Shielding of the reactor must also
continue due to the radioactivity of the fission products.
Given the extensive knowledge base of reactor design for terrestrial and naval reactors on Earth
and the knowledge base in launching radioisotope power sources, it is judged that surface nuclear power
on the Moon or Mars is feasible. The safety record of the former Soviet Union and United States is very
good, only one accident resulting in fuel release out of 76 launched power systems. Through development
oF surface nuclear power for another planet, the door is opened for further development of nuclear
propulsion systems and the capability to live on other planets. As President George W. Bush said at the
end of his speech announcing the new space policy of the United States, Mankind is drawn to the
heavens for the same reason we were once drawn into unknown lands and across the open sea. We choose
to explore space because doing so improves our lives, and lifts our national spirit. So let us continue the
journey." [ 11]
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Appendix A: Power Models
surfaceSolarPower.m - This Matlab file calculates the mass and efficiency of a solar power
system given a power level, cell type. planet. and mission length.
%,Author: Afreen Siddiq
Loast Mlodified: 01/12/05
0
'INPUTS:
°o, Power: [W
%O Tspc: type of cell
%O planet: 'Moon' or'mars'
%' life: mission life in earth days
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%oRef []: Solar Electric Power System Analysis for Mars Surface Missions. NASA/TM-1999-209288
%Ref [2 : Long Rangc Mobility on Mars - Zubrin
°' oRef [3]: http://wwvxxv.knovel.com/knovel/databook/pdf/627/59788_22.pdf
%Ref [41: HSMAD
function [TotalMass. size. mass. P)ACmass]=surflaceSolarl)oxer(Po er. 'I'ylpe.planet.life.orientation.fiatFactor)
%ORetl4]. page 654
%oloss corrections
loss=[0.85: %,cell packing actor
loss =[loss .996]: %tracking cosine loss
years = life/365: °%lifetime of system in earth years
loss =[loss 0.96`' ears]: %/radiation damage
loss =[loss 0.989' ears]: %micrometeoroid damage
% loss =[loss 0.0028*1ifel: %Ocontamination and dust obscuration. Reti 11. page 2. first column
°oloss =[loss 0.98]: °'0contanination and dust obscuration
% oM()O)IFICATION !!!!!!!!
if strcmp(orientation,' Ilat')
orientationFactor = 0 0028*latFactor
theta=0:
overall Factor = 1:
elseif strcmp(orientation,'inclined')
orientationFactor = 0 0028*0.05: %for inclined case assume the dust obscuration is reduced b 95%. Retllj
theta =45 *pi/180;
overallFactor=l:
elseitf strcmp(orientation.'MER')
theta=0;
orientationFactor(:
it' strcmp(planet.'Moon')
overallFactor= -lfiatFactor:
elsei f strcmp(planel.'mars')
overallFactor=0.7:
end
end
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loss = [loss ( -orientationFactor)"life 1: %
% loss = [loss ( -0.0028*'0.05)A600]:
loss = [loss overallFactor]:
loss =[loss ().9581: %arrav resistance and diode losses
°
0
odistriubtion losses
loss =[loss 0.98]: %distribution resistance losses
loss =[loss 0.933]: %oDC to AC conversion and regulation losses
loss =[loss 0.917]: %proer management and distribution losses
cumLoss=prod(loss): %cumulative loss
P = Power/cuml.oss: %P is power required from array
0
,solar cell data is from RelI4[ pg 649-650
if strcmp(''Typc.'Si')
StandardFfl' = 0.148:
Tc = -4.5e-3: %0[C"-1]
blanketMass = 1.7: %[kg/m*2]
elseifstrcmp('l' pe.'GaAs' )
StandardEf ' = 0.185:
Tc = -2.2e-3: %[LC'-1]
blanketMass -- 2.05: %[kg/m '2
elseif strcmp(T\ pe.'Concentrator')
StandardEffl= 0.205:
['c = -1.9c-3: %[C' -I 
blanketMass = 2.05* 1.0026: %[ke/m12] %/extra lass contributes 0.260/ to blanket mass
elseif strcmp( Tvpe.'GainPl-dualJunction')
StandardEtf= 0.225:
lc = -2.Oe-3: 0 o[C'- I
blanketMass= 2.05: %,[kg/m'2]
elsecif strcmp( Type.'l ripleJunction')
Standardlff= 0.22:
Tc = -2.3e-3: %[C"-I]
blanketMass = 2.052: %Okg/m21 (1 %!!!!!need to confirm. not iven in rt4!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
elseifstrcmp('l'vpe.'lnP') %thin film
StandardEl'f = 0. 18:
Tc = -2.6e-3: %o[C"'-I]
blanketMass = 0.6: O[kgg,'m'21
elseif strcmp( T\ pe.'a-Si') %thin film
StandardElff= 0.05:
'Fc = -2.0c-3: %[C'- -]
blanketMass = 0.06: °%[kg/m"2]
elseif strcmp(Type.'CIS') °othin film
Standardlfft = 0.11:
TIc -= -6e-3: °[C'-l]
blanketMass = 0.6: %[kgmk2]
end
if stremp(planet,'Moon')
SolarFlux = 1360: %P[W/m"2]
T = 253-273: °OICI., mean surface temperature. HSMAD Table 4-l(should change this ideally to reflect operating location
on planet)
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clseif strcmp(planet.'rnars')
%SolarFlux= 494: %[W/ml2] Ref [1]. Fig 3.494 at aphelion
SolarFlux = 235.22.39: °,o[W/m'2] °'o MODIFICATION !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
T = 210-273: %[Cj , mean surface temperature. HSMAD Table 4-1
end
To = 25: °o[CI operating temperature at which standard efficienty is measured
ConversionE ff = StanidardEff*( 1 +-'I'* ('I'-''o)):
% theta=0: %assume for nok
Area = P/(SolarFlux*cos(theta)*ConversionEff): %[m'2] assume array is perfectl? aligned so cosine(theta)=l:
massArrav = Area*blanketMNass: %/[kg]
0, MIOI)IFICAIION !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
°% CHECK THE FORMULA
%massDrive = (-0.014*massArra+±20.6)*massArra/100 %Refl4 eq 20-4
massl)rive =0: 9,%assuming panels are fixed
mass = (massArra%+rnassDrive)* 1.35: %adding 35% extra mass to account tfor thermal control and electrical equipment
Retl4]. page 653
I'PD)AC'_SpecificMass = 17.4: %[kg/kWV ReTI3]. page 3 (I)AC: Power Distribution and Control)
PDA(Cmass = Power'1000*PDAC_SpeciticMass:
TotalMlass = rnass+Pl)AC'mass:
size= Area: °o[m*'21
O o O 0 0 °o °o ,o 0 o. oOO ,oOOoaO%,o,o,09oOoOO/o o ooo ooooo% 0O 0 00 ,0/
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MarsPowerCalcSK.m - This Matlab file compares the mass of a solar power system and a
nuclear power system on Mars. Afreen Siddiqi is the original author and SuLsan Kane updated it to account
from new assumptions.
% a 535 kg ATV with solar and fuelcell power supply has - a ratio of 1:3 of
% energy provided bv solar and fuel cell sstem respectively. Peak power is
%O 2.25kW (540N motion resistance) for a 15 km/hr vehicle. or non-towing operations. the energ
9'o needed for an 8 hour operation is then 8*2.25 = 18 kW-hr. If the fuel
0%o cells supplies 3/4 of that energy, the batterd has to have 13.5 kW-hr.
% To haul a 1.2 tonne camper. at 10 km/hr. 3.4 kW are needed. If each day we
,( to\ for 8 hours, then energv needed is 3.4 * 8 = 27.2 kW-hr. If we use the
0o same ratio, then we can expect that the battery
%O needs to deliver 27.2*0.75 = 20.4 kW-hr tfor one day of towing.
% The mass of camper includes its own power supplx so we assume that only
O fuel cells for ATV need to be recharged. We also assume that fuel cells
°O carry charge needed for the entire trip. So for a 7 day trip with 2 total
% days of towing. the energy required is 20.4 *2 = 40.4 kW'-hr.
% It is assumed that the energy required to carry out traverses at the camp
('%o l cation will be provided by an extra set of batteries/fuel cells which will be
%, recharged by pow er sx stem of camper. so there wvill not be any down time
% of the ATVs w\hile at carnp site. However the tow-energy is charged up at
%O the base surlface power plant.
close all
clear all
planet ='mars:
life =600: %osols
solarl owerGenerationl'ime = 13.9333: N%[hrs]depends on the length of day
ATVenerg? = 13.5: °0OkW-hr
%O A'l'Vencrgy_7davTrip = 40.4: %okW-hr. 7 day trip. 2 days of towing
AVenerv = 12: °okW-hr (based on 55 k AV (with fuel cells and solar panels) towing camper and carring charge for 8
hour haul operation)
-0 plot showing energy vs time at different power levels----------------
step=20:
E = 0:step: 00: 0 energ? alues in kW-hr
P=2.5:2.5:10: 'ookW
for ind = 1: length(P) 
% Rows of T are recharge times for a specific level of recharge power
% columns arc different encrgies
'I'(ind.:) =l/P(ind): %tinmle is in hrs
end
Tdaxys = T/solarPowerGenerationTime:
figure
plot(E.T'daN s)
grid on
xlabel('Fnergx [kW-hr]')
label('Charging time [days )
legend(' 2.5 kW'.'5 kW'.'7.5 kW'.'10 kW')
9/oshow ing positions of open rok er and press rover cases
hold on
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plot([ATVcncrgy.ATVcncrgyI. [min(Tdays( 1,:)). max(Tdays( .:))J)
%O plot([AT'Venergy_7dav'rip. Al'Venergy_7dav'Trip]. [min(Tdays( I .:)). max(Tdays( 1.:))])
axis([min(E) max(E) min(Tda? s( 1,:)) max(Tday s( 1,:))])
/0--------------------.
%oabove plot shows that a 5kWV power level is reasonable charging level for
°othe AT'Vs
0,
oassume 2 A'T'Vs are charged at a time
ATVchargePo%~er = 5000*2: °'oW
haPower = 10000: %[WI
ISR LiTpower = 00000: °o[WI
°o battervPok er := habPower: %obatteries only suppl power needed b\ hab during non-day light time
FuelCellsPower -habPowcr: %0W
°'sizing battery mass
solarPowerGenerationTime = 13.9333: ,O[hrs]depends on length of day
duration = 24-solarPow.erGenerationTime: %[hrs] depends on length of daN
'o 3 BatteryELncrgn = battcryPower*duration: /%[W-hrl
0,'
,O ,
0% SpecificEnerg\= 150: %o[W-hr/kg] ToLi-Ion batteries
Energ Densit = 10: %'['-hr/L]
o T'cmpHligh 50: %[C
T 'lemplxoN =-20: ,[C1
°O battervlile = 1000: [ccles]. Relf "The Electric Car" b Michael Westbrook, page 66, table 5.1
0o/
°o [)DOD = 0.80: °odepth of discharge. assume to be 80%
0'
To Battery Mass = Batter Energ?/(DOD*SpecificEnerg ): %since onlx fractional energy is obtained, battern needs to be bigger b%
DOD amount
To atterx Size = Batter Encrg(DOD*EnergDensity): o[L
FuelCellsEnergy = FuelC(ellsPower*duration: %oW-hr
NlM~ ater := 0.000364*FuelCellsEnerg: %okgH20
nwater = Nlwater* 1000/18: omoles 120
Ml2 = 2*2*nwater/l1000: %okgl 12
M02 = 32*0.5*nvater/1000: okgO2 moles of 02 in water is 1/2 the moles of water
'% FuelCelIlsMass = FuelCcellsEnergy/ 1000* 1.5+20* FuelCcllsPowcr/ 1000 o 1.5 kg/'kW-hr of reactants and 20kg/kW of
machinerx
FuelCellsIslass = FuelCe llsFPo er*0.0 1655+0. * Mw ater+0.5*(N/I [12+MO2)+M1I2+M2/I2+20* FuelCellsPower/I1000 %O 0.01655
kg,'W per regenerative fuel cell,
01
-......sizing solar panelsi-----
0
oassuming solar arrays enerate additional power that maybe needed or
%ISRU. rover recharging etc. It is also assumed that rovers are charged
°oduring da? light time during their 'down' da s
To BattlossE = 1.75: °'for ever I W-hr charged. 1.75 W-hr needs to be supplied to account for inefficiencies
%o solarPowerForl lab = habPowcr+(BateryEnergy* BattLossE,/solarPowerGenerationTime): /opow er needed to be generated by
solar panels for powering hab only and recharging batteries for night power for hab
solarIPowerForl lab = hab Power+(FuelCellsEnergy /(0.6*solarPowxerGenerationI ime)):
HabAndATVs = solarPowerForHab + ATVchargePokver:
Total = ISRUpower + HabAndATVs:
Pow ers=- [solarPowerForl ab. labAndA'TVs. Total]
To'owers gives power levels lfor four scenarios. i.e. solar plant powers:
%o]. only hab,
%o2. Ilab and ATl'Vs. assuming ATVs only charge during the day
To3. Power exer thing. assuming ISRU and ATVs charging only during the day
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%- ---------------------inclined orientation-----------------------------
orientation='inclined':%assume equatorial position
flatFlactor=l: %oapplicable tor only 'flat' orientation. should be or 0.5
disp('inclined. 0.014%)
Txpe = char('a-Si'.'lnP'.'GaAs'):
a=size(T pe, 1):
for indr= 1 :a( 1 ) %# of clements in Type
cellType = deblank(TlVpe(indr.:)):
lor indc = 1 :length(Pox\ ers)
solarPowerPomers(indc):
I arrayMass. sizePanel l-=surfaceSolarPower(solarPower.cellType.planet.litfe.orientation.flatf actor):
structureMass = (sizePanel/64)*50*2: %[kgl. each panel is 8 x 8m and weight of support triangle is 50 kg. two support
triangles are used for each panel
S stemMass(indr,inde)=arravMass+struetureMass+FuelCellsMass: %eaeh rovk of matrix contains mass lbr one type of solar
cel for different power levels
So liarArray Nlass( i ndr. indc)=arra Mlass:
PArea( indr .inde )=sizePlanel:
end
end
% S stemMass(:.2)=SystemMass(:.2)+FuelCellsMass: 'adding batters mass for hah power system assuming that for ISRUJ and
ATV plants no batteries are needed
o ISRU and ATVs are operatedcharged only during day
°o-----plot shok ing mass of solar+batteries power sx stem and area of solar arrays -----
fiw:ure
plot( Po-m ers./! I 000. PArea(2 .:).'-go')
grid on
xlabel('Power [kW ')
ylabel('lP Array Area I m"2I')
title('Area s Po\er fr inclined Inl' solar panels and dust loss of 0.014% / sol')
figuure
plot( Powers.! I 000.SvstemMass'./ I 000.'-o')
grid on
title('Mass vs Power or inclined solar panels and dust loss of 0.014%O / sol')
xlabel('Power [kW ')
ylabcl('Solar Poxer Plant Mass Itonnesl')
° mass estimates for nuclear
0%6MNTl or 10kWV
% 6.42E+03 or 50 kW
o 7.90F-+03 for 100 kW
o% 1.20F0 +4 fo)r 200 kW
hold on
plot([10() 50 100l,[6 6.42 7.91'-k " )
leend( 'a-Si'.' In P'.'GaAs'.'nuclear' )
%interpolating to get nuclear data corresponding to solar power levels
nuclearNass( )=((6420-6000)/(50-10))*(Powers( 1)/1000-1 0)+6000: %'getting mass for nuclear corresponding to first power level
nuclearMass(2 )= ((6420-6000)/(50-10))*( Powers(2)/1000- l 0)+6000:
nuclearMass(3 )= (( 12000-7900)/(200- 100))*((solarPowerForl lab+Al VchargePow er+ISR Jpov er)/1000-100)4-7900:
X I =[( System Nlass( 2.:)./ 1000)'. (nuclearMNass./1 000)' ]:
figure
bar(XI )
title('Power SN stem Mass: Nuclear and inclined InP panels with dust loss of 0.014% /soI')
ylabel('mietric tonnes')
leL:end('solar'.'nuclear')
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set(gca.'XTIickLabel'. 'lab':'Hab & AT Vs':'Hab. ATVs & ISRU')
% -- ---------------- flat orientation. with 0.28°O/SOI dust degradation (Pathfinder case)-----------------------------
orientation=' flat' : /%,assume equatorial position
flatFactor=l: %applicable for only 'lat' orientation. should be I or 0.5
disp('flat. with 0.28°%' dust')
Type = char('a-Si'.'lnP'.'GaAs'):
a=si7e(IType. I ):
tor indr = I :a( 1 ) %# of elements in Ts pe
celITs pe = deblank(T pe(indr.: )):
for indc= :length(Powers)
solarPower=Powers( indc ):
[array Mlass. sizelanell=surfaceSolarPower(solarPower.celll'ype.planet.life.orientation.flatFactor):
structureMass = (sizePanel/64)*50*2: %[kg]. each panel is 8 x 8m and weight of support triangle is 50 kg. two support
triangles are used for each panel
SystemMNlas,,s( indr.indc)l=arra? Nfass+structureMass+FuelCellsMass: 'oeach row of matrix contains mass for one type of solar
cell fo)r different power levels
SolarArra? Mass( indr.indc )=arrav Mass:
PArea( indr. i ndc)=sizcP'anel:
end
end
% SystemMass(:.2)=SystemMass(:.2)+FuelCellsMass: %adding batter mass for hab power system assuming that for ISRLI and
A'IV plants no batteries are needed
O' ISRUIJ and ATVs are operated/charged only during day
% ----- plot showing mass of solar+batteries power system and area of solar arrays -----
fig(ure
plot( Powers./ 1000. PArea(2.:).'-go')
grid on
xlabel('t'ower [W]')
?label('InP Array Area [m'2]')
title('Area vs Pokker for flat InP solar panels and dust loss of 0.28o8% / sol')
figure
plot(Po. ers./1000.S-stemMass'./1000,'-o')
grid on
titlc('Mass vs Power for flat solar panels and dust loss of 0.28%O sol')
xlabel('Povker [kW]')
y label('Solar Po\wer Plant Mass [tonnes]')
gO mass estimates for nuclear
%" 6 NIT fr 10 kW\
% 6.42 E+03 for 50 kW
%O 7.90E+03 for 100 kW
9 I .20E+04 lor 200 kW
hold on
plot([10 5 1001.16 6.42 7.91.'-k"')
legend('a-Si'.'InP'.'GaAs'.'nuclear')
X2= I( SvstemMass( 2.: )./ 1000)'. (nuclearMass./1 000)']:
f izure
bar(X2)
title('Poser Sy stem Mass: Nuclear and flat InP panels with dust loss of 0.28%/sol')
ylabel('mrietric tonnes')
legend('solar'.'nuclear')
sel(gca.'XTickLabel'., "'Hab':'Hab & ATVs':'Hab, ATVs & ISRUJ'})
% ---------------------- flat orientation. xvith 0. 14%/sol dust degradation -----------------------------
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orientation='flat':%assume equatorial position
flatFactor=0.5: %applicable for only 'flat' orientation. should be I or 0.5
disp('flat. with 0.14°% dust')
Type = char('a-Si'.'lnP'.'GjaAs'):
a=size(T pe. I):
For indr= 1 :a( 1) °O# of elements in Type
cellTNpe = deblank(Type, indr,:)):
for indc=l :length(Powers)
so I arlPow er- Pok ers( indc):
[array Mass. sizePanel]:=suraceSolarPo er( solarPower.cellType.planet. life.orientation. latFactor):
structureMass = (sizePanel/64)*50*2: °%[kg], each panel is 8 x 8m and weight of support triangle is 50 kg. two support
triangles arc used for each panel
SystcmMass(indr.iindc)=arravNiMass+structureMass+FuelCellsM/lass: %,each row of matrix contains mass for one type of solar
cell for different po\er levels
SolarArra vMass(indr. inidc)=arra\ Mass:
PArca( indr.indc)=sizePancl:
end
enl
0O SystemMass( .2)=SystemMass(:.2)+FuelCellsMass: %adding battery mass for hab power system assuming that for ISRU and
A']l'V plants no batteries are needed
%O ISRU and ATVs are operated/charged onl\ during da\
% o----plot showing mass of solar+batteries power system and area of solar arrays -----
figure
plot(PosN ers./ 000.PArea(2.:),'-go')
grid on
xlabel('Power [kW]')
) label('InP ArraN Area [m"2]')
title('Area vs Power for tfiat nP solar panels and dust loss of 0.14% / sol')
fiure
plot( Pov, ers./1000.S? stemM[ass'./1000,'-o')
grid on
title('Mass vs Power for flat solar panels and dust loss of 0.14% / sol')
xlabel('Power [kWi')
label('Solar Po\ er Plant Mass [tonnes]')
0o mass estimates for nuclear
%O 6 MT for 10kW
°o 6.42E+03 for 50 kW
00 7.90E+03 for 100 kW'
%o 1.20E+04 for 200 kW
hold on
plot(J 10 50 100.[6 6.42 7.91.'-k`)
lecgend('a-Si'.'InP '.'a.s','nuclear')
X3.=I( SystemMass( 2.:)./ 1000)'. (nuclearMass./ 1000)' 1:
Iiure
bar(X3)
titlc('Power System Mass: Nuclear and flat nP panels with dust loss of 0.14'%/sol')
ylabcl('metric tonnes')
legend('solar'.'nuclear')
set(gca.'XTickLabel'. 'Hah':'Hab & ATVs':'Hab, ATVs & ISRUI')
.O- --------------------- flat orientation. with 0.01 4%/sol dust degradation-----------------------------
orientation='llat':°%assumne e(luatorial position
lfiatFactor=0.05: oapplicable for onlb 'flat' orientation, should be I or 0.5
disp('flat. wvith 0.014°o dust')
Type = char('a-Si','lnP'.'GaAs'):
a=size('[ vpe. I):
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for indr= :a( ) %# of elements in Type
cellType = deblank(Type( indr.:)):
bfor indc= :length(Powers)
solarPower=Powcrs( indc):
[arra Mass. sizePanel.mnass. PDACmass]=surtfaceSolarPlower(solarPower.cell'I'vpe.planet. li fe.orientation. flatFactor):
structureMass = (sizePanel/64)*50*2: °o[kg]. each panel is 8 x 8m and weight of support triangle is 50 kg. two support
triangles are used for each panel
if indr-2 %"lnP casc
solarPo\ er
arra\ Mass
structureMass
mass omass of solar blanket plus thermal control
PDACmass
sizePanel
end
SvstemMass( indr.indc})=arravMass+structureMNlass+FuelCellsMass: oeach roxv of matrix contains mass for one type of solar
cell tfor different power levels
SolarArrayMass(indr. indc)=arrav Mass:
PArea( indr.indc)=size'anel:
end
end
S stemMass(:.2)=SrstemMass(:.2)+FuelCellsMass: %adding batter,, mass for hab power system assuming that lFor ISRI and
A'lV plants no batteries arc needed
% ISRII and A 'Vs are operated/charged only during da
%o-----plot showing mass of solar+batteries power s stem and area of solar arrays -----
figure
plot(Powers./ I 000.PArea(2.:)'-o')
grid on
xlatbel('Power [kW ')
xlabel('lnl' Arrax Area [mrn2l' )
title('Area s Power tor flat InP solar panels and dust loss of 0.014% / sol')
figure
plot( PoA ers./ I 000.SvstemMass'./I 000.'-o')
grid on
titlc('Mass vs Power for flat solar panels and dust loss of 0.014% / sol')
xlabel('Power IkW]')
ylabel('Solar Powker Plant Mass [tonnes]')
0o mass estimates For nuclear
o%6MT for 10 kW
°o 6.421.+03 for 50 kW
°o 7.90E+03 for I0(0 kW
0 l1.20E+04 lor 200 kW
hold on
plot([l0 50 1001.[6 6.42 7.9 .'-k'"')
leLgend('a-Si'.'n'nP'.'GaAs''nuclear')
X4=( SystemMass(2.: )./1000)'. (nuclearNlass./1000)' 1:
figure
bar(X4)
title('Power Sstem Mass: Nuclear and flat InP panels with dust loss of 0.0140/o/sol')
5 label(''metric tonnes')
lcgcnd('solar'.'nuclear')
set(ca.'X'l'ickl.abel'. {'l lab':'l lab & AVs':'Iab. AVs & ISRU'} )
%---------------------- flat orientation. with MEIR dust degradation-----------------------------
orientation='ME/IR'-%assiumt equatorial position
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flatEactor=l: %applicable for only 'flat' orientation. should be I or 0.5
disp('flat. with MER dust')
Type = char('a-Si','lnP'G.aAs'):
a=siz7e([ype. ):
for indr= I :a( ) O# of elements in Type
cellType = deblank(Type(indr.:)):
For indc lc= 1:length(Po~ ers)
solarPower=Powers( indc):
[array Mass. sixePanel.mass. PD)ACmass]=surtaceSolarPower( solarPox er.cel ITv pe.planet. li fe.orientation. flatF actor):
structureMass = (sizePanel/64)*50*2: %o[kg], each panel is 8 x 8m and weight of support triangle is 50 kg to support
triangles are used for cach panel
if indr==2 %olnP case
solarIPower
array Mass
structureMass
mass 0omass of solar blanket plus thermal control
PDACmass
sizePanel
end
SystemNlass(indr. indc )=array /lass+structureMass+FuelCellsM/lass: °,each rok of matrix contains mass for one tpe of solar
cell for different poxer levels
SolarArraM Nass(indr, indc)=array Mass:
PArea( indr. indc )=sizePanel:
end
end
% SystemMass(:.2)=SvstemMass(:.2)+FuelCellsMass: %adding battery mass for hab power system assuming that for ISRU and
A IV plants no batteries are needed
°O' ISRIJ and ATVs are operated/charged only during day
% .-----plot showing mass of solar+batteries power systemn and area of solar arrays -----
ficure
plot(Powers./1 000, PArea(2.: ).'-go')
grid on
xlabel('Power [kW\')
\label('InP Arrax Area [m^2]')
title('Arca vs Power for flat nP solar panels and dust loss of MER')
fi:ure
plot(Powers./1000,Sy stemMass'./1000,'-o')
grid on
tit'le('Mass vs Power for flat solar panels and dust loss of MER')
xlabel('Pover [kWl')
ylahel('Solar Power Plant Mass [tonnes]')
Io mass estimates otbr nuclear
%o 6 MT for 10 kW
% 6.42Fi+03 tor 50 kW
% 7.90E+03 for 100 kW
% 1o .20E-+04 for 200 kW
hold on
plot( 10 50 100].[6 6.42 7.91.'-k ' )
leenid( 'a-Si'.'InP'.',GaAs.',nuclear' )
X6=( Sy stem MNass( 2.:)./1000)'. (nuelearMass./ 1000)' 1:
fiure
bar(X6)
title('Power S stem Mass: Nuclear and flat InP panels with dust loss of MNER')
ylabel('mctric tonnes')
leg'end('solar'.'nuclear')
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set(gca,'XTicklabcl'. {'Hab':'Hab & ATVs':'Hab. ATVs & ISRU' )
X5 = [X4(:,1 ).X6(:,I).X(:.2)]: %assembling matrix for plotting combined graph
fiourc
bar(X5)
ylabel('metric tonnes')
legend( 'solar 0.014%o/sol dust loss (flat)','30%/ overall dust loss (MER)'.'nuclear')
scl(ca.'XTicklabel'. "I'lab':'[lab & ATVs:'Hlab. ATVs & ISRU')
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marsflux.m - This MatLab model calculates the mean solar flux over a Martian day at the Martian surface
depending on the latitude, aerocentric longitude, elevation mask, and atmospheric optical depth.
function meanflux = marstlux(lat. Ls. el tau)
% function marstlux(lat, Ls. el. tau)
% Computes average daily solar flux on MNars surface under dust conditions.
% Night time is already averaged in. Cosine losses due to a flat solar
% panel are NOl' included... these are the values ou would get by tracking
% the sun perfectl?.
'oo
%' lat -- latitude of ground point (degrees. negativec for south)
% ls -- aerocentric longitude (degrees. 0 = vernal equinox. 90 =
°o northern summer). The value of Ls also decides the distance of
%O Mars from the sun (closest at Ls = 253 degrees)
'!o el -- elevation mask (degrees, sunlight cuts off below value)
%o tau -- atmospheric optical depth (dimensionless)
°o 0.1 - 0.5 clear
"% 0.5 - 2.0 dusty
" 2.0 - 5.0 dust storm
%O Conversion factors
deg = piil 80:
O% Convert inputs to radians
Ls = Ls * deg:
lat = lat * deg:
elrnask = pi/2-el*deg: %, max angle from zenith
% Astronomical constants
inc = 25.2 * deg: % obliquitV of Mars to its orbit plane
rp = 1.381398: 9 perihelion (AtJ)
ra = 1.666984: ° aphelion (AU)
lonrp = 253 * deg: longitude of perihelion from vernal equinox (epoch 1980)
fluxau -= 1371: %)o solar flux at I AU (W/m2)
O Compute approximate distance from the sun based on Ls (season). Note
°o that this sinusoidal approximation does not take into account the fact
% that Mars is moving faster near aphelion and that the duration of the
% seasons is affected... so don't trx to do vearly aerage fluxes.
ramp = (rp - ra) /2:
r ave = (rp + ra)/2:
r = rave+r amp * cos(Ls- lon rp):
% Lookup table of flux lfraction based on theta and tau
thtvalues = 10:15*deg:75*deg 90*degl: % theta (incidence angle from vertical)
tauvalues = [0:0.5:5]: % tau
[thtgrid.taugrid] = meshgrid( thtvalues. tau_values):
°, data read from Shane Byrne plot... last column extrapolated (to go bey ond
9 75 degrees incident angle without crashing interp2)
ffr;ic= [.0) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0:
0.96 0.955 (0.94 0.91 0.85 0.72 0.63:
0.91 0.90 0.875 0.825 0.735 0.59 0.5:
0.85 0.84 0.805 0.75 0.655 0.52 0.41:
0.785 0.775 0.74 0.68 0.58 0.47 0.38:
0.72 0.71 0.68 0.61 0.52 0.42 0.34:
0.66 0.65 0.615 0.55 0.47 0.38 0.31:
0.601) 0.59 0.555 0.5 0.42 0.35 0.28:
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0.55 0.54 0.5 0.45 0.38 0.32 0.26:
0.5 0.49 0.46 0.40 0.34 0.285 0.23:
0.45 0.44 0.41 0.37 0.305 0.27 0.21]:
% compute sun vector in MCI frame based on season (Ls)
sun = [cos(Ls) sin(Ls)*cos(inc) sin(Ls)*sin(inc)]:
°o Note: rotation vector of M/lars in MCI is always [0 0 1]
%o compute path of ground point during one sol
phi= [:dcg:359*degl':
ground = cos(phi).*cos( lat) sin(phi).*cos(lat) sin( lat)*ones(sizc(phi) )J:
'o compute angle between ground point vector (i.e. normal) and sun vector
theta = acos(ground(:.1 ). * sun( I )+ground( :.2 ).*sun(2 )+ground( :.3 ).*sun(3 ) ):
0 compute flux tfraction at surtace, based on tau
inight = find(theta > enask):
ida = tfind(thcta <= elrnask):
fluxfrac(inight) = 0:
if length(ida?) > 0). oo don't bother calculating if in perpetual darkness
fli xfrac(i da ) = interp2( thigrid.taugrid. fl'frac.theta( i_da? ).tau*ones(size(theta( i_da 3 ))).'cubic'):
cnd
00 compute total flux (going from dimensionless fraction to W/m2)
maxflux = flux au / (r * r):
flux = maxflux * fluxfrac:
o I' wve wanted to take into account cosine losses from a ixed panel (e.g.
% laying flat on the ground],. this is where we would factor those in. based
°o on theta abovc.
00 lfind the mean and return it
Da. inhrs=length( ida? )/( length( inight)+length( i_day ))*24
meanflux = sum(flux)/length( i day)
I0 plot it all up
plot( (0:1/'359:11. flux.'k.'):
xlabel('time of day (dimensionless)'):
ylabel('Surface Flux (W'rn2)' ):
title(sprinttf('Latitude °o. If deg, Ls = %/. f deg, tau = %.2. el mask %O. f deg'...
lat'deg, Ls/deg, tau. el)):
hold on:
grid of:
plot( [0 I . [meantl ux meanflux].'r:'):
h text(0.5.meanflux,sprintf('Da\time average flux = %.OfW/m2' meanflux)):
set(h,'VerticalAlignment'.'bottom'.'HorizontalAlignmient'.'center')
plot( [ I .[maxftlux maxlux.'b:'):
h -:: text(0.5,maxflux, sprintll'Orbital flux = %.0f W/m'2'. maxflux))
set( h.'VerticalAl ignment'.'top'.'lorizontalAlignment'.'center' )
hold off.
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Appendix B: Pilgrim Preoperational and Startup Procedures
All of the information in this Appendix is from the Volume 1I1, Section 13 of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power
Station Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 16 prepared by the Boston Edison Company in February
of 1970.
Preoperational Tests
Three sets of tests are performed prior to startup as part of the preoperational test program. These
tests are the construction tests, formal preoperational tests, and the acceptance tests. The constructions
tests are to determine if equipment and systems are complete and could be put into operation as
construction inishes in other areas of the plant. The formal preoperational tests calibrate systems
associated with nuclear safety to the extent possible in the empty plant. Acceptance tests check the
condition of other systems and equipment not associated with nuclear safety to prepare for initial fuiel
loading and startup.
The construction tests are as follows:
1. Containment over pressure test
2. System hydrostatic tests
3. Cleaning, flushing, and leak testing of piping and equipment
4. Nondestructive testing of field welds
5. Wiring continuity checks
6. Megger tests
7. Electrical system tests
8. Initial adjustment and bumping of motors
9. Check control and interlock functions to verify wiring and/or pneumatic tubing
10. Pneumatic test of instrument and service air system and blow out of lines
t11. Equipment adjustments
12. Motor-operated and air-operated valve tests
13. Verify installation of main steam flow restrictors, control rod drive (CRD) housing
support, reactor vessel (RV) stabilizers, and pipe hangers, component
restraints, and expansion joints
The test on the electrical system includes checking grounding and continuity of the wiring,
checking circuit breaker operation and controls, and megger tests. Adjustments made to the equipment
prepare the equipment for operation, such as alignment, lubrication of equipment, and tightening of bolts.
The tests on the motor-operated valves include adjusting limit torque switches and limit switches,
measuring operation speed, and checking leak-tightness of stem packing and valve seating during hydro-
tests. The tests on the air-operated valves are very similar, these tests include pilot solenoids, adjusting
limit switches, measuring operating speed, checking leak tightness of stem packing and valve seat during
hydro-tests, and checking leak-tightness of pneumatic operators.
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Next, the formal preoperational tests are as follows:
1. DC Power Systems
2. AC Power Systems
3. Control Rod Drive Hydraulic and Manual Control Systems
4. Salt Service Water System
5. Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System
6. Core Spray System
7. Residual Heat Removal System (RHR)- Shutdown and Cooling Mode
8. RHR-- Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Mode
9. RHR- Containment Spray Mode
10. RHR - Suppression Pool Cooling Mode
11. Standby Liquid Control
12. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
13. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)
14. Reactor Recirculation System
15. Liquid Radwaste System
16. Primary Containment Leak Rate
17. Control Rod Drivers
18. Reactor Protection System, Primary Containment and RV Isolation and Control System,
and Core Standby Cooling System
19. Neutron Monitoring System
20. Fuel-Handling System
21. Reactor Level Control
22. Standby Gas Treatment and Reactor Building Leak Rate
23. Roclworth Minimizer and Position Indication
24. Nuclear System - Pressure Relief
25. Nuclear System Leak Detection
26. Standby AC Power System Tests
27. Main Steam, Offgas, Main Stack, and Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitoring
Systems
28. Area Cooling for Safeguards Equipment and Main Control Room Environmental
Control
Tests on the power systems, both DC and AC, involve checking and calibrating the major
electrical components of those systems. Two tests relate to leak testing, the primary containment leak rate
test, and the nuclear system leak detection test. The primary containment leak rate test checks the
containment and isolation valves at two different pressures. The nuclear system leak detection test checks
and/or calibrates the pressure and temperature sensors for monitoring primary containment, flow elements
for measuring flow rates from drywell equipment and floor sumps, the temperature sensors for main
steam line leak detection and on drywell coolers, and the vessel head seal-leak-off system.
Three of these tests relate to the control rods, the CRD hydraulic and manual control systems, the
control rod drivers, and the rodworth minimizer and position indication test. The CRD hydraulic and
manual control system test involves performance checks and/or calibration of pumps, instrumentation,
flow control valves. interlocks, alarms, controls, control rod selection relays and valves, and all scram
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valves and solenoids. Next, the control rod drivers test practices control rod stroking, times the stroke,
sets the drive speed, sets proper position indicators, and tests control rod scram for timing purposes and to
check the safety circuit system. Lastly, the rodworth minimizer and position indication test verifies the
computer control of the control rods by simulating control rod movement and comparing position data
with computer logged position data. In addition, the computer control system is checked and interlocks
are verified.
The neutron monitoring system test comprehensively checks all components of the neutron
monitors. In the Pilgrim plant there are five main neutron monitors: the short range monitor (SRM),
intermediate range monitor (IRM), local power range monitor (LPRM), average power range monitor
(APRM), and traversing in-core probe (TIP) systems. The monitors measure neutron flux by in-core
detectors, which are connected to the reactor protection system. The SRM and IRM provide flux level
indications during reactor startup and low power operation. The APRM and LPRM assess local and
overall flux conditions during power range activities. In addition to the checks of the neutron monitors,
the wiring to and from the monitors are checked for proper operation.
The last set of preoperational tests is the acceptance tests. These are the following tests:
1. Electrical System Test, Normal Auxiliaries
2. Domestic and Makeup Water System
3. Instrument and Service Air System
4. Fire Protection
5. Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water
6. Chlorination System
7. Screen Wash System
8. Circulating Water System
9. Condensate Demineralizer Regeneration
10. Condensate and Feedswater System
I 1. Reactor Vessel (RV) Instrumentation
12. Reactor Cleanup System
13. Drywell Cooling System
14. Area and Process Radiation Monitoring Systems
15. Solid Radwaste Systems
16. Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering
17. Heating Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
18. Turbine Extraction Steamrn
19. Lube Oil Purification
20. Gland Steam System
2 1. Teanm Air Ejector
22. Generator Cooling System
23. Isolated Phase Bus Cooling System
24. Turbine Generator Protection System
25. Station Heating Boilers
26. Process Computer
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The instrument and service air system test verifies the dew point of the instrument air system,
checks and calibrates all of the instrumentation, and performs an operational check of the entire system.
The reactor vessel instrumentation test verifies the instrumentation on the reactor vessel that is not related
to nuclear safety or contained within other control systems. The area and process radiation monitoring
systems tests checks and calibrates all radiation-monitoring instrumentation no related to nuclear safety
such as area monitors and personnel monitors. Lastly, the process computer test checks all hardware,
software, and periphery equipment for the balance of plant and nuclear steam supply system.
Startup Tests
After all of the preoperational tests and construction has been completed, the reactor startup and
power tests can be performed. This test program includes fuel loading and tests at atmospheric pressure.
the heat up from ambient temperature and pressure, then raising the reactor from rated temperature to
100% power. Initial fuel loading and critical testing are performed at approximately zero power with the
reactor pressure vessel open. Zero power means criticality has been obtained but there is no net heat
production [30]. Rated temperature is the expected, and licensed, operating temperature.
Table B- displays the fuel loading and atmospheric pressure tests and a brief description of each
test. These tests are the first set of tests that characterize the reactor in terms of the nuclear properties.
Table B-I: Fuel Loading and Atmospheric Pressure Tests
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Test or System Tested Description
Chemical and radiochemical Test the water at different points to establish initial water
tests conditions. In addition, background radioactivity levels are
determined for use in fuiel assembly failure detection.
Control rod drive system All drives are tested before fuel loading to confirm proper
operability, and measure and adjust operating speed. Once
zero reactor pressure is reached after fuel loading, the drive
line friction and scram times are determined.
Vibration measurements Vibration measurements are taken at cold flow conditions to
determine the vibrational characteristics of the reactor vessel
internals.
Fuel loading This is performed according to systematic written procedures.
Control curtains are in place and all neutron sources are
installed.
Shutdown margin The shutdown margin is demonstrated periodically during
fuiel loading. The shutdown margin is the amount of reactivity
that would have to be added to a subcritical core to become
critical given the single highest worth control rod withdrawn.
Once the zero power criticality tests have been performed, the reactor head is installed. A
hydrostatic test is performed on the reactor vessel confirm the vessel has been sealed. The reactor vessel
gradually pressurizes to rated pressure by the universal gas law and active reactor pressure control. The
following are the tests associated with the heat tip from ambient to rated temperature and pressure:
. IRM Calibration
2. SRM performance
3. Reactor vessel temperatures
4. System expansion
5. Control Rod Drive
6. Control Rod Sequence
7. Radiation measurements
8. Chemical and radiochemical checks
9. Main steamline isolation valve fiunctional tests
1 0. Core performance evaluations
11. Reactor pressure control
The first test, IRM calibration, is a recalibration of the IRM neutron monitors by correlating the
IRM readings with the known heat input to the reactor coolant from a non-nuclear heat source. The
correlation is proportionality determined by measuring the pump heating and nuclear heating, which
result in a temperature increase in the reactor coolant. The control rod drive system is again tested for
scram times and drive line friction at two intermediate pressures during heat uip and at rated reactor
pressure once obtained. The drive times of selected rods are also measured. Core performance
evaluations, including a reactor heat balance at rated temperature, are made at the end of the heat Uip
process.
The very last part of the startup process is ramping to full power. The reactor power is increased
in increments of 25% power through control rod withdrawal. Tests are performed at each 25% power
increment with the last tests at 100% power. The following are these tests:
1. Chemical and radiochemical tests
2. Radiation measurements
1 33
Control rod sequences The control rods are withdrawn in a specified sequence to
bring the reactor to criticality. The reactivity addition rates
are measured during these sequences and the preselected
sequence may be modified meet safety and operating criteria.
Source Range Monitor(SRM) The performance of the SRMs is determined by data from
Performance operational neutron sources. During operation. SRMs are
calibrated and performance is determined by criteria on noise,
signal-to-noise ratio, and response to core reactivity changes.
Intermediate Range Monitor The IRMs are initially calibrated in the overlap region with
(IRM) Calibration the SRM to provide extra protection during this phase.
Process Computer Verification of process variable signals is performed by the
.__ _ computer and system performance calculations are checked.
3. Vibration measurements (if necessary)
4. System expansion tests
5. Main steam isolation valve
6. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system
7. HPCI system
8. Recirculation pump trips
9. Flow control
10. Turbine trip tests
11. Generator trip tests
12. Pressure regulator tests
13. Bypass valve measurements
14. Feedwater pump trip
15. Flux response
16. LPRM Calibrations
1 7. APRV[ calibrations
18. Core performance evaluations
19. Calibrations of control rods
20. Axial power distribution measurements
21. Rod pattern exchanges
22. IRM calibration
23. Auxiliary power loss tests
24. Electrical output and heat rate tests
Many of the tests are functional and operational tests on important systems. The IRM, LPRM.
and APRM are all calibrated for operation. The IRM is calibrated for the overlap region with the APRM,
which in turn is calibrated by reactor heat balances calculated during significant power level changes. The
LPRM is calibrated to measure local fuel rod surface heat flux by use of the TIP system at 50%, 75%, and
100% power. The control rods are also calibrated to set the reference relationships between rod
movements, reactor power, and steam flow.
Other tests ifurther characterize the reactor. Flux response to control rod movements, for example,
is examined during equilibrium and transient conditions. This data allows the measurement of steady state
and verifies the power-void loop stability. The axial power distribution is measured by the TIP system
after changes in power, coolant flow rate. or control rod patter. Core performance evaluations are also
conducted periodically to show local surface heat flux and the critical heat flux ratio is within acceptable
limits.
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